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Syndicate: (1) Ethnicizing and Natosevic - the war and the lef |
From: "Arthur Bueno" <abueno@v2.nl> To: "syndicate" <syndicate@aec.at> Subject: Ethnicizing and Natosevic - the war and the left Date: Thu, 30 Dec 1999 17:57:37 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3110.5 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3110.3 >Date: Mon, 27 Dec 1999 16:32:42 +0200 >From: Alain Kessi <kessi@bitex.com> >Subject: Ethnicizing and Natosevic - the war and the left >I meant to send this earlier, but when I finished the translation a few >months ago I was temporarily unsubscribed from nettime and syndicate >because I was travelling. > >Alain > >-------- Original Message -------- > >[sorry for cross-posting to people who are on several lists i felt the >article might be relevant for. a word version is available for nice >print-out if you like.] > >i've finally (after a few months) managed to find the time to translate >the article on "the left and the war" that i wrote for com.une.farce in >may. i hope that some discussions may come out of the english >translation as well, especially among balkan-based activists. if >anything seems offensive to people who have lived through the war from >within, be assured that this is not intentional, and is due to the >limitations of my understanding. even if i have lived in sofia for two >years now, it may be that some points are perceived as fatally imbued >with western-european misunderstandings. nevertheless i hope that some >points may encourage discussions on how we could deal with situations in >which complicated loyalties, fears and hopes are at play. > >best, > >alain > >------------- > >Translated by the author in September 1999. The notes added at >translation time are marked as such. The article was first published on >1 June 1999 in com.une.farce number 2 (99), which can be found at ><http://www.copyriot.com/unefarce>, or directly at ><http://www.copyriot.com/unefarce/no2/kosovo.html>. It was then >reprinted in part in Diskus (Frankfurt), Schwarzer Faden (Grafenau) and >Alaska (Bremen), all three with Germany-wide circulation. If you wish to >reprint it, please mention the original source including the URL, and >let the author know: <kessi@bitex.com>. > > >Kosov@ / NATO: Economy of the War and of Communication > >by Alain Kessi > >When I listen to what people say about the war of NATO against >Yugoslavia, and of the Yugoslav regime against the Albanian population >of Kosov@[1], be it on various mailing lists or in personal >conversations with people, it is striking how insecure many seem to >feel. Apparently many activists are having difficulties to remain true >to even the most elementary principles of long-standing leftist >politics, in a time in which a war cannot any longer be interpreted >simply as imperialist/antiimperialist - here the ugly imperialists, >there the brave liberation fighters. It seems to me that it is not those >principles that have to be given up. Just like ever before, people and >the lives they live should come first, before big-time politics. The >point remains to develop, in solidarity, resistance against the attacks >on our autonomy, without making differences among us invisible in the >process. The point is still to see through discursive maneuvers of >distraction and to base our analysis on an understanding of economic and >social mechanisms of power. It is rather the less conscious >characteristics of leftist and autonomist political practice that need >rethinking. > >Against ethnicizing! > >The reflex of some antiimperialist activists, when they perceive efforts >towards independence as "liberation movements", to consider these >efforts to be legitimate and worthy of support, seems to lead to a dead >end in the case of Kosov@. Perhaps the wish to identify with the enemies >of a cunning and reckless power player like Slobodan Milosevic has led >some, for some time at least, to close their eyes on the racist >tendencies of a KLA (Kosova Liberation Army, also UCK, "Ushtria >Clirimtare e Kosoves"), or at least tendencies towards "ethnic" >separation. Others have preferred to remain silent on this point, in the >general uncertainty of the moment. The former, among them one part of >the editors of the Info International program of Radio LoRa in Zurich, >have at least had the merit to be involved with what was going on in >Kosov@ and to launch discussions about it (making contact with KLA >people in Zurich in the process), at a time at which other media barely >paid any attention to the KLA. When the NATO attacks started and it >became clearer how the KLA put itself unconditionally at the service of >NATO strategies, some of the early advocates of a solidarity with the >KLA used the opportunity to critically reassess their position. Others, >even among those usually very critical of the state and media (I'm >surprised, for instance, about the declaration of an anarchist friend on >an Eastern European mailing list), have flirted with the line of >argument about preventing a "humanitarian catastrophe". This means they >have walked into the trap set up by NATO by creating facts on the ground >and then feigning to offer solutions. I was outright shocked by the >machist and aggressive statements of some European and US-American net >activists (e.g., on the nettime mailing list) as a reaction to e-mail >diaries reporting from a personal point of view on the bombings in >Belgrade, Novi Sad and Kraljevo - although I do see how such personal >accounts can be put to use for propagandist purposes. In any event, I >would like to deal with this by trying to contextualize such accounts, >and not by suppressing them. Maybe out of a feeling of insecurity for >having to argue politically on unusually unfamiliar terrain, some of the >net activists emphatically embrace an anti-Milosevic position that in >its negligent way borders on anti-Serb racism. The fact that on the >other hand a group with a more streamlined political stance, like the >Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz (Revolutionary Build-Up Switzerland), >manages to write a leaflet against the NATO war without mentioning even >one word about the refugees fleeing from Milosevic's campaign, should >probably not come as a surprise. This position is just as fatally based >on a simplified understanding of imperialism (in the latter case, >probably adopted for tactical reasons) - once again there is only one >bad guy, even if this time it is not Milosevic but NATO, and implicitly >the Kosov@ Albanians collaborating with NATO. It seems to me that all >these positions are evidence of a weak point in our political praxis. A >more in-depth inquiry into the political developments in Kosov@ that >points out the complexity of economic and power strategic causes of a >social conflict and the willfully forced ethnicizing of the conflict is >something that I have seen bits and pieces of, but usually discussed in >a limited circle of people. > >The "facts on the ground" for which Slobodan Milosevic, Hans-Dietrich >Genscher, the KLA leadership (but also Ibrahim Rugova in his own more >discreet ways) have, each for their own reasons, worked hard for years, >are widely accepted. These "facts" consist in the perception that the >conflict stems from age-old "ethnic" feuds and is so much ingrained in >people that it is impossible to live together. In view of the crushing >weight of "history", even from a leftist point of view the only thing to >do then is to call for the "ethnic" separation - perceived as the only >way to defuse the smoldering conflict - to be achieved by peaceful means >through negotiations. This procedure has been demonstrated in the case >of Bosnia in which the Dayton Agreement was reached under US >sponsorship. But - it was not possible to implement the "ethnic" >separation agreed upon there without violent relocations and massacres, >since the people would not let themselves be moved without resistance. >"Srebrenica" was in this sense a prerequisite for the implementation of >Dayton - part of the plan, so to speak. > >It seems vital to me to break out of the discourse about an "ethnic" >conflict. To achieve this, we must concentrate our efforts on the one >hand on laying bare the (economic and power-strategic) causes of the >conflict. A central aspect herein is the high indebtedness of Yugoslavia >and especially Serbia after decades of preferential access to >international credit lines, due to the privileged position of Yugoslavia >during the "Cold War". The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policy of >debt collection thereby leads to an intensification of the strategies of >exploitation of the Yugoslav government, which in its turn gives rise to >social struggles against this exploitation. The second part of our >efforts must concentrate on exposing the mechanisms of ethnicizing, and >thus the strategies for diverting the attention from those causes. Of >course this is easier done in a (Western European) context in which the >people have a certain distance to the events, than in the circle of >those who are already exposed to an attack defined in "ethnic", i.e., >racist terms and immediately need to react to it and develop strategies >of survival against this attack. But even in Yugoslavia, in the context >of war, some people manage to consistently speak of the conflict in such >a way as to expose the absurdity of the logic of war. In (Ex-) >Yugoslavia there is a long tradition of resistance against "ethnic" >dividing lines imposed by the governments. From the ?Women in Black" and >conscientious objectors' initiatives, e-mail lists like the anarchist >ex-yu-a-lista and attack[2] all the way to various feminist groups. This >is whom we must refer to when we want to build up solidarity with people >in Yugoslavia. Such solidarity is possible and does not require taking a >stand for one or the other parties to the war. In the case of Kosov@ it >is slightly more difficult than in Bosnia to refer to existing projects >and contacts, since the networking between Kosov@ Albanians and other >people in Yugoslavia is less developed. For instance, there does not >seem, in Kosov@, to be an anarchist movement visible to the outside - >and the anarchist movement is an important pillar of anti-national >politics in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. There are nevertheless contacts, >be it in feminist circles, in the peace movement or in other contexts. >Together with the people from these contexts I see the possibility to >develop a common anti-national, "leftist" position. > >It would be especially interesting to develop, in a common process, an >understanding of how the attractiveness of various nationalist >discourses, myths and loyalties is constructed for people in >Switzerland, in Germany and in Yugoslavia. How can existing certainties >that currently contribute to the front-building and legitimization for >NATO, the KLA and/or Milosevic, be undermined? Some ideas in this >direction can be gleaned from the "Materialien für einen neuen >Antiimperialismus"[3] Nr. 6 (Materials for a New Antiimperialism). This >is a discussion I would like to have with people from Yugoslavia, and in >the process I want to take the fears and hopes of those people >seriously. I think it is easy to point to the danger of various >legitimizing constructions, but it is much harder to debate those >questions with people who have appropriated these legitimizing >constructions (often in incomplete and fragmentary ways) under the >pressure of bombs and/or massacres. Since these legitimizing >constructions are part of a strategy of survival, we must also try, in a >collective process among radical/emancipatory activists, to develop new >strategies of survival or point out existing alternatives. This process >not only applies to Yugoslavia and the front-building there. In mixed >(East-West) e-mail fora like nettime or syndicate, we also find a >dynamic of front-building that we need to understand and undermine. > >How we speak about the war > >In attempting to delegitimize the war to all sides, it seems to me that >in a first step it is not so much "historical reality" that counts and >should be researched in full detail in order to oppose "facts" to the >"propaganda". Maybe it is more important, for now, to look at the >tactical question of assessing the effect of a given discourse. The >reason I say this is not that I find a historical understanding useless >or unimportant, but because in my view propaganda can be pursued with >quite correct and confirmed "facts" - for instance, a war can be >legitimized using massacres that have actually taken place. It would >seem dangerous to me, for instance, to put much emphasis on the >probability that a massacre like the one in Racak was a fake. A >discussion on this may be interesting only in the context of >investigating the requirements of a media war. A discussion that could >probably lay bare the motives for inventing a massacre. It seems >difficult to avoid, however, that the emphatic denial of this or other >massacres contribute to the discourse of those who generally deny the >very existence of massacres and in this way attempt to paint one of the >parties to the war as the "Good" or at least the "Innocent". > >Many of the arguments that can be given against the war turn out not to >be unproblematic in one way or other. A widely used line of argument >compares the Yugoslav policies towards Kosov@ Albanians to the attacks >by the Turkish state on the life and identity of Kurds that have been >going on for many years. It asks why NATO is not bombing Turkey, if it >considers Human Rights so important. In its outrage about different sets >of standards being applied to Turkey and Yugoslavia, this comparison >takes the humanimilitarist legitimizing construction of NATO seriously. >By pointing out that Turkey is not being bombed, the alleged motive of a >humanitarian intervention is at once questioned and reaffirmed. >Nevertheless I think that Kurdistan can be brought into the discussion >in a different context, without legitimizing the motives given for the >NATO attacks. We can do this by emphasizing the interests of Turkey as a >NATO state to be perceived by the world public as being on the side of >the "Good Guys" - on the side of those who enforce Human Rights. Among >other things, the news coverage of the NATO bombings diverts the >attention of the public from the gigantic campaign of repression the >Turkish state is currently waging against Kurds with increased >intensity. > >Similarly, claiming that NATO, through its "autonomous decision" to >attack Yugoslavia, has booted out the UN and OSCE - the "legitimate >actors" of the search for a "peaceful solution" - and thus broken >international law, bears some danger. I do not only speak of the fact >that it may sound strange if from an autonomist, radical leftist >position one speaks in defense of structures that belong to the realm of >big politics. Pragmatically, maybe one could take it that these >institutions act as an opposite pole to NATO, and aim to strengthen them >against powerful NATO. It is, however, only true to a limited extent >that the UN/OSCE are an opposite pole to NATO. This became clear, among >other things, from the espionage work done by the OSCE observers in >preparation for the NATO attacks.[4] On the one hand, the UN elite's >interests give rise to a strategy of "survival", of retaining its power >in view of the NATO attacks started without regard to UN competence in >the matter. Thus in a first phase Kofi Annan condemned the single-handed >approach of NATO. But while the NATO leadership aims at making >Yugoslavia (with or without Milosevic in power) submit to its will, at >the same time it follows a strategy of first showing the UN managers who >is the master and reducing their options, before courting them with >offers for a renewed participation in the process - at NATO's >conditions. Kofi Annan at least seems to be playing along already. In >this way the transnational institutions legitimize one another - despite >power games among each other. They are reminiscent of the good old >interplay between the good-cop-bad-cop duo of police interrogations, >inspiring confidence and fear all at once. In the new NATO strategic >concept that has recently been presented to the public, a possible >future relation between UN and NATO is formulated - the UN should once >and for all give the go-ahead for NATO interventions outside NATO >territory. > >Also, speaking of the incompetence of the decision-makers or referring >to the sexual life of one of them contributes to legitimizing the war by >depoliticizing the events, turning them into a spectacle and ignoring >the existing interests. It is probable that a strategy of escalation >might not remain under the full control even of the escalating >strategists over the complete course of events, and some of the >consequences of the NATO attacks may be unwanted and maybe even >unexpected. But one thing is certain - it is not the failure of >diplomacy that has led to NATO attacks, but the success of the >escalation diplomacy. The now famous Annex B of the Kosovo Interim >Agreement[5] of Rambouillet, signed by the Kosov@ Albanian leadership >under the pressure and propaganda efforts of the US diplomacy, was meant >to turn all of Rest-Yugoslavia into a NATO protectorate. It was >definitely not out of diplomatic incompetence that it was conceived such >that the Yugoslav leadership would under no circumstances be able to >sign it. > >I rather like the tactical move of those who claim there is a secret >agreement between Milosevic and NATO representatives. There is no need >for this to be real, and the claim is not all that serious. The real >importance of it is to point out that Milosevic is one of the main >beneficiaries of the NATO attacks, and that NATO, the KLA and Milosevic >need each other for legitimizing each other's war strategies, and that >all three parties are united in a patriarchal-lifedestroying showdown >against the Serbian and Albanian population. Sprayers in Belgrade said >it in a nutshell. "Slobo, du Clinton!"[6], Boris Buden of Bastard/Arkzin >quotes a Belgrade graffito. Beyond the general interest in imposing the >logic of war, a common interest between the Yugoslav leadership and the >transnational power structures, symbolized by William Clinton, can be >traced to their division of labor in pressing added value out of the >majority of the Yugoslav population - with the aim of collecting the >debt. > >The interests involved in this war > >Quite possibly it may be a fundamentally unsatisfactory endeavor to >inquire into the motives of "big politics" behind the escalation of the >conflict in Kosov@. None of the personalities involved is likely to >share their innermost thoughts with us. What then could be the aim of >juggling with assumptions and circumstantial evidence? Any >interpretation of events carries with it traces of its intention. Mine >is to explore a discourse that does not refer to "ethnic" criteria but >considers ethnicizing as a power strategy, as a vehicle for more >material interests. The criminological search for a motive may bear the >danger of ending in conspiracy theories. I think that I can (maybe) >elude this by considering the interests (motives) of the various parties >of "big politics" involved as heterogeneous and, for instance, seeing >NATO not as a block but exploring the dynamic and the interaction >between the politics of the USA, Germany and others. [continued in mail no. 2] ------Syndicate mailinglist-------------------- Syndicate network for media culture and media art information and archive: http://www.v2.nl/syndicate to unsubscribe, write to <syndicate-request@aec.at> in the body of the msg: unsubscribe your@email.adress