Diana McCarty on Sun, 7 Sep 1997 00:42:51 +0200 (MET DST) |
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<nettime> Heim's Anxieties 3 |
4. Finding WAYS TO EVALUATE As I said, I identify particularly with humanists, not the sect of true believers but thinkers whose primary concern is the way humans interact. Humanists have taken special interest in language and the arts, because there we find human interaction crystalized. Humanists have what almost amounts to a fetish about written texts. I recall my own experience with Eugen Fink in Freiburg. He was an eminent philosopher teaching a highly-praised course in Immanuel Kant's CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. When I entered his seminar in Freiburg in 1972, he and a loyal group of students had been working their way through Immanuel Kant's CRITIQUE. They had already spent ten semesters on the CRITIQUE. I entered on the first day of the 11th semester. They were continuing where they had left off discussing the text the year before. When I sat down the first class, I was amazed when everyone opened their texts to page 30 of the Introduction. This is how far they had gotten in five years time! I can tell you we had not yet cracked Chapter One when I left Germany two years later! (Of course, all the graduate students had read the CRITIQUE on their own, perhaps even as undergraduates, but this painstaking line-by-line analysis was not uncommon in the traditional German university.) Humanists try to judge the impact of computers on language and on our psyche. Is there some incorrigible crankiness in humanism or are the liberal arts customarily laced with "negative vibes"? Not exactly. Humanists traditionally study, relish, and speculate on human language activity. When they notice long-range changes in our language and notice how these changes connect with the changes in the technologies of symbol manipulation, then they pay attention. Humanists see language as an indicator of our awareness of who we are as a species. Humanists see the changes in language as indicating some shifts in our self-concept. The humanist is not stuck narrowly within our present-day experiences. As individuals, humanists are often thrilled with the efficiency and power of computing machines. But the humanist also tries to perceive the philosophical intent, the long-range thrust of the computer. The humanist tries to understand the computer as it originated, as an idea. If we narrow our vision exclusively to the present tense, our views would be obsolete in a couple years. Only by going beneath the surface, down to the philosophical roots, can we anticipate the future and absorb its shock. In other words, the humanistic study of digital writing takes us back in time, whereas most people online today are turning primarily toward the future -- as pioneers should. Nevertheless, as a humanist, I do believe we sometimes must go back to the future. The future is always steered by the expectations and limitations of what we have inherited from the past. So, by becoming more deeply aware of the past -- making the past more conscious, -- we gain greater freedom for the true novelty of the future. Otherwise we are doomed to repeat ourselves without even knowing it. So it is hard to be a humanist today when the rate of change accelerates. We end up being ambivalent, especially about this medium we are using. Most participants on this network are de facto pioneers and partisans of the medium. We are in the process of creating a medium. This is heady business. Like any group of pioneers, we can rightly brush criticism aside, asserting our need to focus exclusively on the positive future we are shaping. In this light, negative criticisms seem ill- mannered if not poorly timed. Utopians try to achieve an ideal world through control and through mechanisms of planning. Dystopians are these who attack utopians. Neither utopian nor dystopian, the humanist sees the spectrum of history and realizes that utopias belong to our human man nature, that utopias lure us into fulfilling a destiny that is uniquely ours. Nevertheless, humanists take part in destiny by doing what they do best, and that is to ask questions. They ask not, How can we continue doing what we are doing, or How can we do it better, but instead they ask, Why should we at all do what we are doing? What is the point of it anyway? How does what we are doing affect ourselves as human beings? How do we match up to our ancestors? Such questions do not always make the humanist welcome and may even make humanists seem mere annoyances, like horse flies. Isn't that what Socrates found out? 5. WORRY in the GLOBAL VILLAGE One of the strongest, most appealing qualities of computerized writing is the construction of the networks we are using here and which we are in the process of creating. In our modern world, communication technology holds a special allure. This is because the computer seems to give what technology in general has taken away. Oddly enough, computer networks promise to fill a void left by other technological bulldozers. Technology has increasingly eliminated direct human interdependence. Our devices give us a greater of amount of personal freedom and autonomy, but at the same time they disrupt the familiar and intimate networks of personal association. Because our machines automate so much of our labor, we have less to do with each another, or at least we can choose the degree of our associations. Because machines provide us with the power to flit around the universe, the roots of our communities are fragile, airy, and ephemeral. Isolation is a major problem. I mean spiritual isolation, not physical isolation. I mean the kind that can plague individuals even on crowded city streets. So the computer appears as a potential counter measure to technological isolation. In contemporary society, the computer network appears to be a godsend by bringing people into closer personal proximity. Networks like "The Well" are just the more well-known computer antidotes to the atomism of our society. They become social nodes to foster those elective affinities that everyday life does not offer by happenstance. I see now that a business in San Francisco is even arranging "buddies for lunch" as a kind of computerized dating service applied to friendship. The computer becomes an active or passive center for organizing affinities. Despite the good intentions and the limited good effects of these networks, there is a paradox here that troubles the humanist. The humanist's anxiety takes a clue from the genesis of computer networking. The origin of computer communication tells us something about the inner thrust of the tool itself. What seems to be a neutral tool, something available for good or ill, may in fact inherently slant our psychic life. It may tilt users in a definite direction, a direction which contravenes their conscious intentions. Computers may at first liberate societies through increased communication. They may even help foment revolutions (I think of the computer printouts in Tienanmen Square during the pro- democracy uprising last year). but the even earlier inaugural application of the tool may belie its short-range impact. And even prior to the first applications, the original design of the tool may hide from us its long-range impact. While de facto computer conferencing is taking on a life of its own today, the future may demonstrate how strong the inner direction of a technology is, how powerful its inner guiding telos. The original impetus behind computer mediated communication was in maximizing the management and control of individuals. CMC originated with the Pentagon, and the basic research for our conferencing and word-processing equipment was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense (its ARPA project). It is true that the genesis of something does not necessarily determine its ultimate purpose or its final use, but the genesis of a thing often provides a good indicator as to where it may take us overall. Put simply, the origin of computerized communication does not point to a deeply democratic tendency or to a grassroots freedom movement. Moving from the Pentagon to business corporations, computer networks held out the promise of one or another type of controlling network. The military weaves a tighter net of control than business corporations, but both use the word "communications" in a way that alters what humanists mean by the term. When the theory of computer-mediated communication (Harry Stevens and Murray Turoff) speaks of "organizing people" and achieving more participation, we should not imagine that this means a radical democratization -- except in the vaguest terms. We should instead think of businesses managing their employees, all the better to make them more productive, or we should imagine a more efficient military chain-of-command in the government. After all, this is the original semantic domain from which the language of "participation" and "collaboration" originally came into computer networks. To enhance organizations, is not of itself a humanistic achievement. Computers are powerful devices for collecting and centralizing information. Gee-whiz abstractions like "supernetworking globally" may sound harmless now, like some exciting adventure out of Star Wars or like a page out of The Inevitable Progress of History by G.W.F. Hegel. In the pre-glasnost, cold- war era, terms like "global village" and the "Global Society" carried with them a suggestion of peace, a promise of diminished confrontation in a nuclear world. But an actual global network may in fact homogenize individual societies, forcing them into a common mold. A "global village" can be a mask for exploitation under which we hide the drive to render the entire planet a mere resource for omnivorous human consumption. Can you imagine the "softer than software protocols" that could structure the "dialog" among millions and not at the same time dwarf the individuals involved? Isn't this the way the word democracy has been used in this century? -- by inherently centrist forces? We might piously hope that a global network management might succeed at turning the passive TV audience into an active, interactive group that exchanges information for mutual betterment. Still, we have seen how our most powerful communications tools have become primarily sites for entertainment (Neil Postman). Welcome to "active lurking"! with millions on line, we can expect to lurk. lurk, lurk. And while we're doing so, we might as well lurk actively -- whatever that means. Answering questionnaires will never give me a sense of power or input. The sheer number of participants excludes any sense of involvement. It's like a classroom: the larger the class size, the fewer the serious questions. One solution to the pedagogical problem is to replace the instructor with A/V equipment and canned lectures. I think of a comment Paul Levinson made when, as a lecturer on CONNECT ED, I complained of the sheer abundance of textual material generated by computers today. He said, if you can't beat them, join them! The problem then becomes not one of what to listen to but how to get a word in. I must say that such a situation strikes me as irredeemably nihilistic. nothing will get said when everyone is talking and no one is listening. Listening is an active receptivity, and it is essential to real communication. That is the Achilles' heel of the large centralized systems, whether of business or the military. They offer only an illusory gesture of listening. This is because they must actively structure and organize -- even while they are pretending they are receptively listening. This is where the bad taste comes in the connotations of the corporate word "communication." (It usually means one-way address.) How do you install silence and seriousness reflection on a global system? Computer networks may usher in a post-industrial kind of organization. But this does not mean that control of the individual's life and time are not greater than in the industrial era. In fact, what better tool than the computer could be invented to manage the individual's life -- even if under the guise of allowing more individual "input." A network is still a net -- in which we are ensnared and our lifetimes captured. Reflections Part Three Reflections Reflections the Reflections on computer screen Reflections on computer screen Reflections on computer screen Reflections Reflections the Reflections Reflections Reflections by Michael Heim 6. The OTHER SIDE of COTECHNOLOGY Soon after learning how to use computers we get over our initial worries. We no longer care to hear about general psychological hazards like "technostress" (Craig Brod) or the fear of sprouting a "second self" (Sherry Turkle) made in the image of the computer. Instead we begin to appreciate the power we have when our reading and writing are computerized. We see the positive side of our digital language. Digital language over the modem brings new kinds of personal associations which seem to hold out the hope of integrating us in an increasingly isolated world. Soon we hear suggestions that this network can expand and become an all-embracing world wide "cotechnology" (Stevens). We hear thoughts about a "multi-dimensional organizational matrix." Now we are getting into big thinking, into system-building. The system naturally leads us to focus on integration, not on individuality and uniqueness. Of course, ideally we would have it all. But the trade-offs are inevitable. We are finite. So we begin to argue with ourselves. Some people believe that a global network could solve many problems: coordinate the technical skills of humanity so that we could increase the standard of living of all, control excess, reduce waste, improve the environment, halt the arms race, provide more, not less, constructive employment, etc. But to others it is just as likely that these efforts and skills, in certain hands, could increase the wealth of the wealthy through the further subjugation of the powerless and oppressed in our world, encourage excess and waste in the interest of profits, collaborate to rape the environment in a Faustian bargain, etc. (Weren't there similar utopian visions of atomic power?) There is no guarantee that we will use a global network to good ends. Furthermore, there may be something about the medium itself which favors a certain vision. There is a certain vision in the medium itself. And it is a vision more likely to oppress individuals than any previous forms of technology. The computer network is not a neutral computer application which works like a tool for either the morally upright persons or the morally twisted. The internal thrust of the computer informs the networks that we can create on it. The internal thrust of the computer is distinctive and powerful. We can think of it as a spider's web, lying in wait for the deposit of everything random and free. As we focus on expanding and integrating systems, we willy-nilly tighten the noose on planetary diversity and individuality. Because of the lure of its power, the web will inevitably grow. What it spins is not intrinsically liberating for humans. The genesis of the computer points to the internal essence of cotechnology. The historical-philosophical genesis of the computer shows that it was more than an instrument to serve any arbitrary or freely intended purpose. The original computers, those crude prototypes by Leibniz and Pascal, contained the spark of total integration and control. Complete control over individuals was there in the original idea. Only now the idea dawns on us in the full light of day. Underneath the computer's calculating power lies an inner core sprung from a seed planted two centuries ago. The origin contains the core, the inner telos, the half-forgotten truth about computers. The initial germ for the birth of computers began with the rationalist philosophers of the 17th century who were passionate in their efforts to design a world language. The notion of a world language arose in the early modern period. Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) founded modern logic as the science of symbols. With his rationalism Leibniz placed his stamp on the modern mindset. His work envisioned a total text, a unified language under a single controlling insight. Leibniz's computer prototypes contained this vision only seminally. His monadological metaphysics, though, gives us a clearer notion of what lay behind the crude prototype. Leibniz could build machines capable only of numeric calculation. The Leibnizean machines could do deductive proofs using Leibniz's binary computational logic. Centuries later -- after the contributions of Boole, Venn, Russell, Whitehead, and Shannon -- symbolic logic could handle both deductive proofs and electronic circuits. Later, John von Neumann would use Leibnizean binary numbers to develop digital computers at Princeton. But what Leibniz lacked in hardware he made up for in speculative imagination. Leibniz's speculations revolved around language, specifically around a universal emotion-free language. On the practical side, he was a courtier, a diplomat, and an ecumenical theologian. He strove to unify the European world. His idealism brought him to believe that, by focusing on the new physical sciences, the national states of Europe could unite under a shared project, namely, scientific research. In an age of religious wars and growing nation states, Leibniz imagined a world federation based on common linguistic symbols. He advocated a universal system of symbols for all the sciences. He hoped that a rational scientific language might smooth the way for international cooperation. Leibniz believed that all problems are in principle soluble. The first step is to create a universal medium in which to communicate. With a universal language, you can translate all human notions and disagreements into the same basic set of symbols. A universal character set (Characteristica Universalis) can absorb every significant statement or piece of reasoning for use in a logical calculus, a system for proving things true or false -- or at least for showing them to be consistent or inconsistent. Through a commonly shared language, many discordant ways of thinking can exist under a single roof. Disagreements in attitude or belief, once translated into matching symbols, can yield to logical operations. Problems that before seemed insoluble can stand on a common ground. In his search for a universal calculating language, Leibniz was to some extent continuing a pre-modern medieval-scholastic tradition. That medieval tradition held that human thinking (in its pure or ideal form) was more or less identical with logical reasoning and argument. To the partisans of dispute Leibniz would say, "Let us put this into our common language, let us sit down and figure it out, let us calculate." He worked on a single system to encompass all the combinations and permutations of human thought. He longed for symbols to foster unified scientific research throughout the civilized world. The universal calculus would compile all human cultures, bringing human languages into a single shared database. Lurking behind Leibniz's ideal language is a pre-modern model of human intelligence. That model measures humans against a Being who knows things perfectly. Human knowledge models itself on the way a divine or infinite Being knows things. Finite beings go slowly, one step at a time, seeing only moment by moment what is happening. On the path of life, a finite being cannot see clearly the things that remain behind on the path nor the things that are going to happen after the next step. A divine mind, on the contrary, oversees the whole path. God sees all the trails below, inspecting at a single glance every step travelled, what has happened and even what will happen on all possible paths below. God views things from the perspective of the mountain top of eternity, sub specie aeternitatis. Human knowledge, thought Leibniz, should emulate this VISIO DEI, this omniscient intuitive cognition of the Deity. no temporal unfolding, no linear steps, no delays, limit God's knowledge of things. The temporal simultaneity, the all-at-once-ness of God's knowledge serves as a model for human knowledge in the modern world as projected by the work of Leibniz. The power of Leibniz's modern logic made traditional logic seem puny by comparison. Aristotle's traditional logic was taught in the schools for centuries. Logic traditionally evaluated the steps of finite human thought, valid or invalid, as they occur in arguments in natural language. Traditional logic stayed close to spoken natural language. When modern logic absorbed the steps of Aristotle's logic into a system of symbols, modern logic became a network of symbols which could apply equally well to electronic switching circuits as to arguments in natural language. Just as non-Euclidean geometry can make up axioms that defy the domain of real circles (physical figures), so too modern logic freed itself from any naturally given syntax. The universal logic calculus could govern computer circuits. The global network of cotechnology emulates a divine access to things. The global text of cotechnology will strive to become a net that traps all language into something like an eternal present. The net will place top priority on maintaining itself and securing its power. While the users will feel geographical and intellectual distances melt away, the cost they pay will be their ability to initiate what is truly new. The sense of their finite individual uniqueness will dwindle and their private thought will be dwarfed. The computer is an inherently unifying, integrating device. But this does not mean everyone will get involved. Hegel once said that, as far as Real Progress is concerned, the life of the solitary shepherd in the countryside is meaningless. People will fall through or around the net, either because they stubbornly resist the universal rationality or because their activity does not merit recognition by Progress. Today many people remain isolated, many who could benefit greatly from telecommunications. But they are simply not financially able to get into the loop. Maybe they will help us keep a sensible perspective on the Big Network. Our high-tech labor-saving devices can lead us to become a hive of drones steered by a power elite that runs the technology. We must be suspicious when organizers asks us to trust their "pluralistic open elites" whose power is based on deferring to competence without a basic emotional bond. As finite physical beings, we learn to trust what we directly and intuitively feel. Are we human beings ready for total integration under the surveillance of Leibniz's Central All- Knowing Monad? --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@icf.de and "info nettime" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@icf.de