Diana McCarty on Fri, 7 Feb 97 01:16 MET |
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nettime:*Markets and Anti-Markets,4/4 DeLanda |
What would happen if bandwidth scarcity was to end all of a sudden? To begin with the current channels used by the Internet are owned by telephone companies, and the technology that runs those channels was designed to deal with bandwidth scarcity. When bandwidth is expensive much of the infrastructural investment is on the hardware switches that control the movement of analog or digital information through the conduits. Today, as Guilder argues, the telephone companies have replaced much of the old copper wire with optical fiber, vastly increasing the amounts of data that can flow through these channels. However, to take advantage of the huge bandwidth increase that optical fiber makes possible, we need to get rid of hardware switches, replacing them with control devices simulated by software. But this move is resisted by the telephone companies since they are in the business of selling services based on switches. This is an example of a corporate culture that develops around a specific set of practices and the specific economic situation of bandwidth scarcity that then becomes so rigidified that it cannot change easily. The packet switching design of the Internet of military origin is in danger of being replaced by old-fashioned circuit switching, in the form of the new standard the TelCo.'s are trying to impose, ATM. ATM is supposed to replace IP, Internet Protocol. Because they are in the business of selling services based on switches, they cannot take advantage of this new world of bandwidth plenty. A similar point applies to other potential channels for data such as wireless transmission through the electromagnetic spectrum. Just like the switched based technology evolved in the world of bandwidth scarcity, so our current broadcast technology grew to take advantage of the limited, hence scarce, space in the radio portion of the spectrum. Today, the technology exists to use higher frequency portions of the spectrum, like microwaves, increasing bandwidth enormously, but the cellular telephone companies that should be rushing to take advantage of this are still caught in the scarcity-based paradigm. (However, this is not entirely true now, as low orbit satellite systems operating in this spectrum are being heavily invested in by communication corporations.) A system of optical fiber liberated from switches, a "fibersphere" as Guilder calls it, together with the use of the atmosphere at high frequencies, could result in a world that bandwidth is so plentiful as to be virtually free. So far so good. But when Guilder switches to an analysis of the economic consequences of these developments and even more to his advice to policy makers, Guilder's ideological baggage completely overrides his technological insights. There are two biases which any invisible hander will bring to an analysis. First, the most obvious one: any intervention by the government is by definition evil, since it interferes with the invisible hand, therefore one has to attack government regulations even if they serve to break up monopolies, thereby contributing to technological development, as was the case with the break up of AT&T in 1984. Guilder uses a slight of hand to accuse the government of creating the monopoly in 1913. This is ridiculous. AT&T ruthlessly eliminated all its small competitors prior to 1913 and only settled into its monopoly regulated form once it had already won via anti-competitive, antimarket tactics. Newt Gingrich and John Perry Barlow's speeches reflect this pro-corporate, anti-government perspective. If you read interviews with CEOs, the head honchos of large multinational corporations, from the early 1970s, the entire discourse of "Let's break the national government" and "governments are obsolete, etc." was already part of their own little theoretical contribution. It does not take a genius to say why. National governments, today, are one of their main obstacles to the global expansion of antimarkets. They would like no regulations, no labor protection, nothing that would stop them from converting the world into a global supermarket. It is quite ridiculous that today pseudo-populists ideologues in the United States are supposedly taking this banner of "Let's break the government" as a radical move. The second bias is more dangerous because it is less obvious: one divides society into private and public sectors and then one applies the term market to all private organizations, regardless of their size, structure, or economic power. This ideological maneuvre is performed through several operations. First one uses the word competition, as if it applied to both the anonymous competition between hundreds of buyers and sellers in a real market, the only one to which Adam Smith applied his invisible hand theory, as well as to the competition between oligopolies, for example, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. The problem is that these two forms of competition are completely different. In the competition between oligopolies--involving rivalry between opponents which must take each others responses into account when planning a strategy--oligopolies will set their own prices but will always avoid entering into a price war with one another. You might remember two years ago when Compaq started by dropping the prices of personal computers and forced the rest of the oligopolies producing personal computers into a price war, which, of course, was good for consumers but was bad for these large corporations. Large corporations have a variety of means to avoid price wars. One of them applies when they exist as a joint stock company: they have a management hierarchy, a lot of stock holders, and a board of directors which supposedly represent the stock holders. But in the board of directors they sit people from banks or large insurance companies that also sit on the board of directors of other corporations. Although they are not a monopoly conspiring to push prices up, these interlocking directorates, as institutional economists call this phenomenon, make it into a completely different kind of entity. In other words, the competition between antimarkets should not be called competition, but rivalry. But if you want to keep the word, then a distinction should be made between market-theoretic competition and game-theoretic competition, involving rivalry and knowledge of the opponent that characterizes antimarket dynamics. As economist John Kenneth Galbraith has shown, oligopolies are structures as hierarchical as any government bureaucracy with as much centralized planning and as little dependency on market dynamics. Unlike the small buyers and sellers in a real market who are price takers, oligopolies are price makers. They create prices by adding a mark-up to the cost of production, and they may manipulate that mark-up as much as they want. In short when one confuses these two different kinds of competition, one fails to distinguish between markets and antimarkets. The consequences of these two biases are very obvious: oligopolies with the power to absorb smaller competitors through horizontal and vertical integration are eliminated from the picture, and the landscape now contains only markets and the government, with monopolies like electric utilities being the only antimarket forces left but one that can be easily dismissed. (A very typical right wing ideological maneuver is to dismiss monopolies. Guilder agrees that there is such a thing as monopolies like those famous robber barons in the 19th century who created the railroad industry. But he dismisses Microsoft because the enormous profits that this monopoly generates is seen as transitory. Therefore, the menace they represent is dismissed as largely imaginary. Guilder actually says this. Microsoft is today playing a similar role as the robber barons, but, according to Guilder, its potential menace and any government action should be dismissed.) When Wired Magazine interviewed Newt Gingrich the only pointed question they asked him was, "What would you do about Microsoft. Would you pursue the antitrust case against it?" And Gingrich responded with something like, "No I wouldn't. In this I am influenced by Guilder, and the answer is "no" because Java will now become the operating system of the Net and that will end the domination of Windows 95." So, what if Bill Gates has a virtual monopoly on operating systems, a position of power that allows him to control the evolution of software that runs on top of those operating systems? "No problem," says Guilder, "In a world of bandwidth plenty the paradigm of operating systems will change to one of distributed software on the Internet, and this by itself will end Microsoft's domination." Dream on. This, of course, assumes that Microsoft, using its enormous leverage, cannot simply buy and internalize any company it needs in order to ensure its presence in a network economy. In short, the core of Guilder's ideological maneuver is to lump together small producers and oligopolies in one category and to call that "the market" and to focus exclusively on government regulation as the only real enemy, dismissing monopolies as chimerical. Applied to his theory of the Internet, the theory works like this. A world of bandwidth scarcity like today's cable television favors the creation of large companies wich acquire control of both the channel and the contents flowing through those channels and, therefore, gain monopoly rents. For example, TCI a cable giant in the United States, also owns content producing channels such as the Discovery Channel, Home Shopping Network, TNT, etc. With bandwidth scarcity gone, argues Guilder, the rationale for owning both conduit and data is gone, and this will benefit small producers of content. Here he seems to siding with real decentralized markets. But what are his policy recommendations to get to this decentralized world created by cheap bandwidth? Well, the fastest way to get there is to allow the optical fiber infrastructure of the telephone companies to be combined with the final connection to homes owned by cable companies and create a huge monopoly. His reasoning is totally absurd. Remember that according to Guilder this would all be a transitory monopoly, an evil thing that we must live with for a while but will go away. The government which, of course, opposes the merger between the TelCo.'s and the cable giants is the enemy of the people because its antitrust regulations are preventing us from enjoying the benefits of the world with cheap bandwidth. I could go on adding detail to this criticism, one that Guilder, himself, makes easy by offering such an obvious target. But we would wrong to think that the only ones to be ideologically biased are rightwing invisible handers. Left wing commodifiers, i.e., intellectuals for whom the very entry of an object into a market involves commodification (which is seen as a bad thing), are equally simplistic in their assessments. I strongly believe that neither side of the political spectrum can be trusted anymore in their economic analysis, and a new economic theory, one that respects the lessons of economic history and that assimilates the insights from nonlinear dynamics and complexity theory, should be created. The elements for this new theory are already here not only from institutional economists and materialist historians but from philosophers of economics that are now more than ever participating in dispelling the myths that have obscured our thought for so many centuries. ---------------- Q: (Andreas Broeckmann) The way you describe the non hierarchical economies, the market, its a very appealing model and there are problems that we are dealing with at the moment as content producers that resemble what you are describing. Is there any way of intervening and strategically acting within these really fluid environments. I guess that developing an economic theory for this is one way of doing this, but ...[tape] So the question is how much space is there for individual agency. MDL: I obviously believe that there is plenty of space for individual agency, but again, it really depends on how we draw our distictions. For instance, we tend to think of capitalist institutions being run by entrepreneurs, but of course that is not the case. As far back ,as I said, as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries large economic institutions, ones that had economic power were run by managers. And the moment the joint stock corporatation began, ownership and control were separated, and now indeed you had a completely hierachical structure. An entrepreneur is a completely different category, particularly if he is an entrepreneur of a small business. He is the owner and the force behind that particular business. Anything that we can do to create the conditions for entrepreneurs to fluorish is somehting that would help the creation of decentralized decision making structures. In other words, there is individual agency in the form of entrepreneurship. There is also individual agency in the form of criticism of standards that go on in the Internet. For instance, (and I already talked about this in Madrid when you asked me a similar question) the payment structure in the Internet, standards for which are being developed now, should essentially include micro payments, that is 5 cents or even better 1 cent payments, and the possibility of doing that efficiently. If we set a lower limit of say, ten dollars, like credit cards sometimes have, by that very means we will be influencing who can actually be a producer on the Internet. Another thing that would immediately change the nature of the Net is if we switched to asymmetric technology, i.e., more bits coming to your computer than going out. The moment more bits come into your computer than go out, then you are becoming a consumer and a computer is becoming a vehicle for you to consume things. And you send a few bits of email to your relatives and friends. It is essential that we keep the hardware of the Internet perfectly symmetrical to allow small producers to produce. Those are some areas, some of criticism, some of direct intervention, that I can think of right now. As I said, we must proceed with a lot of caution here because the very first thing, and its the most important thing, we must do is to avoid creating a caricature of history in which the decentralized structures appear as the heroes and centralized structures as the villains. The reason for this is twofold. First of all, decentralized structures become centralized structures. Apple Computer started with $1300 in a garage and two entrepreneurs but the monent they brought in a professional manager from Pepsi Cola and kicked out Steve Jobs, it was already an antimarket institution. So obviously, small businesses grow into big ones and become antimarkets. This is not a new phenomenon. The large fairs in the 13th and 14th centuries such as the Champagne Fairs were huge markets that were already hierarchical with a money market at the top, luxury items next, and then the humble goods that were exchanged in the marketplace. Markets give rise to hierarchies, hierarchies give rise to markets. We need to confront the complexity and never over simplify, just so we can give ourselves a role as the heroes of decentralization. Besides that, of course, we need to consider that many of the right wing, and particularly extreme right wing like the skinheads or the militia movement in the United States, are completely decentralized. Therefore, there is nothing intrinsically good or heroic about decentralization. If I am drawing these distinctions carefully right now, it is because I believe it is crucial for us to understand our economic history and therefore to be able to intervene in the present and the future, not becuase I am trying to romanticize decentralized decision making per se. Manuel DeLanda (delanda@pipeline.com) Delivered at MetaForum IIIUNDER CONSTRUCTION/Budapest Content Conference October 1996, www.isys.hu/metaforum transcribed and edited by Tom Bass and Manuel Delanda -- * distributed via nettime-l : no commercial use without permission * <nettime> is a closed moderated mailinglist for net criticism, * collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets * more info: majordomo@is.in-berlin.de and "info nettime" in the msg body * URL: http://www.desk.nl/~nettime/ contact: nettime-owner@is.in-berlin.de