<nettime> Meta text (2 of 2) on compatibility standards

[Don Weightman <weightmands@radix.net>]

This is the second part of the reading list on the political economy of
technical standards.

Don Weightman



>  the standardization process.
>
>Lewis M. Branscomb and Brian Kahin, Standards processes and objectives
>for the National Information Infrastructure, in Brian Kahin and Janet
>Abbate, eds, Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure,
>Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
>
>  Branscomb and Kahin are close to the ground of government policy
>  processes, and their introductory chapter to the very useful
>  "Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure" volume is written
>  in the language of those processes.  It quickly surveys issues
>  such as competing models for the standards process, the increasing
>  sophistication of users, the emergence of standards consortia,
>  intellectual property, and the several potential roles for
>  government in the new standards environment.
>
>Paul A. David, Standardization policies for network technologies: The
>flux between freedom and order revisited, in Richard Hawkins, Robin
>Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds, Standards, Innovation and Competitiveness:
>The Politics and Economics of Standards in Natural and Technical
>Environments, Edward Elgar, 1995.
>
>  The choice between standardization and non-standardization is often
>  framed as a choice between the respective virtues of order and
>  freedom, and standards policy is consequently framed in similar
>  terms.  David, though, argues that this analysis is ill-posed.
>  Instead, he urges us to view the institutional processes of
>  standards-setting as a dynamic response to a dynamic environment.
>  The consequences for policy are complicated and largely pessimistic.
>
>Samuel Krislov, How Nations Choose Product Standards and Standards
>Change Nations, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.
>Chapter 9: The Evolution of Standards and the Processes of
>Formalization.
>
>  Krislov's book is a comparative study of standardization policies as
>  part of broader national industrial and economic strategies.  This
>  concluding chapter draws on his case studies of the United States,
>  European Union, Japan, and the erstwhile Soviet Europe by placing
>  the evolution of standards and standardization processes in that
>  broader institutional perspective.
>
>Sanford V. Berg, Public policy and corporate strategies in the AM
>stereo market, in H. Landis Gabel, ed, Product Standardization and
>Competitive Strategy, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987.
>
>  AM radio in the United States is an example of a laissez faire
>  policy that leads to rapid, sharp competition between competing
>  standards, selecting a clear winner without stranding too many
>  consumers.  Berg briefly recounts the particular and tries to derive
>  lessons for the broader question of markets for interdependent
>  components.
>
>Joseph Farrell, Standardization and intellectual property, Jurimetrics
>Journal 30(1), 1989, pages 35-50.
>
>  Farrell argues that the market dynamics of standards recommend
>  a limited role for intellectual property protection in general
>  and copyright in particular.  If the economy benefits from
>  compatibility, then the difficult question is whether and when
>  intellectual property rights encourage markets to evolve toward
>  compatibility.
>
>Recommended
>
>Samuel Krislov, How Nations Choose Product Standards and Standards
>Change Nations, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.
>Chapter 6: Standards in the European Community.
>
>  Krislov's study of the European Community describes standards policy
>  as part of a larger project of economic integration.
>
>W. Edward Steinmueller, The political economy of data communication
>standards, in Richard Hawkins, Robin Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds,
>Standards, Innovation and Competitiveness: The Politics and Economics
>of Standards in Natural and Technical Environments, Edward Elgar,
>1995.
>
>  This is a brief but sophisticated analysis of the consequences
>  of the public good character of standards for the development
>  of communications protocols.  The argument is particularly
>  useful because it turns on the role of such protocols in shaping
>  organization and industry structures through their effect on
>  transaction and coordination costs.
>
>David J. Gerber, Intellectual property rights, economic power, and
>global technological transformation, Chicago-Kent Law Review 72, 1996,
>pages 463-476.
>
>  Gerber's article is a brief introduction to the issues that arise
>  as intellectual property policy responds to the globalization of
>  markets.
>
>
>Week 9 / Antitrust
>
>  The most topical policy question relating to standards is antitrust
>  law.  A company that owns proprietary de facto standards possesses
>  a license to print money, particularly when those standards enable
>  the company to leverage its control into new markets.  The law is
>  struggling to comprehend this phenomenon in traditional antitrust
>  categories, and we will consider a range of opinions.
>
>Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet standardization problem,
>Connecticut Law Review 28, 1996, pages 1041-1094.
>
>  This is a lengthy but lucid explication of the theory of standards
>  lock-in as applied to antitrust law.  Its conclusions are skeptical.
>  Antitrust law is held to be incapable of regulating standards-driven
>  industries, and standards organizations are held to be
>  overwhelmingly pro-competition.
>
>Bryce J. Jones, II, and James R. Turner, Can an operating system have
>a duty to aid its competitors?, Jurimetrics 37(4), 1997, pages
>355-394.
>
>  When markets are dominated by proprietary standards, it is commonly
>  argued that the standard constitutes an "essential facility" in the
>  sense provided by American antitrust law.  This argument is almost
>  never successful in court, but Jones and Turner lay it out
>  nonetheless in the case of Microsoft Windows.
>
>S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Should technology choice be
>a concern of antitrust policy?, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology
>9(2), 1996, pages 283-318.
>
>  These scholars, as we have already seen, are highly skeptical of
>  the network externality theory of market failure.  In this article
>  they apply their critiques to antitrust issues, arguing that the
>  foresight and sophistication of market participants is sufficient
>  to ensure that the best technology wins in a standards competition.
>  The consequence, of course, is that the government has no reason
>  intervene.
>
>Recommended
>
>W. Brian Arthur, Competing technologies: An overview, in Giovanni
>Dosi, Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg, and
>Luc Soete, eds, Technical Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter,
>1988.
>
>  Arthur's economic model of technological lock-in through positive
>  returns to scale suggests that monopolies can arise through
>  self-reinforcing market mechanisms, and that those mechanisms do
>  not necessarily select the optimal technology.  The model abstracts
>  away from far too many aspects of real-world technology markets
>  to be evaluated in isolation, but it suggests many possible lines
>  of research.  I have included it as a recommended reading because
>  is cited heavily in both the popular and legal literature.
>
>James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao, Standard-setting consortia,
>antitrust, and high-technology industries, Antitrust Law Journal 64,
>1995, pages 247-265.
>
>  Standardization activities, whether conducted through formal
>  standards organizations or through private consortia, strongly
>  resemble illegal marketplace collusion.  Society obviously needs
>  standards, however, and so it is important to determine the
>  difference between socially necessary standardization activities
>  and standardization activities that mask illegal market fixing.
>  This article applies some of the economic theories that we've
>  already read to an analysis of the problem.
>
>Joseph Kattan, Market power in the presence of an installed base,
>Antitrust Law Journal 62, 1993, pages 1-21.
>
>  On one analysis, the dispute between the Justice Department and
>  Microsoft concerns what antitrust lawyers call "tying".  This
>  article analyzes the leading tying case, in which Kodak required
>  the companies that bought its photocopiers to purchase parts and
>  supplies for those copiers exclusively from Kodak.  The intuition
>  is that this constitutes restraint of trade to the extend that the
>  vendor has market power, and the question then arises of what market
>  power is and how one measures it.
>
>
>Week 10 / Implementation
>
>  We'll focus mainly on the case studies this week, so the reading
>  is light.  I just want to remind us that proclaiming a standard does
>  not automatically cause the world to become uniform.  This week's
>  readings, therefore, show what happens when standards are put into
>  practice.  In particular, I want to point at the interaction between
>  the standardization of information and communications technologies,
>  which has been our primary focus, and the standardization of
>  everything else in the world.
>
>Stefan Timmermans and Marc Berg, Standardization in action: Achieving
>local universality through medical protocols, Social Studies of
>Science 27(2), 1997, pages 273-305.
>
>  Several traditions in science and technology studies have
>  used ethnographic methods to argue that standards are social
>  constructions.  That doesn't mean that they aren't real, but it
>  does force a sophisticated rethinking of what it means for them to
>  be real.  This article derives from the same "actor network" school
>  as Callon's article in week 2.  It describes some of work that is
>  required in executing work processes in a standardized way -- that
>  is, in a way that a bureaucracy can recognize as conforming to a
>  standard -- together with the cascading consequences of this work.
>
>Geoffrey Bowker, Information mythology: The world of/as information,
>in Lisa Bud-Frierman, ed, Information Acumen: The Understanding and
>Use of Knowledge in Modern Business, London: Routledge, 1994.
>
>  Technical people are accustomed to defining the behavior of a
>  computer solely in terms of its internal workings.  As Bowker
>  points out, however, most computers process information that
>  derives from diverse places and times in the world.  Those numbers
>  will only be useful if they are commensurable, and they will only
>  be commensurable if the world itself is standardized, together with
>  the practices by which the numbers are defined and captured.  Simple
>  though it may be, this observation has profound consequences for our
>  understanding of computers and computation.
>
>Mark Casson, Economic perspectives on business information, in Lisa
>Bud-Frierman, ed, Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of
>Knowledge in Modern Business, London: Routledge, 1994.
>
>  Casson's chapter is a whirlwind introduction to information
>  economics.  Markets are frequently claimed to have near-miraculous
>  properties, but underneath those claims are numerous assumptions,
>  including the assumption that information is plentiful and free.
>  But information is a commodity that gets produced and distributed
>  like any other, and it will only get produced in large quantities
>  if somebody pays for it.  One consequence of this seeming paradox,
>  Casson argues, is that increases in the efficiency of information
>  production will cause reality to approximate the wonderland of
>  economics.  Put this argument together with Bowker's, and it
>  becomes possible to comprehend the profound embedding of computers
>  in evolving institutional arrangements.
>
>
>Reading list
>
>The following is a complete list of the works that I consulted in
>preparing the syllabus.  If you are aware of other relevant materials,
>I would greatly appreciate a citation that I can include in future
>editions of the course.
>
>Frederick M. Abbott, Public policy and global technological
>integration: An introduction, Chicago-Kent Law Review 72, 1996, pages
>345-356.
>
>Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, antitrust consent
>decrees, and the need for a proper scope of judicial review, Antitrust
>Law Journal 65, 1996, pages 1-40.
>
>Cristiano Antonelli, The dynamics of technological interrelatedness:
>The case of information and communication technologies, in Dominique
>Foray and Christopher Freeman, eds, Technology and the Wealth of
>Nations: The Dynamics of Constructed Advantage, London: Pinter, 1993.
>
>W. Brian Arthur, Competing technologies, increasing returns, and
>lock-in by historical events, The Economic Journal 99, 1989, pages
>116-131.
>
>W. Brian Arthur, Increasing returns and the new world of business,
>Harvard Business Review 74(4), 1996, pages 100-109.
>
>William P. Barnett, The organizational ecology of a technological
>system, Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1), 1990, pages 31-60.
>
>George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, Cambridge: Cambridge
>University Press, 1988.
>
>Stanley M. Besen and Garth Saloner, The economics of
>telecommunications standards, in Robert W. Crandall and Kenneth
>Flamm, eds, Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International
>Competition, and Regulation in Communications, Washington, DC:
>Brookings, 1989.
>
>Stanley M. Besen and Joseph Farrell, The role of the ITU in
>standardization: Pre-eminence, impotence or rubber stamp?,
>Telecommunications Policy 15(4), 1991, pages 311-321.
>
>Marjory S. Blumenthal, Realizing the information future: Technology,
>economics, and the Open Data Network, in Gerald W. Brock, ed, Toward a
>Competitive Telecommunication Industry: Selected Papers from the 1994
>Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum,
>1995.
>
>Severin Borenstein, Repeat-buyer programs in network industries, in
>Werner Sichel and Donald L. Alexander, eds, Networks, Infrastructure,
>and the New Task for Regulation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
>Press, 1996.
>
>Stephen A. Brown, Revolution at the Checkout Counter: The Explosion of
>the Bar Code, Harvard University Press, 1997.
>
>Michel Callon, The dynamics of techno-economic networks, in Rod
>Coombs, Paolo Saviotti, and Vivien Walsh, eds, Technological Change
>and Company Strategies, London: Academic Press, 1992.
>
>Michel Callon, Variety and irreversibility in networks of technique
>conception and adoption, in Dominique Foray and Christopher Freeman,
>eds, Technology and the Wealth of Nations: The Dynamics of Constructed
>Advantage, London: Pinter, 1993.
>
>Carl F. Cargill, Information Technology Standards: Theory, Process,
>and Organizations, Digital Press, 1989.
>
>Carl Cargill, Justifying the need for a standards program, in Robert
>B. Toth, ed, Standards Management: A Handbook for Profits, New York:
>American National Standards Institute, 1990.
>
>Carl F. Cargill, A five-segment model of standardization, in
>Brian Kahin and Janet Abbate, eds, Standards Policy for Information
>Infrastructure, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
>
>Jay Pil Choi, Irreversible choice of uncertain technologies with
>network externalities, RAND Journal of Economics 25(3), 1994, pages
>382-401.
>
>Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal, Network effects, software provision,
>and standardization, Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1), 1992,
>pages 85-103.
>
>Fabrizio Coricelli and Giovanni Dosi, Coordination and order in
>economic change and the interpretative power of economic theory, in
>Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg,
>and Luc Soete, eds, Technical Change and Economic Theory, London:
>Pinter, 1988.
>
>Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public
>Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
>
>Robin Cowan, High technology and the economics of standardization,
>in Meinholf Dierkes and Ute Hoffman, eds, New Technology at the Outset:
>Social Forces in the Shaping of Technological Innovations, Frankfurt:
>Campus Verlag, 1992.
>
>Robert W. Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds, Changing the Rules:
>Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in
>Communications, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1989.
>
>Rhonda J. Crane, The Politics of International Standards: France and
>the Color TV War, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1979.
>
>D. Crocker, Making standards the IETF way, StandardView 1(1), 1993,
>pages 48-54.
>
>Terry Curtis and Hajime Oniki, Economic and political factors in
>telecommunication standards setting in the US and Japan: The case of
>BISDN, in Gerard Pogorel, ed, Global Telecommunications Strategies and
>Technological Changes, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1994.
>
>Paul A. David, Clio and the economics of QWERTY, American Economic
>Review 72(2), 1985, pages 332-337.
>
>Paul A. David, Path-dependence and predictability in dynamic systems
>with local network externalities: A paradigm for historical economics,
>in Dominique Foray and Christopher Freeman, eds, Technology and the
>Wealth of Nations: The Dynamics of Constructed Advantage, London:
>Pinter, 1993.
>
>Paul A. David and Dominique Foray, Percolation structures, Markov
>random fields and the economics of EDI standards diffusion, in Gerard
>Pogorel, ed, Global Telecommunications Strategies and Technological
>Changes, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1994.
>
>Paul A. David and Geoffrey S. Rothwell, Standardization, diversity,
>and learning: Strategies for the coevolution of technology and
>industrial capacity, Publication No. 402, Center for Economic Policy
>Research, Stanford University, 1994.
>
>William J. Drake, Europe in the new global standardization
>environment, in Charles Steinfield, Laurence Caby, and Johannes Bauer,
>eds, Telecommunications in Europe: Changing Policies, Services and
>Technologies, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992.
>
>Nicholas Economides, A monopolist's incentive to invite competitors
>to enter in telecommunications services, in Gerard Pogorel, ed, Global
>Telecommunications Strategies and Technological Changes, Amsterdam:
>North-Holland, 1994.
>
>Nicholas Economides and Charles Himmelberg, Critical mass and network
>evolution in telecommunications, in Gerald W. Brock, ed, Toward a
>Competitive Telecommunication Industry: Selected Papers from the 1994
>Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum,
>1995.
>
>Joseph Farrell, Arguments for weaker intellectual property protection
>in network industries, StandardView 3(2), 1995, pages 46-49.
>
>Joseph Farrell, Harnesses and muzzles: Greed as engine and threat in
>the standards process, StandardView 4(1), 1996, pages 29-31.
>
>Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization, compatibility, and
>innovation, RAND Journal of Economics 16(1), 1985, pages 70-83.
>
>Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Competition, compatibility and
>standards: The economics of horses, penguins and lemmings, in
>H. Landis Gabel, ed, Product Standardization and Competitive Strategy,
>Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987.
>
>Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Converters, compatibility, and the
>control of interfaces, Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1), 1992,
>pages 9-35.
>
>Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan, and Joen E. Greenwood, Folded,
>Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM, Cambridge:
>MIT Press, 1983.
>
>Dominique Foray, Coalitions and committees: How users get involved
>in information technology (IT) standards, in Richard Hawkins, Robin
>Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds, Standards, Innovation and Competitiveness:
>The Politics and Economics of Standards in Natural and Technical
>Environments, Edward Elgar, 1995.
>
>H. Landis Gabel, ed, Product Standardization and Competitive Strategy,
>Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987.
>
>Neil Gandal, Hedonic price indexes for spreadsheets and an empirical
>test for network externalities, RAND Journal of Economics 25(3), 1994,
>pages 160-170.
>
>D. Linda Garcia, Standard setting in the United States: Public and
>private sector roles, Journal of the American Society for Information
>Science 43(8), 1992, pages 531-537.
>
>Richard J. Gilbert, Symposium on compatibility: Incentives and market
>structure, Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1), 1992, pages 1-8.
>
>George Gilbert, The battle for the enterprise backbone, Beyond the
>Enterprise 1(1), 1997.
>
>E. M. Gray and Dennis Bodson, Preserving due process in standards
>work, StandardView 3(4), 1995, pages 130-139.
>
>Shane M. Greenstein, Invisible hands and visible advisors: An economic
>analysis of standardization, Journal of the American Society for
>Information Science 43(8), 1992, pages 538-549.
>
>Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust tie-in analysis after Kodak: Understanding
>the role of market imperfections, Antitrust Law Journal 62, pages
>264-325.
>
>Peter Grindley and Saadet Toker, Establishing standards for Telepoint:
>Problems of fragmentation and commitment, in Gerard Pogorel, ed,
>Global Telecommunications Strategies and Technological Changes,
>Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1994.
>
>Martyne M. Hallgren and Alan K. McAdams, The economic efficiency of
>Internet public goods, in Lee W. McKnight and Joseph P. Bailey, eds,
>Internet Economics, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
>
>Jerry A. Hausman, Proliferation of networks in telecommunications:
>Technological and economic considerations, in Werner Sichel and Donald
>L. Alexander, eds, Networks, Infrastructure, and the New Task for
>Regulation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
>
>Richard Hawkins, Robin Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds, Standards,
>Innovation and Competitiveness: The Politics and Economics of
>Standards in Natural and Technical Environments, Edward Elgar, 1995.
>
>Richard W. Hawkins, Standards-making as technological diplomacy:
>Assessing objectives and methodologies in standards institutions,
>in Richard Hawkins, Robin Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds, Standards,
>Innovation and Competitiveness: The Politics and Economics of
>Standards in Natural and Technical Environments, Edward Elgar, 1995.
>
>Michel Hergert, Technical standards and competition in the
>microcomputer industry, in H. Landis Gabel, ed, Product
>Standardization and Competitive Strategy, Amsterdam: North-Holland,
>1987.
>
>Linda F. Hogle, Standardization across non-standard domains: The case
>of organ procurement, Science, Technology, and Human Values 20(4),
>1995, pages 482-500.
>
>Kai Jacobs, Rob Procter, and Robin Williams, Users and
>standardization: Worlds apart? The example of electronic mail,
>StandardView 4(4), 1996, pages 183-191.
>
>Eric Jaeger, Review of Information Technology Standards: Quest for the
>Common Byte by Martin Libicki, StandardView 3(4), 1995, pages 159-161.
>
>Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Path dependence in corporate
>contracting: Increasing returns, herd behavior and cognitive biases,
>Washington University Law Quarterly 74, 1996, pages 347-366.
>
>Brian Kahin, Information technology and information infrastructure,
>in Lewis M. Branscomb, ed, Empowering Technology: Implementing a US
>Strategy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
>
>Brian Kahin and James H. Keller, eds, Coordinating the Internet,
>Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
>
>Brian Kahin and Janet Abbate, eds, Standards Policy for Information
>Infrastructure, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
>
>Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network externalities, competition,
>and compatibility, American Economic Review 75(3), 1985, pages
>424-440.
>
>Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Product introduction with network
>externalities, Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1), 1992, pages
>55-83.
>
>Michael Klausner, Corporations, corporate law, and networks of
>contracts, Virginia Law Review 81, 1995, pages 757-852.
>
>Rob Kling and Suzanne Iacono, The mobilization of support for
>computerization: The role of computerization movements, Social
>Problems 35(3), 1988, pages 226-243.
>
>Andreas Knie, Yesterday's decisions determine tomorrow's options:
>The case of the mechanical typewriter, in Meinholf Dierkes and Ute
>Hoffman, eds, New Technology at the Outset: Social Forces in the
>Shaping of Technological Innovations, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1992.
>
>Ken Krechmer, Recommendations for the global information highway:
>A matter of standards, StandardView 4(1), 1996, pages 24-28.
>
>Ken Krechmer, Technical standards: Foundations of the future,
>StandardView 4(1), 1996, pages 4-8.
>
>Herbert Kubicek and Peter Seeger, The negotiation of data standards:
>A comparative analysis of EAN- and EFT/POS-systems, in Meinholf Dierkes
>and Ute Hoffman, eds, New Technology at the Outset: Social Forces in
>the Shaping of Technological Innovations, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
>1992.
>
>Robert H. Lande, Chicago takes it on the chin: Imperfect information
>could play a crucial role in the post- Kodak world, Antitrust Law
>Journal 62, 1993, pages 193-202.
>
>Bruno Latour, Technology is society made durable, in John Law, ed,
>A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination,
>London: Routledge, 1991.
>
>Martin C. Libicki, Second-best practices for interoperability,
>StandardView 4(1), 1996, pages 32-35.
>
>S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, The fable of the keys,
>Journal of Law and Economics 33, 1990, pages 1-25.
>
>Robin Mansell, Standards, industrial policy and innovation, in Richard
>Hawkins, Robin Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds, Standards, Innovation and
>Competitiveness: The Politics and Economics of Standards in Natural
>and Technical Environments, Edward Elgar, 1995.
>
>Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau, Compatibility and bundling of
>complementary goods in a duopoly, Journal of Industrial Economics
>40(1), 1992, pages 37-54.
>
>John R. McIntyre, ed, Japan's Technical Standards: Implications for
>Global Trade and Competitiveness, Westport, CT: Quorum, 1997.
>
>Lance McKee, OGC: User-mediated technology drives vendor opportunity,
>StandardView 4(4), 1996, pages 192-197.
>
>Judith A. Molka, Surrounded by standards, there is a simpler view,
>Journal of the American Society for Information Science 43(8), 1992,
>pages 526-530.
>
>Geoffrey A. Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-Tech
>Products to Mainstream Customers, New York: Harper Business, 1991.
>
>Marco R. Negrete, Setting up the standards organization within a
>manufacturing company, in Robert B. Toth, ed, Standards Management: A
>Handbook for Profits, New York: American National Standards Institute,
>1990.
>
>Richard Nelson, The roles of firms in technical advance: A perspective
>from evolutionary theory, in Giovanni Dosi, Renato Giannetti, and
>Pier Angelo Toninelli, eds, Technology and Enterprise in a Historical
>Perspective, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
>
>Steven Oksala, Anthony Rutkowski, Michael Spring, and Jon O'Donnell,
>The structure of IT standardization, StandardView 4(1), 1996, pages
>9-22.
>
>John C. Panzar, Technological determinants of firm and industry
>structure, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds, Handbook
>of Industrial Organization, volume 1, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989.
>
>Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and technological infrastructures for
>electronic payment systems, Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
>Journal 22, 1996, pages 1-60.
>
>David J. Phillips, Cryptography, secrets, and the structuring of
>trust, in Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg, eds, Technology and
>Privacy: The New Landscape, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
>
>Gerald H. Ritterbusch, Function of a standards program, in Robert
>B. Toth, ed, Standards Management: A Handbook for Profits, New York:
>American National Standards Institute, 1990.
>
>Nathan Rosenberg, Telecommunications: Complex, uncertain, and path
>dependent, in Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics, and
>History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
>
>Liori Salter, Mandated Science: Science and Scientists in the Making
>of Standards, Kluwer, 1988.
>
>Susanne K. Schmidt and Raymund Werle, Coordinating Technology: Studies
>in the International Standardization of Telecommunications, MIT Press,
>1997.
>
>Lee L. Selwyn, Market failure in "open" telecommunication networks:
>Defining the new "natural monopoly", in Werner Sichel and Donald
>L. Alexander, eds, Networks, Infrastructure, and the New Task for
>Regulation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
>
>Oliver R. Smoot, Tension and synergism between standards and
>intellectual property, StandardView 3(2), 1995, pages 60-67.
>
>Mark Shurmer and Gary Lea, Telecommunications standardization and
>intellectual property rights: A fundamental dilemma?, StandardView
>3(2), 1995, pages 50-59.
>
>Michael B. Spring and Lois F. Lunin, Introduction and overview
>[special issue on information technology standards], Journal of the
>American Society for Information Science 43(8), 1992, pages 522-525.
>
>Michael B. Spring, Information technology standards, Annual Review of
>Information Science and Technology 26, 1991, pages 79-111.
>
>Susan Leigh Star, Power, technologies and the phenomenology of
>conventions: On being allergic to onions, in John Law, ed, A Sociology
>of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, London:
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