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<nettime> Representation, information, technology - Fanie de Beer |
http://www.unisa.ac.za/dept/press/comca/221/debeer.html [from Communicatio, South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research, Volume 22 (1) 1996] Representation, information, technology: the Enlightenment project revisited Fanie de Beer SUMMARY The Enlightenment project represents form, light, orderliness, and predictability. The key notion is representation. Representation presupposes a specific conception of reality. It is an operation that reduces the multiplicity of reality to rational sequences and controllable consequences, to laws and regularities, to a specific kind of logic. Through simplification, counting, calculation and brutal manipulation, the intractably complex, the disparate and the heterogeneous and the original richness of the real are severely reduced and eventually suppressed. Its most important current manifestation is information and the most reinforcing principle is technology. This bringing of form, light, and order is a distortion of reality rather than a sense-giving endeavour. We must try to assail this distortion and the problems it poses by redesigning our thinking, away from the representational thinking of the Enlightenment tradition to the differential thinking of the heterological tradition. This tradition focuses on the complex and the heterogeneous, on the non- dialectical interplay of the representational and the non-representational. The knowledge of differential thinking expands and extends to the entire body; it is an appeal for the rediscovery of knowledge as eros. It severely questions 'the epistemology of light' and promotes the thinking of complexity, or multiple thinking. To achieve the redesign of thinking a different educational dispensation is called for. 1 INTRODUCTION The urgent intellectual challenge posed to us at this time is the re-thinking of the consequences of Western cultures and traditions as these have been taken for granted for generations now, albeit that they have been articulated in many different ways. Many things have been promised in the name of these cultures and traditions. The question is: Do they offer what they promise? And, more important perhaps, can they offer what they promise, or, why don't they fulfil their promises? These cultures and traditions and their manifestations are collectively referred to here as the Enlightenment project. Central to this project is the enterprise of knowledge, a fundamental enterprise since the Greeks, by which we move towards a more complete understanding of the world. Since the Enlightenment the achievements of science have provided the propaganda for this enterprise. The world of the Enlightenment is a world of certainties and absolutes; a world in which the distinction is accepted between fact and fiction, reality and myth, truth and falsity, light and darkness, order and disorder; a world in which we have contributed to the growth of knowledge through the diligent application of reason, empirical method and statistical calculation; a world in which pure and uncontaminated facts are allowed to determine the quality of knowledge; a world in which the successful prediction of the future and deliberate planning for the future are obtainable ideals. Currently developments in the much-debated area of 'technology', the movement of the phenomenon of information to its current central position in much of social discourse, and the notion of representation which undoubtedly forms the epistemological basis to both these cultural expressions and which is dramatically reinforced by them, is adding impetus to the dream. When one looks at the transformations which have been taking place in the domain of knowledge for more than a century now, and which have taken on very specific directions and dimensions during the last two and a half decades, possible answers to the questions posed in the introductory paragraph seem much more than a mere contrivance. In various areas the claims mentioned above are no longer uncontentious. These claims, like certainties, absolutes, facts, predictive power and so forth, are expressed through texts, language, and sign systems which are no longer seen to be uncontaminated or even neutral. In principle then these claims are thoroughly questioned. 2 ENLIGHTENMENT AND INFORMATION When the Enlightenment project is considered in terms of perhaps its most important current manifestation, namely information in almost the literal sense of the word, then at least two facets of the term emerge: the giving of form and the bringing of light. 'Inform' can be exchanged for 'enlighten'. In Afrikaans, as well as in Dutch and Flemish, the terms 'inligting' and 'voorligting' are often used as equivalents of 'information'. The name of our teaching Department has just been changed from Library and Information Science to 'Information Science'. In Afrikaans it is called 'Inligtingkunde'. Form and light seem to be the central terms. The term light certainly stems from the 'light' metaphor of Western religious terminology, but without doubt is also reinforced by the Enlightenment tradition itself as the continuation of the religious -- although in a secular form. In both instances, however, the Enlightenment project loses sight of the fact that the process of forming or form-giving implies off-cuts and rejects, and that in the process of lighting the blindness caused by overexposure is conveniently forgotten. The bringing of form and order is a distortion of reality rather than a sense-giving endeavour (Serres); the throwing of light can be equalled to 'the madness of the day' of Blanchot. The deep significance of distortive and maddening dimensions is not taken into consideration, nor given account of, apart from being seen as something to be avoided or eliminated at all cost. 3 THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION Moreover, the way the distortion and maddening really penetrates every facet or subproject of the Enlightenment project is what is at issue here. Since the explicit workings of these issues are repressed into oblivion and forgottenness, the real causes of many failures are never detected, and remain to a great extent unresolved. Ecology, famine, starvation, literacy, development, social relations, individual tension and stress are certainly not only unresolved but are also aggravating issues, despite many claims to the contrary. Issues like these cause a deep and wide re-thinking of the crisis of representation as the most important single cause of the crisis of the Enlightenment. The crisis or problem of representation, expressed as the specific conception of knowledge of the Enlightenment tradition (enlightenment in the sense of 'bringing to light' and representation as 'making present to' in a most direct sense are closely related), must be related to the gradual but definite transformation of our conception of knowledge as emphasised by numerous authors and thinkers. These authors and thinkers emphasise the productive characteristics of issues such as unavoidable paradoxes, contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in all writings about the enterprise of knowledge. I wish to focus attention on some of the noetic pairs characteristic of the different oeuvres of specific authors without discussing them at all. It is hoped that the reason for mentioning them will become clear from the context of the paper. The following are the most prominent examples: dissemination-representation (Derrida); discontinuity-continuity (Foucault); rhetoric-grammar (Lacan); paradox-rule (Lyotard); tabularity-linearity (Serres); rhizome-tree (Deleuze); heterogeneity-homogeneity (Bataille); smoke-crystal (Atlan); unpredictable-calculated (Ekeland); abnormal-normal (Canguilhem). In essence this transformation implies a critique of the verities of Western philosophy and a rejection of stable identities. The critique and rejection suggest in a very fundamental way a critique of representation and a renewal of impermanence, contradiction, non-identity, simulacra, difference. This entails an attack on realist theories which claim that subjects can accurately reflect or represent (mirror, according to Luypen and Rorty) the world in thought without the mediations of culture, language, and the body. Obviously the subject-object distinction is at issue where a neutral and objective world is mirrored in the receptive mind of a passive subject. Paradoxical as it may sound it is nevertheless true that the empiricism of John Locke and the rationalism of Rene Descartes (and their descendants -- that is the Enlightenment tradition) hold this view. It also entails a rejection of the predominant focus on and emphasis of conscious existence and representational schemes and the death instincts related to them that find expression in totalising discourses, humanist frameworks and cognitive schemes. 4 THE REDESIGN OF THINKING We must try to assail this theme and the problems it poses by redesigning our thinking and acting, rather than the world around us. In this transformation we encounter not only the key to this process of redesign, but also the acknowledgement of the mediatory function of language in both its material and abstract dimensions, culture in its dynamics, and bodies and their forces, affections and desires to the same effect. The transformation provides a fairly effective basis for an attack on representation in a broad sense as well. In this view the perception of the world is mediated through discourse and socially constructed subjectivity. This transformation forces us to argue on behalf of the dynamic and indeterminate aspects of reality, in other words in terms of precisely those issues that representational schemes try to fix and stabilise through foundations of knowledge/foundations of information/foundations of data bases -- foundational thinking or identity thinking. The implications of the transformation are that knowledge, information, data, and technology all acquire new and different perspectives and dimensions. This is because we are forced to think differently. We encounter in this transformation a philosophy, not of a renewed Enlightenment, but of difference, the difference of light and darkness, of the representational and the non-representational, whereby we are forced to adopt differential thinking as our ultimate mode of thinking. These transformations and their implications have been sketched in a recent publication (De Beer, 1991:24--53). The essence of this discussion was that binary oppositions, reflecting very specific developments in the history of knowledge, must be suspended. They ought to be replaced by an approach of complementarities. Instead of opposing truth and falseness or the lie, it is much more significant to view truth and falseness as complementary, as two sides of the same coin. The same is valid for light and darkness, representation and non-representation. What is indeed encountered then, clearly identifiable in the literature, is a complex non-dialectical thoughtful interplay of differences between the two members of any of the many possible 'conceptual or noetic pairs'. This playful differential move of thought between the noetic pairs is the precondition and the substance of the move beyond the Enlightenment project and its limitations. The challenge is to articulate the transformations properly and adequately instead of shying away from them. Certainly this poses an immense challenge. It means in effect that we must try to say what cannot be said. What is needed is the emphasis on a wholly different kind of thinking, not a new kind of thinking but a long-forgotten one. Let it be called differential thinking. See Serres -- but not forgetting Heidegger's explicit distinction between two modes of thinking: calculative and meditative thinking. Numerous other thinkers have drawn similar distinctions. The forgotten mode of thinking, when revived, enables us to leave oppositional strategies behind and to move into the dynamics of differential and complementary thinking -- the ability to think presence and absence, light and darkness, truth and lie, life and death, and so forth simultaneously. We must try to give significance to the things that representational thinking or identity thinking tries to eliminate, hide and even bury. This is the challenge. Most of the time scientists are aware of these issues and their importance, although they would do everything to avoid them. Through simplification, counting, calculation and brutal manipulation the intractably complex, the disparate and heterogeneous and the original richness of the real are severely reduced and eventually suppressed. Many who are so nastily concerned about Derrida's so-called reduction of thought and experience to textuality fall effortlessly into the more disastrous trap of reducing to technology our modes of thinking, our methods of investigation and our experiences of the complexities of the real. The problem of translating the German 'Technik', the French 'technique' and the Dutch/Flemish 'techniek' into technology is certainly an interesting one and probably not without its hidden and even explicit ideological inspirations as well as aspirations. For example referring to a new cheese recipe and to Heidegger's reflections on the comprehensive and incisive impact of technical developments in the same way -- as technology -- is nothing but ludicrous, yet not without the disastrous consequences pertaining to all reductive, distorted and one-sided knowledge claims. 5 HETEROLOGY The challenge is posed because it is precisely these issues that haunt us and make it impossible for promises to be fulfilled. Our views on reality, and our thinking, fall short, limp, if we fail to consider these issues properly. The heterology of, for example De Certeau, has shown that the particular vulnerability of the Enlightenment claims lies in the inability to articulate the dependence of light-giving knowledge upon language, more particularly the materiality of language. We find a superb exploration of this point by Lecercle (1985). Godzich (1991:xix--xx) states the case as follows: 'The heterological tradition, focusing upon epistemological issues, has sought in the ontological dimension the reasons for this particular resistance of language, frequently granting a privileged status to literature as the linguistic practice in which this resistance is most easily apparent in the form of a complex nondialectical interplay of the representational and the nonrepresentational.' This statement emphasises in its own way the complementariness of the representational and the non-representational, or what I would prefer to call, following Derrida, the disseminational -- not only the mirror but also 'the tain of the mirror'. If we attend carefully to Serres, Lecercle and De Certeau it seems as if the relationship between literature and science becomes a crucial issue in articulating the flaws in the Enlightenment project and the opening up of new perspectives in terms of the heterological. Various writers use various terms for the same issue, namely this dimension of the unsaid or unsayable that is nevertheless to be said. (cf the article on transformation). The intelligent glimpses into the thinking of Lacan and Deleuze by Lecercle should be considered here. Central to this challenge posed to the Enlightenment project is the problematic of representation or of representation as problem. This problem was well articulated and decisively analysed by Heidegger and later on by Derrida. Representation presupposes a specific conception of reality. It is an operation that reduces the multiplicity of reality to rational sequences and controllable consequences, to laws and regularities, to a specific kind of logic. What has actually happened is the constitution of a unitary space of representation. The most reinforcing principle of this is technology. It finds perhaps its best ally in information technology. This space is viewed as a geometry of violence. Michel Serres writes: 'Violence is one of the two or three tools that permit us to insert the local into the global, to force it to express the universal law, to make reality ultimately rational. In fact, as in geometry, what passes for a universal globality is only an inordinately distended (local) variety. Representation is nothing but this distension, swelling, or inflation' (Serres 1974:75). For a confirmation of these ways attention can be given to Geertz on local knowledge, Lyotard on pagan instructions and Levinas on the primacy of an ethical philosophy. Representational thinking causes a certain kind of blindness -- it enables us indeed to see, but to see only part of the problem, which in fact means not the real problem at all. Both Godet (1986) and Mitroff (1983) have made topical remarks about this. It is therefore not to the identification of wrong problems on a wrong scale that we should direct our primary attention. Symptoms are often recognised as problems. All efforts to reach solutions then focus on symptoms and not on the cause of the symptoms. In doing so we actually double our problem: not only are we directing our attention towards the wrong goal but because of this we are also fabricating distorted, and thus counterproductive solutions. The Enlightenment project does not give sufficient light; alternatively it gives too much light, but on the wrong issues. In a most fundamental sense it is not our world but we human beings who are the cause of our problems. This is perhaps the reason that Alisdair MacIntyre (1982:34--35) puts it that 'the failure of that culture [the eighteenth-century culture of Enlightenment] to solve its problems ... was ... perhaps thekey factor in determining the form both of our [current] academic philosophical problems and of our practical social problems'. In most circles current thinking about information and technology is dictated by this problematic of representation. The challenge posed by this problematic is the radical rethinking of the world, not in terms of its laws and regularities, but in terms of perturbations and turbulences in order to bring out its multiple forms, uneven structures, and fluctuating organisations. (Cf Prigogine and Stengers, 1979 on this.) Not the representational but the non-representational should be emphasised. Laszlo (1989:27) writes: 'You do not solve world problems by applying technological fixes within the framework of narrowly self-centred values and shortsighted national institutions.' It is a matter of rethinking the relations between order and disorder in such a way as to show how everything begins, ends, and begins again according to a universal principle of disorder. One must re-think the physical universe of the clinamen or creative circumstance, the transformational universe of psychodynamics, and the informational universe of noise according to a founding disorder with the power to modify reality and to render it in all its complexity. By way of disorder, which primacy must be emphasised, a more complex order is produced. Michel Serres basically uses four arguments against the factual defect of our representations: the problem of motors: introduction of indetermination and circumstance as a fact not reducible to representation; irreversibility and the absence of fundamental structure; the positive role of chance and the insufficiency of deterministic representation; creative circumstance or the real outside representation. The major issue in view of the arguments is: 'How can one know what is to be known in reality?' or: 'Is the real rational?' The real, and we cannot exclude anything from it, is not only about that which is given to reason but first of all about that which is given to the senses. It is like a crowd (often chaotic and noisy) of qualities and events in the centre of which we move; an abundance of tastes, smells and colours, audible and tangible luxuriance, an expansion of multiple meanings. This infinitely varied real -- can we render an account of it, can we express it, say it through the medium of logos, that is of formal thought? The response evidently presupposes that a specific meaning is given to 'render account'. 6 THINKING BODIES Serres proclaims in several places that the real is not rational, that it escapes from every system, that it always withdraws partly from representation. Formalism does not suffice; thought cannot be contented with the empty rigour of abstractions. Things cannot be reduced to words or to representations. Consequently his work searches for, introduces into, utilises and describes in its functioning, a pluralistic, non-systematic, non-referential logos, an intramundane logos that speaks of all things of the world and of which we are not the source. It is an amorous or erotic logos which does not represent the world in order to master it, definitely a knowledge which is in search of communication. It is an appeal for the rediscovery of knowledge as Eros, Eros which pushes towards placing souls and bodies in contact. It is an appeal to the resistance of every assimilation of the world to the representation of a subject (cf Felman, 1979). Serres (compare Serres 1985:345--361) dissolves the classical cogito of representation, which is posed as the absolute centre of the world, into a fragmented, erring, intermittent and contingent cogito . This cogito is born from a contingence or a contact, from a limit-event as fragile and as insubstantial as representation itself. The implication is: I am a thing among the things in the world: therefore I think. The knowing subject expands and extends to the entire body. The ancient subject condensed itself in a simple abstraction, somewhere, obliterated, unknown in a transparent place, leaving the whole rest of the body in the shadow. The presently knowing body becomes a hypercomplex spirit, leaves the ancient knowledge in its brutal simplicity behind, forgotten, and considers it as known, while it departs towards this total and new conquest: I know or understand by means of the skin, which is altogether as subtle as the iris or pupil, themselves as subtle as intuition; in the bath of sounds or of noises, disharmony, I understand or know by the wisdom, taste well named at last, art and wisdom, and by the sagacity, smell at last returned to its cognitive dignity; but I know and conceive also by muscles and joints; bone become transparent, stature at a difference from equilibrium in the oscillation of the world; attentive and subtle posture, by the rhythm of the heart and the coat of the arteries beating at the encounter of its stony obstacles, by assimilation and inspiration, by running and jumping, marching and dancing, loving, the knowing subject occupies at last his house, his true house, all his house, all of his old black and sombre box. The knowing subject returns to its place, the prodigal son travelling for a long time in the vague world and abstract spaces. The knowing subject occupies the whole body, ostentatious seats of an enlarged and complete knowledge, seated and founded on the softness and competence of the senses, knowledge accorded to the members of the body as well as to the things in the world, softened, pacified, ready to say yes, delivered from resentment, consenting, body subject, luminous, transparent, vibrant, spiritual, supple, rapid, alive ... thinking. 7 QUESTIONING THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LIGHT Another way of dealing with the same problem is perhaps to express it in terms of the obsession with light in the context of the Enlightenment project as inheritance of the Christian West: sun of righteousness; light of the world. The way Michel Serres (1989) portrays the scene can be particularly helpful. He offers us a reflection on light in which he very delicately plays off the Enlightenment project against its alternative, the heterological tradition, or perhaps preferably in his own terminology: the linear and the tabular. Here we find an excellent demonstration of what was earlier called the complex, non-dialectical interplay of terms. Serres articulates the Enlightenment project as follows: beneath the solitary and all-encompassing sun, the unity of knowledge shines. This light extinguishes the innumerable multiplicity of the different stars. Knowledge, in the light of day, has lost time. Since the East, nothing new. Nothing new since dawn, since that light has been shining, since the Age of the Enlightenment. Nor since the Greek Sun, since the one God, since Science. Since Plato, since the wisdom of Solomon, since Louis XIV and the AufklŠrung. The epistemology of enlightenment, of clear knowledge, presupposes the sun as its source, harks back to its greatness, power and victory -- a sort of male myth. According to Serres the sun, however, is no longer the lord of knowledge and its ultimate end or its first beginning, as well as its totality. We have abandoned the platonist god, the Age of Enlightenment, the triumph of science. This is the age of glimmers. While knowledge enlightens that which glimmers is only a hope. The ray of sunlight is saturated with dust. This is the age of flashes, of scintillation. 'The age and hour of the enlightenment brings with it clear and distinct knowledge, scientific unity, the triumph of reason. The age and the hour of scintillation brings with it tentative knowledge, given over to large numbers and to circumstances, to distributions, interceptions, to large populations, the random choice of a wisp of rare information by means of the angle of the sun; the theory of knowledge gives its kingdom in exchange for expectations' (Serres 1989:32). It seems as if a new epistemology is emerging in which the sun, light, aging male, flamboyant and superb, becomes modest. The multiple returns beneath the ray of the single, the man falls asleep while hearing the footsteps of the woman; knowledge gives way to expectation, light gives way to that which gleams. If information, technology and representation are all under the spell of the metaphor of light and expressed in those terms it remains of crucial and decisive importance not to forget the madness of light as dealt with by Maurice Blanchot (1980) in his Madness of the day. This throws an entirely different 'light' on the issues at stake. Derrida's reading of this text is of particular significance: '[It is] a story whose title runs wild and drives the reader mad ... in every sense of the word and in every direction: The Madness of the day, the madness of today, of the day today, which leads to the madness that comes from the day, is born of it, as well as the madness of the day itself, itself mad ... The Madness of the day is a story of madness, of that madness that consists in seeing the light, vision or visibility, from an experience of blindness ... To see sight or vision or visibility, to see beyond what is visible, is not merely 'to have a vision' in the usual sense of the word, but to see-beyond-sight, to see-sight-beyond-sight ... The story obscures the sun ... with a blinding light' (Derrida 1979: 89, 91). In the traditional perspective it is absurd to posit disorder, or the madness of light, as primordial. In the context of recent scientific inquiry it becomes not only possible but very real (cf Jacob 1970; Monod 1979; Thom 1980; Atlan 1979; Prigogine and Stengers 1989). The traditional idea of evolution towards progress becomes a journey among intersections, nodes and regionalisations. We do not encounter an epistemology that would represent the possible totalisation and unity of knowledge. We are called upon to think of knowledge not in terms of order, mastery, control and manipulation, but in terms of chance and invention. 8 MULTIPLE DISCOURSE OR THINKING COMPLEXITY World, understood in this way, requires multiple discourse for adequate articulation. It is a discourse that undertakes many journeys following complex itineraries across multiple spaces that interfere with one another -- a discourse in which polymorphism remains irreducible (Serres 1977:288). The simple, the distinct, the monosemic are no longer acceptable values of this discourse; they are replaced by concepts and logics of fuzziness, complexity and polyvalence (cf Serres 1972; 1980). To be facilitated this discourse requires a special emphasis on thinking of a different kind. Thinking the simple is fundamentally distinct from thinking the complex. In representation objects find themselves imprisoned behind the facade of a language perspective where truth is at the centre, in the mouth of the speaking subject. The speaking subject is understood and not that about which he speaks (Serres 1968:168). It is indeed the drama of representation that the subject as such and in itself is lost. But for the structural perspective on language there is no subject. It speaks, says Lacan. It exchanges forms and information. The language system of structures is the language system of things, and in the structural space, each thing as far as it carries a structure can be reference and speak of other things. The place of language structure is precisely the here-elsewhere. It organises several domains into multivalent statements; it is at the same time formal, pluralist and non-referential (Serres 1972:145). The same structure can take us into different fields of knowledge, diverse domains of sense. The space of structural archaeology, as for example elaborated by Foucault (1967:396), is an undetermined totality of all possible sites. Hereby an image is suggested which can signify a thinking that avoids representation or simply does not represent (Serres 1968:191--192). But to move out of the structure of representation it would be necessary to relate once again what reason (of the Enlightenment) has separated. This reason constitutes in an arbitrary way a structure that represents itself with regard to its other. Prior to the separation or division and to the representation that it permits there was a unique, mixed, chaotic, indefinable space where normal and abnormal (and the other noetic pairs of course) are everywhere, where each one can reveal itself as the other of the other, where each can be a subject for objects. This space can be open or chaos; it is a space beyond the closure of cultures; the space before meaning (Serres 1977:241--242). The operations of representation are ruled out altogether in this space and call for a fundamental re-thinking, the thinking, as I have already stated, that does not represent. The plurality of representations permits us to move from one to the other and to discover the real between them. I can represent objects. When I turn round there are no objects. I become a subject without object, pure movement. I am there with objects; I am not there. I am and I am not. I am nobody. In this way I escape from the magic appeal of representation. Not linearity but tabularity becomes predominant -- the source of numerous discourses, of the network of all possible structures of representation (Serres 1968: 204--205). Outside the fixity of representation, thinking is to pass from one structure of representation to another. It is a movement that connects different structures and different spaces. Thinking means to connect and disconnect circulations, traverse in every sense the transcendental space of communication, intercept and exchange the forms and structures of this space -- each structure operating a movement and some connections. The subject, the ego of the cogito, is no longer a fixed point. It is nothing without circulation, the being of circulation (Serres 1972:154--155). Thinking and discourse are the movements that connect different spatial varieties or different structures which try to open up a path of communication, sometimes with detours, sometimes impossible: logos as nous is bond, link and relationship (Serres 1977:197--210; 240--255). Recent developments in areas referred to as cyberspace and hypertext can assist us immensely. 9 CONCLUSION These insights have vast consequences for education, information and knowledge work, science, technology and technical developments, communication, development, organisations, institutions and, of course, for the thinking of complexity. Serres suggests the quick invention of the Third Curriculum. By this he means 'well-rounded thought, that of both our hands and both our hemispheres'. That, according to him, is the role model -- 'necessary yet lacking'. He becomes more specific in the following remarks: 'We can no longer leave algorithmic ratiocination and literary rehashings completely segregated, without mortal danger. We must imagine a way in which to teach, with the same gesture, both the poem and the theorem, without wronging either and with mutual enrichment: experimentation and experience, the new world of scientists and the storytelling of time immemorial, the immortal world of scientific laws and the new age of the arts. Those taught the third approach to knowledge, born from this mixed school, will have chucked the death wish that makes us cut ourselves off, that puts our world in danger' (Serres 1989:34). Bibliography Derrida, J 1979. Living on: borderlines. In Bloom, H et al Deconstruction and criticism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Felman, S 1979. De la nature des choses ou de l'cart l'equilibre. Critique, XXXV(380):3--15. Foucault, M 1967. Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard. Godzich, W 1985. 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Hermes IV: La distribution. Paris Minuit. Serres, M 1985. Les cinq sens. Paris: Grasset. Serres, M 1989. Literature and the exact sciences. SubStance, 18(2):3--34. Thom, R 1980. Modeles mathematiques de la morphogenese. Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur. Copyright © 1996. All rights reserved. Unisa Press. Items may be freely shared by individuals, but they may not be republished in any medium whatsoever without the express written consent of the publisher. Issues of journals may be archived for public use in electronic or other media, provided that no fee is charged to the user: any exception to this restriction requires the written consent of the publisher. 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