[rohrpost] Interview with Paul Virilio

[Krystian Woznicki <krystian@snafu.de>]

>  ____________________________________________________________________
>  CTHEORY Interview with Paul Virilio:
>  The Kosovo War Took Place in Orbital Space
>  ==========================================
>
>  ~Paulo Virilio in Conversation with John Armitage~
>  ~Translated by Patrice Riemens~
>  ---------------------------------------------------
>
>  Paul Virilio is a renowned urbanist, political theorist and critic of
>  the art of technology. Born in Paris in 1932, Virilio is best known
>  for his 'war model' of the growth of the modern city and the
>  evolution of human society. He is also the inventor of the term
>  'dromology' or the logic of speed. Identified with the phenomenology
>  of Merleau-Ponty, the futurism of Marinetti and technoscientific
>  writings of Einstein, Virilio's intellectual outlook can usefully be
>  compared to contemporary architects, philosophers and cultural
>  critics such as Bernard Tschumi, Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard.
>  Virilio is the author, among other books, of _Bunker Archeology_
>  (1994 [1975]), _Speed & Politics: An Essay on Dromology_ (1986
>  [1977]), _The Information Bomb_ (2000 [1998]) and, most recently,
>  _Strategie de la deception_ (1999). His analysis of the Kosovo War is
>  the subject of his conversation with John Armitage below.
>
>  *John Armitage*: Professor Virilio, to what extent does your
>  intellectual and artistic work on the architecture of war, and
>  architecture more generally, inform your thinking in _Strategie de la
>  deception_?  Is it the case that, in common with other so-called
>  'postmodern' wars, such as the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the
>  architecture of war, along with architecture itself, is
>  'disappearing'? How did you approach the question of the architecture
>  of war and its disappearance in _Strategie de la deception_?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: Well, let me put it this way, I have always been
>  interested in the architecture of war, as can be seen in _Bunker
>  Archeology_. However, at the time that I did the research for that
>  book, I was very young. My aim was to understand the notion of 'Total
>  War'. As I have said many times before, I was among the first people
>  to experience the German Occupation of France during the Second World
>  War. I was 7-13 years old during the War and did not really
>  internalise its significance. More specifically, under the
>  Occupation, we in Nantes were denied access to the coast of the
>  Atlantic Ocean. It was therefore not until after the War was over
>  that I saw the sea for the first time, in the vicinity of St Nazaire.
>  It was there that I discovered the bunkers. But what I also
>  discovered was that, during the War, the whole of Europe had become a
>  fortress. And thus I saw to what extent an immense territory, a whole
>  continent, had effectively been reorganised into one city, and just
>  like the cities of old. From that moment on, I became more interested
>  in urban matters, in logistics, in the organisation of transport, in
>  maintenance and supplies.
>
>  But what is so astonishing about the war in Kosovo for me is that it
>  was a war that totally bypassed territorial space. It was a war that
>  took place almost entirely in the air. There were hardly any Allied
>  armed personnel on the ground. There was, for example, no real state
>  of siege and practically no blockade. However, may I remind you that
>  France and Germany were opposed to a maritime blockade of the
>  Adriatic Sea without a mandate from the United Nations (UN). So, what
>  we witnessed in Kosovo was an extraordinary war, a war waged solely
>  with bombs from the air. What happened in Kosovo was the exact
>  reversal of what happened in 'Fortress Europe' in 1943-45. Let me
>  explain. Air Marshall 'Bomber' Harris used to say that 'Fortress
>  Europe' was a fortress without a roof, since the Allies had air
>  supremacy. Now, if we look at the Kosovo War, what do we see? We see
>  a fortress without walls - but with a roof! Isn't that disappearance
>  extraordinary?!
>
>  *John Armitage*: Let's talk about your theoretical efforts to
>  understand and interpret the Kosovo war in _Strategie de la
>  deception_. Is the campaign in the air the only important element
>  that other theorists should pay attention to?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: Let me emphasise the following points about the
>  Kosovo War. First, while the United States (US) can view the war as a
>  success, Europe must see it as a failure for it and, in particular,
>  for the institutions of the European Union (EU). For the US, the
>  Kosovo War was a success because it encouraged the development of the
>  Pentagon's 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). The war provided a
>  test site for experimentation, and paved the way for emergence of
>  what I call in _Strategie de la deception_ 'the second deterrence'.
>  It is, therefore, my firm belief that the US is currently seeking to
>  revert to the position it held after the triggering of atomic bombs
>  at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 1940s, when the US was the sole
>  nuclear power. And here I repeat what I suggest in my book. The first
>  deterrence, nuclear deterrence, is presently being superseded by the
>  second deterrence: a type of deterrence based on what I call 'the
>  information bomb' associated with the new weaponry of information and
>  communications technologies. Thus, in the very near future, and I
>  stress this important point, ~it will no longer be war that is the
>  continuation of politics by other means, it will be what I have
>  dubbed 'the integral accident'~ that is the continuation of politics
>  by other means. The automation of warfare has, then, come a long way
>  since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Needless to say, none of these
>  developments will help the plight of the refugees in Kosovo or stop
>  the actions of the militias operating there. However, the automation
>  of warfare will allow for the continuation not only of war in the air
>  but also of the further development of the Pentagon's RMA in the form
>  of 'Global Information Dominance' (GID) and 'Global Air Power' (GAP).
>  It is for these reasons that, in my new book, I focus for example on
>  the use of the 'graphite bomb' to shut off the Serbian electricity
>  supply as well as the cutting off of the service provision to Serbia
>  of the EuTelSat television satellite by the EU. And, let me remind
>  you that the latter action was carried out against the explicit
>  wishes of the UN. To my mind, therefore, the integral accident, the
>  automation of warfare, and the RMA are all part of the shift towards
>  the second deterrence and the explosion of the information bomb. For
>  me, these developments are revolutionary because, today, the age of
>  the locally situated bomb such as the atomic bomb has passed. The
>  atomic bomb provoked a ~specific~ accident. But the information bomb
>  gives rise to the integral and ~globally constituted accident~. The
>  globally constituted accident can be compared to what people who work
>  at the stock exchange call 'systemic risk'. And, of course, we have
>  already seen some instances of systemic risk in recent times in the
>  Asian financial crisis. But what sparked off the Asian financial
>  crisis? Automated trading programmes! Here, then, we meet again the
>  problems I noted in earlier works with regard to interactivity.
>  Moreover, it is clear that the era of the information bomb, the era
>  of aerial warfare, the era of the RMA and global surveillance is also
>  the era of ~the integral accident~. 'Cyberwar' has nothing to do with
>  the destruction brought about by bombs and grenades and so on. It is
>  specifically linked to the information systems of life itself. It is
>  in this sense that, as I have said many times before, interactivity
>  is the equivalent of radioactivity. For interactivity effects a kind
>  of disintegration, a kind of ~rupture~. For me, the Asian financial
>  crisis of 1998 and the war in Kosovo in 1999 are the prelude to the
>  integral accident.
>
>  *John Armitage*: How does your description above of the chief
>  theoretical aspects of the Kosovo War map on to the important themes
>  of your previous writings? I would like to start by charting your
>  theoretical and architectural interest in questions concerning the
>  two concepts of military space and the organization of territory. For
>  example, even your earliest research  -- into the 'Atlantic Wall' in
>  the 1950s and 1960s -- was founded on these two concepts. However,
>  before we discuss _Strategie de la deception_ and the war in Kosovo
>  in some detail, could you explain first of all what you mean by
>  military space and the organization of territory and why these
>  concepts are so important for an understanding of your work?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: These concepts are important quite simply because I
>  am an urbanist. Thus the whole of my work is focused on geopolitics
>  and geostrategy. However, a second aspect of my work is movement.
>  This, of course, I pursue through my research on speed and on my
>  study of the organisation of the revolution of the means of
>  transportation. For me, then, territory and movement are linked. For
>  instance, territory is controlled by the movements of horsemen, of
>  tanks, of planes, and so on. Thus my research on dromology, on the
>  logic and impact of speed, necessarily implies the study of the
>  organisation of territory. Whoever controls the territory possesses
>  it. Possession of territory is not primarily about laws and
>  contracts, but first and foremost a matter of movement and
>  circulation. Hence I am always concerned with ideas of territory and
>  movement. Indeed, my first book after _Bunker Archeology_ was
>  entitled _L'insecurite du territoire_ (1976).
>
>  *John Armitage*: In _Speed & Politics: An Essay on Dromology_, you
>  write of the military and political revolution in transportation and
>  information transmission. Indeed, for you, the speed of the
>  military-industrial complex is the driving force of cultural and
>  social development, or, as you put it in the book, 'history
>  progresses at the speed of its weapons systems'. In what ways do you
>  think that speed politics played a role in the military and political
>  conflict in Kosovo? For instance, was the speed of transportation and
>  information transmission the most important factor in the war? Or,
>  more generally, for you, is the military-industrial complex still the
>  motor of history?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: I believe that the military-industrial complex is
>  more important than ever. This is because the war in Kosovo gave
>  fresh impetus not to the military-industrial complex but to the
>  military-~scientific~ complex. You can see this in China. You can
>  also see it in Russia with its development of stealth planes and
>  other very sophisticated military machines. I am of course thinking
>  here about new planes such as the ~Sukhois~. There is very little
>  discussion about such developments but, for me, I am constantly
>  astonished by the current developments within the Russian airforce.
>  And, despite the economic disaster that is Russia, there are still
>  air shows taking place in the country. For these reasons, then, I
>  believe that the politics of intervention and the Kosovo war prompted
>  a fresh resumption of the arms race worldwide. However, this
>  situation has arisen because the sovereignty of the state is no
>  longer accepted. This is also why we are witnessing states rushing
>  forward in order to safeguard themselves against an intervention
>  similar to the one that took place in Kosovo. This is one of the most
>  disturbing, if indirect, aspects of the war in Kosovo and one that I
>  discuss at length in my new book. Of course, one of the most
>  disturbing features is the fact that while we have had roughly a ten
>  year pause in the arms race where a lot of good work was done, this
>  has now come to an end. For what we are seeing at the present time
>  are new developments in anti-missile weaponry, drones, and so on.
>  Thus, some of the most dramatic consequences of the Kosovo war are
>  linked to the resumption of the arms race and the suicidal political
>  and economic policies of countries like India and Pakistan where tons
>  of money are currently being spent on atomic weaponry. This is
>  abhorrent!
>
>  *John Armitage*: Before we turn to consider the aesthetic aspects of
>  the 'disappearance' of military space and the organisation of
>  territory in Kosovo, I would like to ask why it was that in the late
>  1970s and early 1980s you first began to consider the technological
>  aspects of these phenomena? What was it that prompted you to focus on
>  the technological aspects at that time?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: Because it was from that time onwards that ~real time
>  superseded real space!~ Today, almost all-current technologies put
>  the speed of light to work. And, as you know, here we are not only
>  talking about information at a distance but also operation at a
>  distance, or, the possibility to act instantaneously, from afar. For
>  example, the RMA ~begins~ with the application of the speed of light.
>  This means that history is now rushing headlong into the wall of
>  time. As I have said many times before, ~the speed of light does not
>  merely transform the world. It becomes the world. Globalisation is
>  the speed of light. And it is nothing else!~ Globalisation cannot
>  take shape without the speed of light. In this way, history now
>  inscribes itself in real time, in the 'live', in the realm of
>  interactivity. Consequently, history no longer resides in the
>  extension of territory. Look at the US, look at Russia. Both of these
>  countries are immense geographical territories. But, nowadays,
>  immense territories amount to nothing! Today, everything is about
>  speed and real time. We are no longer concerned with real space.
>  Hence not only the crisis of geopolitics and geostrategy but also the
>  shift towards the emergence and dominance of ~chronostrategy~. As I
>  have been arguing for a long time now, there is a real need not
>  simply for a political economy of wealth but also for a political
>  economy of speed.
>
>  *John Armitage*: But what about the cultural dimensions of
>  chronostrategy? For instance, although modernist artists such as
>  Marinetti suggested to us that 'war is the highest form of modern
>  art', Walter Benjamin warned us against the 'aestheticization' of war
>  in his famous essay in _Illuminations_ (1968) on 'The Work of Art in
>  the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. Additionally, in your _The
>  Aesthetics of Disappearance_ (1991 [1980]), you make several
>  references to the relationship between war and aesthetics. To what
>  extent do you think that the Kosovo War can or should be perceived in
>  cultural or aesthetic terms?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: First of all, if I have spoken of a link between war
>  and aesthetics, it is because there is something I am very interested
>  in and that is what Sun Tzu in his ancient Chinese text calls _The
>  Art of War_. This is because, for me, war consists of the
>  organisation of ~the field of perception~. But war is also, as the
>  Japanese call it, 'the art of embellishing death'. And, in this
>  sense, the relationship between war and aesthetics is a matter of
>  very serious concern. Conversely, one could say that religion -- in
>  the broadest sense of the word -- is 'the art of embellishing life'.
>  Thus, anything that strives to aestheticise death is profoundly
>  tragic. But, nowadays, ~the tragedy of war is mediated through
>  technology~. It is no longer mediated through a human being with
>  moral responsibilities. It is mediated through the destructive power
>  of the atomic bomb, as in Stanley Kubrick's film, ~Dr Strangelove~.
>
>  Now, if we turn to the war in Kosovo, what do we find?  We find the
>  manipulation of the audience's emotions by the mass media. Today, the
>  media handle information as if it was a religious artefact. In this
>  way, the media is more concerned with what we feel about the refugees
>  and so on rather than what we think about them. Indeed, the truth,
>  the reality of the Kosovo War, was actually hidden behind all the
>  'humanitarian' faces. This is a very  different situation from the
>  one faced by General Patton and the American army when they first
>  encountered the concentration camps at the end of the Second World
>  War. Then, it was a total and absolute surprise to find out that what
>  was inside the concentration camps was a sea of skeletons. What is
>  clear to me, therefore, is that while the tragedy of war grinds on,
>  the contemporary aesthetics of the tragedy seem not only confused
>  but, in some way, suspicious.
>
>  *John Armitage*: Almost inevitably, reviewers will compare _Strategie
>  de la deception_ with your earlier works and, in particular, _War and
>  Cinema: The Logistics of Perception_ (1989 [1984]). Indeed, the very
>  first chapter of the latter book is called 'Military Force is based
>  upon Deception'. Could you summarise the most important developments
>  that, for you, have taken place in the relationship between war,
>  cinema, and deception since you wrote _War and Cinema_?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: For me, Sun Tzu's statement that military force is
>  based upon deception is an extraordinary statement. But let us start
>  with the title of _War and Cinema_. The important part of the title
>  is not _War and Cinema_. It is the subtitle, _The Logistics of
>  Perception_. As I said back in 1984, the idea of logistics is not
>  only about oil, about ammunitions and supplies but also about images.
>  Troops must be fed with ammunition and so on but also with
>  information, with images, with visual intelligence. Without these
>  elements troops cannot perform their duties properly. This is what is
>  meant by the logistics of perception.
>
>  Now, if we consider my latest book, _Strategie de la deception_, what
>  we need to focus on are the other aspects of the same phenomenon. For
>  the strategies of deception are concerned with deceiving an opponent
>  through the logistics of perception. But these strategies are not
>  merely aimed at the Serbs or the Iraqis but also at all those who
>  might support Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. Moreover, such strategies
>  are also aimed at deceiving the general public through radio,
>  television and so on.
>
>  In this way, it seems to me that, since 1984, my book on the
>  logistics of perception has been proved totally correct. For
>  instance, almost every conflict since then has involved the logistics
>  of perception, including the war in Lebanon, where Israel made use of
>  cheap drones in order to track Yasser Arafat with the aim of killing
>  him. If we look at the Gulf War, the same is also true. Indeed, my
>  work on the logistics of perception and the Gulf War was so accurate
>  that I was even asked to discuss it with high-ranking French military
>  officers. They asked me: 'how is it that you wrote that book in 1984
>  and now it's happening for real?' My answer was: 'the problem is not
>  mine but yours: you have not been doing your job properly!'
>
>  But let us link all this to something that is not discussed very
>  often. I am referring here to the impact of the launch of the
>  television news service CNN in 1984 or thereabouts. However, what I
>  want to draw your attention to is CNN's so-called 'Newshounds'.
>  Newshounds are people with mini-video cameras, people who are
>  continually taking pictures in the street and sending the tapes in to
>  CNN. These Newshounds are a sort of pack of wolves, continually
>  looking for quarry, but quarry in the form of images. For example, it
>  was this pack of wolves that sparked off the Rodney King affair a few
>  years ago in Los Angeles. Let us consider the situation: a person
>  videos Rodney King being beaten up by the cops. That person then
>  sends in the footage to the TV station. Within hours riots flare up
>  in the city! There is, then, a link between the logistics of
>  perception, the wars in Lebanon and the Gulf as well as with CNN and
>  the Pentagon. But what interests me here is that what starts out as a
>  story of a black man being beaten up in the street, a story that,
>  unfortunately, happens all the time, everywhere, escalates into
>  something that is little short of a war in Los Angeles!
>
>  *John Armitage*: In _The Vision Machine_ (1994 [1988]) you were
>  concerned with highlighting the role of the military in the
>  'contemporary crisis in perceptive faith' and the 'automation of
>  perception' more broadly. Has the Kosovo War led you to modify your
>  claims about the role of the military in the contemporary production
>  and destruction of automated perception via Cruise missiles,
>  so-called 'smart bombs' and so on?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: On the contrary. The development and deployment of
>  drones and Cruise missiles involves the continuing development of the
>  vision machine. Research on Cruise missiles is intrinsically linked
>  to the development of vision machines. The aim, of course, is not
>  only to give vision to a machine but, as in the case of the Cruise
>  missiles that were aimed at Leningrad and Moscow, also to enable a
>  machine to deploy radar readings and pre-programmed maps as it
>  follows its course towards its target. Cruise missiles necessarily
>  fly low, in order to check on the details of the terrain they are
>  flying over. They are equipped with a memory that gives them bearings
>  on the terrain. However, when the missiles arrive at their
>  destination, they need more subtle vision, in order to choose right
>  or left. This, then, is the reason why vision was given to Cruise
>  missiles. But in one sense, such missiles are really only flying
>  cameras, whose results are interpreted by a computer. This,
>  therefore, is what I call 'sightless vision', vision without looking.
>  The research on vision machines was mainly conducted at the Stanford
>  Research Institute in the US. So, we can say that the events that
>  took place in the Kosovo War were a total confirmation of the thesis
>  of _The Vision Machine_.
>
>  *John Armitage*: Let us turn to vision machines of a different
>  variety. To what extent do you think that watching the Kosovo War on
>  TV reduced us all to a state of _Polar Inertia_ (1999 [1990]), to the
>  status of Howard Hughes, the imprisoned and impotent state of what
>  you call 'technological monks'?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: There can be no doubt about this. It even held true
>  for the soldiers involved in the Kosovo War. For the soldiers stayed
>  mostly in their barracks! In this way, polar inertia has truly become
>  a ~mass phenomenon~. And not only for the TV audiences watching the
>  war at home but also for the army that watches the battle from the
>  barracks. Today, ~the army only occupies the territory once the war
>  is over~. Clearly, there is a kind of inertia here. Moreover, I would
>  like to say that the sort of polar inertia we witnessed in the Kosovo
>  War, the polar inertia involving 'automated war' and
>  'war-at-a-distance' is also terribly weak in the face of terrorism.
>  For instance, in such situations, any individual who decides to place
>  or throw a bomb can simply walk away. He or she ~has the freedom to
>  move~. This also applies to militant political groups and their
>  actions. Look at the ~Intifadah~ in Jerusalem. One cannot understand
>  that phenomenon, a phenomenon where people, often very young boys,
>  are successfully harassing one of the best armies in the world,
>  without appreciating their freedom to move!
>
>  *John Armitage*: Jean Baudrillard infamously argued that _The Gulf
>  War Did Not Take Place_ (1995 [1991]). Could it be argued that the
>  Kosovo War did not take place?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: Although Jean Baudrillard is a friend of mine, I do
>  not agree with him on that one! For me, the significance of the war
>  in Kosovo was that it was a war that moved into space. For instance,
>  the Persian Gulf War was a miniature world war. It took place in a
>  small geographical area. In this sense it was a local war. But it was
>  one that made use of all the power normally reserved for global war.
>  However, the Kosovo War took place in orbital space. In other words,
>  war now takes place in 'aero-electro-magnetic space'. It is
>  equivalent to the birth of a new type of flotilla, a home fleet, of a
>  new type of naval power, but in orbital space!
>
>  *John Armitage*: How do these developments relate to Global
>  Positioning Systems (GPS)? For example, in _The Art of the Motor_
>  (1995 [1993]), you were very interested in the relationship between
>  globalisation, physical space, and the phenomenon of virtual spaces,
>  positioning, or, 'delocalization'. In what ways, if any, do you think
>  that militarized GPS played a 'delocalizing' role in the war in
>  Kosovo?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: GPS not only played a large and delocalizing role in
>  the war in Kosovo but is increasingly playing a role in social life.
>  For instance, it was the GPS that directed the planes, the missiles
>  and the bombs to localised targets in Kosovo. But may I remind you
>  that the bombs that were dropped by the B-2 plane on the Chinese
>  embassy -- or at least that is what we were told -- were GPS bombs.
>  And the B-2 flew in from the US. However, GPS are everywhere. They
>  are in cars. They were even in the half-tracks that, initially at
>  least, were going to make the ground invasion in Kosovo possible.
>  Yet, for all the sophistication of GPS, there still remain numerous
>  problems with their use. The most obvious problem in this context is
>  the problem of landmines. For example, when the French troops went
>  into Kosovo they were told that they were going to enter in
>  half-tracks, over the open fields. But their leaders had forgotten
>  about the landmines. And this was a major problem because, these
>  days, landmines are no longer localised. They are launched via tubes
>  and distributed haphazardly over the territory. As a result, one
>  cannot remove them after the war because one cannot find them! And
>  yet the ability to detect such landmines, especially in a global war
>  of movement, is absolutely crucial. Thus, for the US, GPS are a form
>  of sovereignty! It is hardly surprising, then, that the EU has
>  proposed its own GPS in order to be able to localise and to compete
>  with the American GPS. As I have said before, sovereignty no longer
>  resides in the territory itself, but in the control of the territory.
>  And localisation is an inherent part of that territorial control. As
>  I pointed out in _The Art of the Motor_ and elsewhere, from now on we
>  need two watches: a wristwatch to tell us what time it is and a GPS
>  watch to tell us what space it is!
>
>  *John Armitage*: Lastly, given your analyses of technology and the
>  general accident in recent works such as _Open Sky_ (1997 [1995]),
>  _Politics of the Very Worst_ (1999 [1996]) and _The Information Bomb_
>  (2000 [1998]), what, for you, is the likely prospective critical
>  impact of counter measures to such developments? Are there any
>  obvious strategies of resistance that can be deployed against the
>  relentless advance of the technological strategies of deception?
>
>  *Paul Virilio*: Resistance is ~always~ possible! But we must engage
>  in resistance first of all by developing the idea of a ~technological
>  culture~. However, at the present time, this idea is grossly
>  underdeveloped. For example, we have developed an artistic and a
>  literary culture. Nevertheless, the ideals of technological culture
>  remain underdeveloped and therefore outside of popular culture and
>  the practical ideals of democracy. This is also why society as a
>  whole has no control over technological developments. And this is one
>  of the gravest threats to democracy in the near future. It is, then,
>  imperative to develop a democratic technological culture. Even among
>  the elite, in government circles, technological culture is somewhat
>  deficient. I could give examples of cabinet ministers, including
>  defence ministers, who have no technological culture at all. In other
>  words, what I am suggesting is that the hype generated by the
>  publicity around the Internet and so on is not counter balanced by a
>  political intelligence that is based on a technological culture. For
>  instance, in 1999, Bill Gates not only published a new book on work
>  at the speed of thought but also detailed how Microsoft's
>  'Falconview' software would enable the destruction of bridges in
>  Kosovo. Thus it is no longer a Caesar or a Napoleon who decides on
>  the fate of any particular war but a piece of software! In short, the
>  political intelligence of war and the political intelligence of
>  society no longer penetrate the technoscientific world. Or, let us
>  put it this way, technoscientific intelligence is presently
>  insufficiently spread among society at large to enable us to
>  ~interpret~ the sorts of technoscientific advances that are taking
>  shape today.
>
>  Ecole Speciale d'Architecture, Paris.
>  --------------------------------------------------------------------
>  CTHEORY editors would like to thank Paul Virilio for participating in
>  this  CTHEORY interview, John Armitage for conducting and editing the
>  conversation, and Patrice Riemens for translating the interview.
>  _______
>
>  John Armitage is Principal Lecturer in Politics and Media Studies at
>  the University of Northumbria, UK. The editor of Paul Virilio: From
>  Modernism to Hypermodernism and Beyond (2000), he is currently
>  editing Virilio Live: Selected Interviews for publication in 2001 and
>  Economies of Excess, a forthcoming issue of parallax, a journal of
>  metadiscursive theory and cultural practices.
>
>
>  ____________________________________________________________________
>  Quelle  CTHEORY  http://www.ctheory.com/
>  ____________________________________________________________________
  


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