Genc Greva on Wed, 30 Sep 1998 18:33:28 +0200 (MET DST) |
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<nettime> Pyramid Schemes: Albania 1996-1998 |
[Even more than a year after the main events, the Albanian pyramid schemes are still particularly interesting. Due to the specific historical conditions the connection between speculative capitalism, the criminal economy and authoritarian political regimes appear in unusual radicality and transparency. While the specifics are singular and unusual, similar dynamics, albeit more behind closed doors, have lead to collapse of the Russian financial system, and fuel the ups and downs of the financial markets every day.] >Pyramid schemes all over. The Albanian Experience. Following the elections of May 26, 1996 -- widely denounced as irregular by the international community and the national independent media -- the situation in Albania deteriorated very quickly. Seeking political benefit, the government of the Democratic Party (the 'DP', which illegitimately won about 90% of the seats in the Parliament) allowed the rise of strange structures called "charity foundations". These structures were pyramid schemes, initially little more than money laundering. The political euphoria spread very quickly to all levels of Albanian society, and in a few months time almost everybody was putting money into these get-rich-quick schemes. It is estimated that close to $1.5 billion had been invested in more than ten schemes offering interest rates ranging from 10 to 25 per cent per month. The average monthly income is only some $80. About 500,000 of Albania's 3.2 million population invested in the schemes. People sold their houses, property or land to invest the proceeds in the pyramids, while economic emigrants working in neighbouring countries -- Greece and Italy -- withdrew money from their bank accounts to transfer it to the schemes in Albania. A large numbers of Albanians invested their life-savings and more. Trying to maximize their benefit, the DP avoided any information about the functioning of such structures -- in the beginning they ignored, and later forced the governor of the Albanian National Bank to stop warning about the dangers of such structures. Of course the danger was eminent. The schemes paid interest to early investors with the capital of later investors, a system which could only last as long as increasing numbers of people continued to invest. However, the schemes became so massively popular that anyone who said a word against them would appear opposed to the entire nation. In October 1996, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned of the danger, even the opposition parties preferred to say nothing. They only condemned the ruling party for using pyramid profits in last year's election campaign. In some elections posters in southern Albania, the names of powerful sponsors - pyramid bosses - appeared beside the names of Democratic Party candidates. "The people's money was spent on buying votes," says the opposition Social Democratic Party's leader, Skender Gjinushi. The schemes started wobbling in autumn 1996, when some began cutting their interest rates and placing restrictions on their investors, for example allowing withdrawal of interest but not capital. The continued operation of the schemes was dependent largely on confidence; once this was shaken, new investment dried up. By mid-December, two of the smaller schemes had collapsed and questions were being asked about the major schemes in which tens of millions had been invested. Having been assured in advance by the government and the President about the legitimacy of the schemes, people's anger towards the government and the DP started to rise. With the fall of one of the important schemes involving the south of Albania, the revolt burst out and sparked the political and social crisis. On January 7, the Democratic Alliance Party (DAP) accused Berisha's Democratic Party of misusing investment funds to finance its 1996 election campaigns, and declared that 'the collapse of the schemes has started.' This may have proved, in part at least, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Two days later, the major Malvasia scheme in Kucova declared itself bankrupt. On the afternoon of January 15, 1997 battle erupted in Albania. The first stones were thrown by angry people who had put their money into failed investment scheme. Traget was first the private residence of a woman called Suda, a promoter of one of the schemes. The government's initial response, on January 14, was to issue a decree limiting the amount any single investor could withdraw from the schemes to $300,000 per day. This was clearly intended to prevent a run on the schemes. But its effect was to hit confidence further and to focus anger onto the government. This anger was expressed at a major demonstration in Tirana on January 19, organized by the Socialist Party and other opposition groups. The government tried to suppress it by police brutality, thus heightening tension. As the protests spread across the country, the government blamed the opposition and cracked down hard, arresting protesters and imposing severe jail sentences and fines on them. But it was also clear that the government had to be seen to be acting against the schemes. On January 21, it announced a commission to investigate them and seized the assets of some. Two days later, it banned pyramid schemes altogether and arrested the leaders of some major ones. At the same time, it also arrested the leaders of various opposition groups whom it blamed for inciting the trouble. The trouble worsened thereafter, with major demonstrations on the weekend of January 25-26. Fighting was reported between protesters and police in Tirana. The cities became a battleground for demonstrators and riot police, and dozens of government buildings were burned or destroyed. The most dramatic and violent scenes were in the towns of Lushnja, Berat and Vlora, and in the capital, Tirana, where riot police attacked opposition leaders, journalists and protesters. But the epicenter of protest became the square in Vlora where, at the turn of the century, Albanians proclaimed their independence. Today, Vlora is known as the capital of the pyramid schemes, because most of them originated there. It was Albania's most serious crisis since the fall of communism in 1991. The military was deployed in order to guard public buildings and keep the peace, despite doubts as to whose side they might take. It was after these protests that the government was forced to promise investors that they would get their money back. The problem is that the assets the government has seized from schemes is thought to total an estimated $300,000, while losses are around $1 billion, about four times the amount of the country's foreign currency reserves at the time. The Albanian currency, the lek, meanwhile lost some 35 percent of its value on the currency black market. It quickly became clear that even then, most investors would receive only about 30-50 percent of the amount they invested, and most of that could be in government bonds rather than in cash. Even then the cash would be in the fast-fading lek rather than the US dollars that many of the schemes had demanded from investors. As the situation worsened the DP, instead of calling for new elections, declared the state of emergency. With this, they completely isolated Albania from the rest of the world. They decided to ban the frequencies of the radio-stations, close all newspapers and take over all the previously mentioned local TV stations. Fortunately, the closure of the satellite frequencies lasted only 48 hours. People started to look for radios on the shortwave frequencies, which couldn't be banned. But the newspapers remained closed for more than one month and the office of the biggest independent newspaper "Koha Jone" -- supported by the Soros fundation -- was burned down by the secret police. During this time, e-mail remained one of the most important sources of information, unfortunately with very little access. There was only one server in the country, UNDP, which was part of an experimental program meant to give NGOs and universities access. Few institutions could make use of an AOL account, which was very expensive as they had to make an international call to Switzerland. It is believed that outgoing e-mail from the UNDP server was monitored. In the meantime, the West appeared more concerned with the danger of a mass exodus and that Albania could become the drugs capital of Europe, than with the absence of political freedom in the country. The Albanian government reacted more strongly to accusations of its ministers' involvement in arms-smuggling and drug-trafficking, than to criticism from human rights organisations about the beating or intimidation of opposition leaders and journalists. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had sent envoy Franz Vranitzky, former prime minister of Austria, to mediate an agreement between President Sali Berisha and the opposition. Both sides agreed to a government of national reconciliation under Socialist Prime Minister Bashkim Fino and to early elections. The Albanian authorities asked the international community to send in a multinational stabilization force, but the West European Union and NATO declined to take full responsibility. Instead, it was left to Italy, fearing mass immigration, to assemble a force for Operation Alba after receiving a UN mandate. Various other European countries--including France, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Romania, Austria and Denmark--participated in the contingent, which arrived in Albania in mid-April. The parliamentary elections in late June and early July 1997 proceeded without major incident, even though the Albanian government, assisted by the OSCE, had hardly two months to prepare for them. Despite fears to the contrary, the elections were a success and ultimately led to the restoration of at least a modicum of law and order. In 1998, the slow recovery process is still underway and the last schemes are being dismantled. Earlier in the year, the French auditing company Deloitte & Touche found that the VEFA investment company had only $7 million in assets after having received more than $300 million in from some 90,000 investors. If and how VEFA owner Vehbi Alimucaj has laundered $40 million into his private bank accounts in Greece is still being investigated. During all of that, most Albanians waited in vain for the return of their savings. All they are left with are memories of the grand gestures paid for with their money: of how the pyramid company Gjallica blew a million dollars on a Miss Europa contest in Tirana; how Vefa paid $450,000 for an advertisement on Eurosport; how Xhaferi paid $400,000 for an Argentinian football star to run the local team in Lushnja. Genc Greva --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@desk.nl and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@desk.nl