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<nettime> East Timor Digest |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date sent: Thu, 16 Sep 1999 14:53:40 +1000 Via: Helen Ester <h.ester@cqu.edu.au> Subject: E. Timor - article by The Australian newspaper's foreign editor (a conservative) would interest you. the Headline is "A holocaust of Canberra's making. The shame we must wear down here....." By GREG SHERIDAN 16sep99 THE deepening tragedy of East Timor represents the greatest catastrophe in the history of Australian foreign policy. Last Saturday, US Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Hugh Shelton told an Australian visitor no Australian had raised the possibility of peacekeepers with him until 48 hours before that time. Given what we were trying to organise, that is astonishing. The success of the Government in putting together a peace force this week should not obscure one crushing fact - the holocaust in East Timor is a direct consequence of the failure of Australian policy. Of course the priority now is to save East Timorese lives, but if the Government is allowed to get away with its catastrophic mishandling of East Timor, we will have learned nothing from the tragedy. The Government's main failures were three: a massive and frightening failure of intelligence to predict what the Indonesian military would do; a gross failure of nerve in negotiating the entry of peacekeepers in advance with the Indonesians; and an astonishing failure to bring the US on board at a suitable level early enough. The failure with the Indonesian army, the TNI, is deeply disturbing. The Government boasts that no one understands the Indonesian military better than Australia. It has a vast intelligence-gathering and analysis capacity - ranging from foreign affairs to defence, to electronic eavesdropping capacities - all dedicated to knowing what the TNI is up to. Yet we either did not know, or did not care, what the TNI was planning. Involved in this was a fundamental misreading of the character and intent of TNI commander Wiranto. Our lack of influence was evident in General Wiranto's refusal to talk to Defence Minister John Moore at a time when Wiranto was talking, face-to-face and on the phone, to the Americans. It was the US, not us, who turned Wiranto around on peacekeepers. We paid a heavy price for having an inexperienced defence minister and for the ludicrous fiasco surrounding the sacking of former defence secretary Paul Barratt. The second failure was not to negotiate the presence of international peacekeepers in advance of the ballot. At a similar point in the at least equally difficult and momentous Cambodian peace process, Phnom Penh leader Hun Sen was proving difficult about the degree of UN peacekeeping involvement. His Australian negotiating partner, Michael Costello, in a marathon and tough meeting, told Hun Sen that if he did not agree to full UN participation, the international community, and certainly Australia, would just walk away. At which point, Hun Sen relented. Labor's Laurie Brereton has received no recognition for the fact that his analysis in respect to peacekeepers was superior to the Government's. He argued from the outset that the TNI could not be trusted to handle security. Alexander Downer argued in the months leading up to the vote that to push for peacekeepers would lead to the Indonesians cancelling the ballot. If that is so, the Government should have been prepared to wear it as a temporary setback rather than allowing such a dangerous process to go ahead. But the Government may well have misjudged its negotiating strength as well. Being prepared to walk away is a last-ditch, but often essential, part of effective negotiation. Instead the Howard Government positively argued against the idea of peacekeepers as likely to derail the ballot process. If the US had been on board, at a level beyond Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, we might have convinced Jakarta to accept peacekeepers. Not getting the US engaged at a really powerful level, which Canberra thought a good thing because it meant Washington was not interfering, was a fundamental failure of strategy. There comes a point at which taking a risk becomes shocking recklessness. There is more than a small suspicion that far too much of this policy has been a response to public opinion. The Government at crucial pressure points took the line of least public resistance. This has been a bloody and appalling failure of Australian strategy and policy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: institute@igc.org Subject: Just Back From East Timor Institute for Public Accuracy 915 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045 (202) 347-0020 * http://www.accuracy.org * ipa@accuracy.org Tuesday, September 14, 1999 JUST BACK FROM EAST TIMOR Despite Indonesia's agreement to an international force in East Timor, the violence there continues. The following people, most of whom were UN-accredited observers for the late August vote, have recently returned from East Timor and are available for interviews: BARBARA NASH, bjnash@juno.com, http://www.etan.org A UN-accredited observer with the International Federation for East Timor, Nash just returned on September 8. Nash is a teacher and grandmother. JEROME HANSEN, jeromehansen@hotmail.com Hansen, who has also done election monitoring in Sri Lanka and Cambodia, is currently a graduate student in conflict analysis and resolution at George Mason University. MIRIAM YOUNG and ANDREW WELLS, apcjp@igc.org, http://www.apcjp.org Associated with the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace, Young and Wells led an ecumenical delegation to East Timor. ELKE ENDER and MARIN GERSKOVIC, elke@erols.com Volunteers with the United Nations Mission in East Timor, Ender is a graduate student, Gerskovic is a former Yugoslavian diplomat. BONNIE LING Ling, who is from Athens, Georgia, recently returned from East Timor. CHRIS LUNDRY Lundry is a doctoral student studying East Timor at Arizona State University. WILLIAM SEAMAN, carriea@mail.e-z.net Seaman was in East Timor for more than a month. DIANE FARSETTA Farsetta, who lives in Madison, Wisconsin, returned from East Timor on September 10. MARK SALZER, http://www.etan.org Salzer is coordinator of the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) in Boston. He recently returned from his second trip to East Timor. BEN TERRALL, http://www.etan.org Terrall, director of the East Timor Research and Relief Project, is San Francisco coordinator of ETAN. For more information, contact at the Institute for Public Accuracy: Sam Husseini, (202) 347-0020 or David Zupan, (541) 484-9167 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ From: Nermeen Shaikh <nermeens@AsiaSoc.org> Subject: RE: <nettime> East Timor Digest (list, links, essays, hacks) Date: Fri, 10 Sep 1999 12:52:03 -0400 I would like to bring to your attention a Special Report the Asia Society in New York has prepared on East Timor. It is available at: http://www.asiasource.org/news/at_mp_02.cfm?newsid=86 Please distribute this URL to all those who are interested in the issue. This Special Report not only includes annotated articles by some of the most prominent commentators on East Timor (John Pilger, for example) but also a list of news sources, links, etc. Please let me know if you have any questions. Best regards, Nermeen Shaikh (Ms) ---------------------------------- Nermeen Shaikh Asia Society 725 Park Avenue New York, NY 10021 t: (212)327-9291 f: (212)744-8825 e: nermeens@asiasoc.org http://www.asiasociety.org http://www.asiasource.org ---------------------------------- # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@bbs.thing.net