Newmedia on Fri, 18 Apr 1997 20:53:01 +0200 (MET DST) |
[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]
<nettime> The English Ideology and N. Catherine Hayles |
Folks: In the interest of explicating why the epistemology adopted by Hayles and her fellow "social constructionists" is, in fact, just the Yin to WIRED magazine's Yang (i.e. the "left" side of the same techno-utopian movement to which WIRED is the "right" side), I'd like to refer to some interesting passages in Leibniz' commentary on Hobbes and Locke. As you recall from my earlier essay, "The English Ideology and WIRED Magazine", Hobbes and Locke represent two of the more important constructors of the view which seeks to use technology to fundamentally reshape human affairs by re-defining humanity itself. This effort, which I have previously identified with the Enlightenment, reflected an ongoing factional battle within the oligarchy for control of future imperial ventures -- i.e. those which we now refer to as the Global/Tribal Information Age. What we have come to know as "liberal" is this Enlightenment-launched effort to champion "reason" over "faith" and, ultimately, to use "reason" to create technologies which would permit widescale social engineering -- i.e. the technocrats. Likewise, what we generally refer to as historically "conservative" is their opponents, those who gravitated to the "faith" side of this artificial split, the other principle oligarchist faction -- i.e. the aristocrats. Today, the conservatives are represented by fundamentalists of all stripes and the liberals are represented by techno-utopians of all stripes. Both are the oligarchist children of the Enlightenment, as I'm sure that you are all aware. In contemporary terms, "left" techno-utopians are the likes of George Soros (and his LSE mentor Karl Popper) and "right" techno-utopians are the likes of Louis Rossetto (and his LSE mentor Fred. von Hayek). As I have been cautioning, however, a technocrat is a liberal oligarchist and a fundamentalist is merely a conservative oligarchist -- both being none other than oligarchists in all essentials. And, as I have been suggesting, strategic thinking requires understanding the various forms that oligarchist politics (liberal/conservative and "left"/"right") takes shape -- lest we find ourselves merely choosing sides amongst oligarchist factions as we ourselves move into battle. Leibniz represents one of the principle anti-Enlightenment philosophers and therefore serves as a powerful foundation for understanding the origins of our present crisis while pointing the way towards solutions to the artificial split between reason and faith which has dominated Western history since roughly the 17th century. In this regard, a full-blown Leibniz revival is long over due. But, to the specifics of Hayles epistemology and it's association with Hobbes and Locke. "Social Constructionism" seems to hold that meaning is contingent on social conventions -- particularly on the highly variable use of language throughout history. As Hayles states, "A model of representation that declines the leap to abstraction figures itself as species-specific, culturally determined, and context-dependent." And, "The temptation to forget the complexities of this account and abstract to the shorthand is very strong. From such abstraction comes the belief that nature operates according to laws that are universally and impartially true. What is the harm in moving to the abstraction? The implications become clear when we look at what it leaves out of the account. Gone from view are the species specific position and processing of the observer; the context that conditions observation, even before conscious thought forms; and the dynamic interactive nature of the encounter." And, "Recognizing that scientific theories operate within the theater of representation, it emphasizes that meaning production is socially and linquistically constructed." I am suggesting that this identification of meaning with cultural context and conventions of language usage is, at root, Hobbesian. Hobbes, as you recall, in addition to his view of life as "war of all against all", is specifically remembered for his doctrine that, insofar as all truth depends on definitions, and definitions are arbitrary, so is truth: "True and false belong to speech, and not to things . . . The first truths are arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things"(Body, Man and Citizen, pp. 48-49). Hobbes would no doubt have approved Hayles' semiotic squares in which the position Truth is designated (unoccupied). In 1677, Leibniz composed a "Dialogue" which deals with this issue, from which the following excerpt is instructive (A: is Leibniz and B: is a student, while the "learned men" refers to Hobbes and his followers): "A: Certain learned men think that truth arises from decisions people make, and from names or characters. B: This view is quite paradoxical. A: But they prove it this way: Isn't a definition the starting place for a demonstration? . . . B: But what follows? There can be thoughts without words. A: But not without some other signs. See whether you can do any arithmetic calculation without numerical signs, I ask. B: I am very disturbed, for I didn't think that characters or signs were so necessary for reasoning. A: Therefore, the truths of arithmetic presuppose certain signs or characters? B: That must be admitted. A: Therefore, they depend on human decision. B: You seem to have trapped me through trickery, as it were. A: These views are not mine, but belong to quite an ingenous writer. . . . (After considerable careful work which involves the arbitrary substitution of various "signs" in a series of quadratic equations, Leibniz shows that the results do *not* depend on the "signs" which are choosen, and concludes by refuting Hobbes thusly:) . . . You see that, by whatever decision the characters are chosen, as long as a certain order and measure is observed in their use, everything will always agree. Therefore, although truths necessarily presuppose some characters, indeed, sometimes they deal with the characters themselves (as with the theorems about casting off of nines), truths don't consist in what is arbitrary in the characters, but in what is invariant in them, namely, in the relation they have to things." . . . (Leibniz, "Philosophical Essays" trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, pp. 269-272) I am further suggesting that Hayles' notion's that "we can only come in touch with the universe through particular sets of sensory apparatus" is, at root, a reformulation of Locke's notion of the "tabula rosa." Regarding Locke's formulation of the "tabula rosa" in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Leibniz wrote a rebutal called "New Essays on the Understanding" which includes this excerpt in its Preface: "Our differences are about subjects of some importance. There is the question about whether the soul in itself is completely empty like tablets upon which nothing has been written (tabula rosa), as Aristotle and the author of the "Essay" maintain, and whether everything inscribed on it comes solely from the senses and from experience, or whether the soul contains from the beginning the source of several notions and doctrines, which external objects awaken only on certain occasions, as I believe with Plato . . ." (op. cit. pp. 292) It should be obvious that if one wished to re-program humanity, then the Hobbesian notion of language would be very helpful (perhaps as Chomsky offered, there really is a built-in "programming language") and the Lockean idea that people are born with an empty slate to be filled in by social conditioners would be very helpful for eager brainwashers. And, now perhaps, upon some reflection, it is a little more obvious what we are up against. (I expressly forbid Bruce Sterling or any other H.G. Wells accolade from cross-posting this note to the WELL or any other related electronic hottub. All others should feel free to x-post as they see fit.) Mark Stahlman New Media Associates New York City newmedia@mcimail.com --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@icf.de and "info nettime" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@icf.de