Mark Stahlman (via RadioMail) on Thu, 12 Jun 1997 01:59:25 +0200 (MET DST) |
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<nettime> Three Faces of "Studied Irrationality" |
Three Faces of "Studied Irrationality" When I use the phrase "studied irrationality", I refer to a thought-system which holds to the notion that regardless of how hard we study the matter, human life is ultimately without rational meaning. This thought-system can be approached through many of its inter-related appearances, of which I have selected three of the more prominent, the phylogenetic, the psychological and the philosophical (or more specifically epistemological) -- but certainly not the only -- faces of the same underlying phenomenon. Perversely ironic and thoroughly pervasive, "studied irrationality" is the principle feature of current intellectual life in the West (and increasingly in the ex-East). "Studied irrationality" is the underlying justification for hedonistic consumption of Leviathan-eroticized propaganda and, in turn, the despair which supports the utopian drive for eco- illogical cyber-nation. And, without exaggerating, from a rational standpoint, it is abundantly clear that irrational people bent on satisfying their desires are as easy to control as the domesticated animals which they so closely resemble. By phylogenetic I specifically mean all those offshoots, grafting and seedpod which trace their post-modern roots to various utopian/occultist circles (particularly to Martin Heidegger in "philosophy" and more broadly to the Frankfurt School in social science). By psychologically, I mean all those attempts to use apparently rational discourse to rationalize personal desires -- usually by falsely crediting them with "revolutionary potential." And, by philosophically, I mean all those efforts to deny the creativity of human understanding by asserting that fundamental notions arise mysteriously in an ultimately mysterious (rationally meaningless) universe. Phylogenetics -- While I am mindful of false associations (pretending to further the aims of a "great" person to absorb some of that "greatness") and of guilt-by-association (accusing someone of adhering to views that are, for them, merely an useful topic of inquiry), nonetheless, sometimes a follower is just what they say they are -- a follower. Tracing one's intellectual parentage has become an increasingly serious business as intellectual spheres rigidity in their orthodoxy and (usually phony) factional conflicts substitute for once thoughtful scholarship. Tribes and teams form and lines of demarcation which become battle lines in mis-guided cultural wars are traced across the floors of lecture halls. Outside of the professionally committed, students find themselves forced to declare allegiances even though they are largely unaware of what is at stake and, in the process, whatever opportunity for real inquiry and thoughtful testing of ideas is largely destroyed. More and more, your ancestors *are* your identity in our global/tribal milieu. So, it is with "studied irrationality." If your "parents" were committed to irrationality, then it is likely that you will be as well. While there are many sources of "studied irrationality" in our times, Martin Heidegger ranks among the foremost. Clearly "studied" in every sense of the term, Heidegger's brand of irrationality came to the fore in the post-WW II West partly as a reaction against the cool, often hyper-logical character of Anglo-American Analytical philosophy and partly due to the instrumental role of irrationality in the larger utopian project of dismantling Western civilization for the purpose of the final solution to social instability through the re-engineering of humanity. Heidegger's story is now widely known. Officially and aggressively a Nazi, he was re-habilitated by, among others, his one-time mistress and student Hannah Arendt in the course of her effort to characterize totalitarianism as commonplace and even banal. As was widely held in the crucial formative decade following the end of WW II, any human could become a Fascist under the right conditions -- so we forgive Heidegger since he happened to fall into those conditions. In fact, as the foundational text of Social Psychology, "The Authoritarian Personality" by T. Adorno of the Frankfurt School and others and published in 1950, portrays the matter, authoritarianism is the incipient psychological condition of anyone who finds rational meaning in life. If you believe in intellectual "authority" (in the old sense of truth), you are a proto-Nazi "authoritarian" (in the newly devised sense) by definition. Heidegger (falsely) characterized himself and his work as outside the entirety of Western Philosophy. Certainly there was no problem with "authority" there. As John Caputo details in his fascinating volume, "The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought" (1978), by the 1950's Heidegger was forcefully attacking the basis of Western philosophy and, in particular, Western metaphysics. In his Frieburg lectures of 1955-56 ("The Principle of the Ground"), Heidegger built up to an exhaustive critique of Leibniz's notion that "nothing is without reason." As Caputo puts it: "Heidegger's critique of the Principle of Ground is for him not merely a critique of Leibniz. Rather, Leibniz's principle is the touchstone of the entire Western meta-physical tradition, i.e., the history of philosophy and reason in the West. . . What comes to a head in Leibniz's thought has been there from the beginning in Western philosophy and is with us still today, viz., the demand that a rationale or a ground be brought forth for whatever is held to be 'true'." (page 47) And, what does Heidegger suggest that we substitute for reason? Again, according to Caputo's analysis: "There are, according to Heidegger, two kinds of thought, meditative and calculative. . . Meditative thought deals with Being itself. . . Calculative thinking, on the other hand, is directed at beings. It employs representations and makes use of the laws of logic, both inductive and deductive. . . If one is interested in philosophy one must make a decision and find where one's heart lies. If one is truly interested in philosophy, in philosophy's deepest concern, then one must be prepared to overcome philosophy and take up the task of thought. Or if this task seems to be so much mysticism or mythology to the philosopher, then his only alternative is to become rational with a vengeance and to give oneself over to physical and social sciences." (pages 265-266) Yes, mysticism and meditation. Exquisitely irrational and, oh so much to study. Or, as Heidegger supporter T. Adorno finally put it in his "Jargon of Authenticity", "irrationality in the midst of the rational is the working atmosphere of the authentic." (page 47) Hmmm, social sciences. And, what might that mean? The Frankfurt School? According to Michel Foucault, the Frankfurt School's program was "rational critique of rationalism." And, the School's own Adorno referred to the task of philosophy as "a sort of rational appeal hearing against rationality." Or, as Karl Popper (George Soros' "mentor") stated in his recapitulation of what he regarded as his ambush by Adorno and others in the "positivism debate" of the 1960's regarding the influence of the School, "I would not hesitate to describe this influence by such terms as 'irrationalist' and 'intelligence-destroying'." Indeed, in the Frankfurt School's leading theoreticians (Horkheimer and Adorno) first major joint work, the 1947 "The Dialectics of Enlightenment", they present the view that myth necessarily consumes rationality: "Mythology itself set off the unending process of enlightenment in which ever and again, with the inevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic view succumbs to the destructive criticism that it is only a belief -- until even the very notions of spirit, of truth and, indeed, enlightenment itself, have become animistic magic." (page 11) Also in 1947, a group of Horkheimer's lectures (conceived in collaboration with Adorno) were published under the title "The Eclipse of Reason" in which two types of reason, subjective and objective, make their appearance and what is viewed as the inevitable triumph of the subjective over the objective is chronicled. In this book, Horkheimer details the task of philosophy in these terms: "Distorted though the great ideals of civilization -- justice, equality, freedom -- may be, they are nature's protestations against her plight, the only formulated testimonies we possess. Toward them philosophy should take a dual attitude. (1) It should deny their claims to being regarded as the ultimate and infinite truth. Wherever a metaphysical system presents these testimonies as absolute or eternal principles, it exposes their historical relativity. . . (2) It should be admitted that the basic cultural ideas have truth values, and philosophy should measure them against the social background from which they emanate." (page 182) And in the central lecture, "The Revolt of Nature", Horkheimer says that in the process in which meditation "is superseded by pragmatic knowledge","nature has lost its awesomeness, its 'qualitates occultae', but, completely deprived of the chance to speak through the minds of men even in the distorted language of those privileged groups [of speculative thinkers], nature seems to be taking its revenge." (page 103) Yes, meditate and attend too the occult but watch out for that revenge. Good, solid irrationalism and, oh so much to study. Further examples abound in the work of Heidegger and Horkheimer/Adorno as well as their epigoni of this overwhelming rejection of rationality as expressed throughout the history of Western philosophy and the favoring of utopian/occult irrationality as the only available option. Resorting to such views and using them as the basis for one's work and thoughts (often obliquely) is what I describe as the phylogenetic face of "studied irrationalism." Psychology -- What is at work here? Why would these German (and later their French counterpart) "philosophers" reject philosophy in favor of "instinct" and "meditation"? Was it to "fight fascism"? Was it simply despair over the failure of their youthful radicalism? No, as we have seen, some were, in fact, Nazis and/or professional collaborators of various brutalizing regimes themselves. And as any competent analysis would show, the central effect of these maneuvers has been to increase -- not decrease -- the pervasiveness of social control and, indeed, oppression throughout society. So, what was it that so infuriated them about the "bourgeoisie"? Why did they hate city-dwellers? Why did they hate civilization? What was it about progress and the ideas which sustained Western development which so wildly, madly compelled them to reject, refuse and criticize 2000+ years of human history? Could it be the notions of morality which accompany this progress? There can be little doubt that it was one of the major factors at work in these men's lives. Throughout these authors work and in thousands of ways in others who came after them, the alternative which is counter-posed to civilization is various forms of appeals to "instinct." "Authenticity" and overcoming the "alienation" imposed by civilization is a constant and rarely questioned theme. At the same time, morality is never present except as an object of ridicule (having been replaced, of course, by relativistic "situation ethics"). Indeed, "studied irrationalism" is plausibly little more than elaborate rationalization of whatever behaviors animated the lives of its practitioners. By and large, it appears that we are dealing with people who wanted to have a good time and then decided to make a career out of rationalizing the license they craved to that end. This should be a familiar phenomenon by now. Yes, I know how dangerous it is to attribute motives to anyone with whom you have no acquaintance. I don't know these people. It is always possible that other motives are involved. However, human psychology being what it is and the details such as they are known about the private lives of many of the contributors to the broad sweep of "studied irrationality" and the incessant claims about "liberation" from repressive restrictions put forward by the popular movements which base themselves on these authors, I have my suspicions. Take for example the fascinating study of the use of the psychedelic drug mescaline by the Frankfurt School's Walter Benjamin, among others. Maybe this is just another academic exercise, but I doubt it. Lately we have once again been treated to the theme that consumption of such drugs is potentially rebellious. Perhaps even revolutionary. Furthermore, any effort to discourage taking such drugs is not only repressive but actually brutally totalitarian -- by once again (incorrectly) drawing connections to events in Nazi Germany. Why, by this formidable illogic dropping acid must be another example of "fighting fascism", it would appear. Bull-dada. Since virtually every 6th grader in the U.S. knows where to find LSD and pot if they want it and "rebellion" is hardly the reality of their lives (unless delivering your baby at the high- school prom and then throwing it in the trashbin qualifies as "rebellion" or even "revenge"), the widespread availability and use of psychedelic and other drugs (including the electronic versions) is demonstrably pointing society in another direction than "revolution." Narcosis would be a better term. And in a period when keeping busy (or stoned) is increasingly replacing productive work -- unlike the Nazi era when squeezing out every drop of blood was a wartime imperative -- drug advocacy itself becomes the modern oppressive option. So, why would someone spend their time studying the details of one of their dead heroes drug "experiments"? Perhaps they wish to take drugs themselves. Perhaps what is at work here is simply rationalization masquerading as "criticism." It can be argued with great plausibility that many of the foundational precepts of both modernity and, yes, post- modernity, are largely based on the desire to be able to do whatever you want with and to whomever you want without any social restraint. This so-called "liberation" is more-and- more evidently a total fraud as millions of participants in one or another "liberationist" movements over the past few decades can readily testify (unless, of course, your goal is social control). For a more detailed treatment of "essential affinity between the utopian impulse and the perverse impulse" as well as the way in which this perverse-utopian impulse is exhibited in "forms of Freudo-Marxism, post- modernism, and psychoanalytic feminism that advocate its direct and full expression in the name of emaciation", the reader might wish to review Joel Whitebrook's thoughtful "Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory." (1995) It is no coincidence that Adorno was intensely engaged in studying the Marquis de Sade as he prepared to write "The Dialectics of Enlightenment." Just as it is no coincidence that libertarians throughout the ages have cited vice-master Bernard de Mandeville as their own phylogenetic root. Once again we have the two sides of the same coin. Based on the two most "honest" Enlightenment "liberation" writers, the apparent left (Adorno et al) and the apparent right (Hayek et al) dissolve into each others arms as bedmates swapping irrationalist doggerel and bodily fluids. Philosophy -- Smash philosophy. Go native. How romantic. Does such an irrational program deserve to be dignified by a rational critique? Perhaps not, but as easy as it may be to see the face of "studied irrationalism" in these current and degenerate forms, there is a far more intellectually substantial and far-wider reaching underpinning to this now epidemic thought-disease. Why does it appear to these characters that rationality must of necessity fail? What are they missing? The most straightforward means to describe their problem in philosophical terms is to return to the beginning. The problem of how one ultimately knows anything at all and, crucially, how one employs that knowledge creatively in our lives is hardly a novel 20th century concern. It is obviously quite ancient. Perhaps the most profoundly condensed effort to address this basic issue is contained at the end of Book VI of Plato's "Republic." It is known as the Simile of the Divided Line. In his exposition, Plato suggests (in dialogue form between Socrates and Glaucon) that we divide knowledge into the visible and the intellectual (or intelligible) and that we consider this division to be like a line divided into two unequal sections which we then divide again in the same proportions yielding four parts overall. He continues by asking us to think of the divisions of the visible as the images of reality and the "originals of these images." Likewise, we are to think of the divisions of the intelligible as the hypothetical and, ultimately, the final division as an understanding of what Plato calls the "unhypothetical first principle of everything" or, in another translation, "the first principle of the whole." Translated in various ways, the four divisions referred to in the Simile are, in Greek, "eikasia" (Imagination), "pistis" (Belief or Opinion), "dianoia" (Thought or Logic) and "noesis" (Understanding or Intellect). It is the apparent inability to grasp the integral character of these four elements and, in fact, the apparent need to insist on a sharp division between thought and understanding which lies at the heart of the "irrationalists" problem -- also an ancient problem. For, as described regarding Heidegger above, the division between "calculative" and "meditative" thought lies precisely at this boundary. And, as Horkheimer and Adorno states, ". . . every specific theoretic view succumbs to the destructive criticism that it is only a belief", which is clearly correct if there is no ability to proceed beyond mere hypothesis and logical operations on hypotheses to an understanding of first principles. As I noted, this problem is hardly a new one. Aristotle, Plato's student, failed to make the leap to understanding, either. The school generally known as the Neo-Platonists mystified this ability and, through a syncretism that is more Aristotle than Plato, frequently fulfilled the injunction of Horkheimer and Adorno and descending sharply into "animisitic magic." Throughout the earlier years of Christianity, Plato was clearly considered to be forcefully helpful in the association of God with the "unhypothetical first principle of everything." Augustine, the principle theologian of the early institutional church, is often considered to be one of the last true Platonists -- despite the fact that he did not read Greek and depended on many undependable translations and commentaries from the often unreliable Neo-Platonists. However, following the collapse of the Roman Empire, virtually all of this Greek philosophical material was lost to the West. First Aristotle's work re-appeared, informing Thomas Aquinas, and then in the 1400's Plato's dialogues were recovered and translated in Florence stimulating what we now refer to as the Florentine Renaissance. Throughout this and later periods, the same question of whether it was possible to rationally comprehend "first principles" was often a life and death issue. In Christian terms, the adequacy of revelation and even the desirability of attempting to rationally grasp God formed the basis of significant historical strife. For Platonists such as Cusa, Ficino, Erasmus and ultimately Leibniz, the Simile of the Divided Line and the cohesion of "understanding" with the three remaining aspects of knowledge was central to their work. All too often, for their opponents, it was not. Ultimately, the question of harmonizing faith with reason -- the Platonic and rational position -- was made moot by the crushing triumph of the Enlightenment over Renaissance humanism. In due course, rational proof of the existence of God and, indeed, the need for God itself was completely dispensed with. So, the position taken by those like Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno (our modern "irrationalist" rootstock) is therefore neither new nor unexpected. If one abandons the rational effort to unite faith with reason, then you are inevitably drawn into the position of a de Sade and his modern epigoni (or in more ancient terms, the Aristotelian position). Likewise, the social problems which arise from this violent disconnect between thought and understanding have powerful ancient expression in Plato. For what follows just after the Simile of The Divided Line is the Allegory of the Cave (in the opening of Book VII of the "Republic"). In the Allegory, prisoners are imagined to be chained so tightly beneath the surface that can only see shadows of puppets throw on the wall. These shadows are, of course, the images which Plato referred to in the Simile. The prisoners, naturally, believe that these shadows (images) are the entirety of the truth. This phenomenon is increasingly identical to the effects of advertising in our day. Plato then proceeds to first unchain, turn towards the fire and then to drag some prisoners out of the cave to the surface. This process is described as moving from the visible realm in the cave to the intelligible (intellectual) realm outside. What ensues is a discussion of the remarkable degree which the prisoners will resist this movement, their doubting of those who return from the surface and of the true meaning of education in the Republic. Not at all unlike the problems we all face daily. The Allegory ends with the following passage (from the Jowett translation): "But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of the good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed." Heidegger, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin and the thousands like them have failed to see the "good" and therefore can only comprehend the life of the prisoners in the cave. "Studied irrationalism" is ultimately just the froth on this failure. And, its practice can only deepen the isolation of those prisoners and forge stronger chains to bind them to the images on their computer screens. Far from "liberating", the phenomenon of "studied irrationalism" is, in our times, the essence and instrument of continued human oppression. --- # distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@icf.de and "info nettime" in the msg body # URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@icf.de