Pit Schultz on Mon, 20 Jan 97 20:35 MET |
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nettime: What does Capital want? 1/2 - McKenzie Wark |
WHAT DOES CAPITAL WANT?: CORPORATE DESIRE AND THE INFOBAHN FANTASY McKenzie Wark mwark@laurel.ocs.mq.edu.au Dateline: London 19th January 1997: 'Prodigal son returns to Apple corps' reads the headline in the Guardian Weekly. Its a no more than usually unimaginative header for a story that's been told and retold all over the world. Steve Jobs has returned to Apple with the purchase of his Next complany for a reported US$400 million. The pictures show Jobs on stage with Apple chairman Gil Amelio. As the trade papers reported with somewhat more thoroughness than the newswires, Apple's San Francisco trade fair stage show, where the Jobs deal was announced, was long on spectacle and short on technical detail. The strategy for the development of the operating system boiled down to a slide showing a blue and a yellow box, with an arrow from one to the other. Somewhat more effort seemed to go into stage managing the video clips from the science fiction film Independence Day and a walk-on guest appearance by actor Jeff Goldblum. So what's going on here? Business as usual. The selling of desire. Apple is going all out to retain the love of its loyal customers, developers, stock holders and institutional investors, reinvigorating the faith in the greap leap from the blue to the yellow box. Business and technology -- its supposed to be hard stuff, impervious to the tools of pointyheaded intellectuals, to our 'critique'. But look what's really at stake here, as Apple tries to sell itself a future. Nothing but smoke and mirrors, words and images, and above all desire -- Apple's desire to be desired, and thus know itself and be itself and grow in our love. Didn't Hegel have something to say about that? And so, we come to the question where art meets money: what does capital want? I want to try to answer it, not by speaking of this immediate future, the one into which all our desires project themselves without certainty. I want to wind back the clock a bit, and look at the desires of a slightly earlier moment in net history -- the great infobahn bubble of the early '90s. For the net has a history, and I think there's as much to learn about the net from its history, as from science fiction. PROJECTING THE FANTASY Dateline: Washington 14th October 1993: The Bell Atlantic telephone company announced a US$23 billion deal to buy America's largest cable TV operator, Tele-Communications Inc and its cable programming company Liberty Media. The merger would create the 6th largest corporation in the country. By combining TCI's 25% of the cable TV market with Bell Atlantic's telephone services, the merger would produce a company with a wire to the home of 42% of American households. This is the biggest merger proposed so far aimed at positioning companies for the development of the 'information superhighway'. This is a concept attributed to American Vice President Al Gore, that describes the ambition to build a communications network carrying voice, video and computer data, to homes as well as businesses. The merger plan will attract close scrutiny from the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department, concerned about monopoly pricing practices and corporate collusion respectively. The value of this deal would be variously reported, from $23bn (Korporaal, 1993) to $33bn (Mandese, 1994), but with a rhetoric invariably the same: Bell Atlantic and TCI shall build between them an 'information superhighway'. Following a Washington policy wonk fashion, I will henceforth abbreviate this strange object of desire to 'infobahn' for short. What is in a name? Quite a lot, as we shall see. The scale of the proposed merger, "one of the largest acquisitions in American history", put the infobahn firmly on the information mediascape of business news. Ray Smith, chairman and CEO of Bell Atlantic Corp was the man of the moment. The business mediascape is often populated by heroic action figures: "He leapfrogged cable industry visionaries like Ted Turner and John Malone in the process and turned a low- intensity battle to create telecommunications services into an all-out war that borders on brinkmanship." (Deagon, 1994a) But there are perhaps more interesting stories to tell than the ones that the business and professional press makes up as it goes along. And I should know -- I've made up my own stories about the infobahn for The Australian, rather cynical and critical ones. (Wark, 1994a; 1994b) This present essay is an extension, even more cynical and critical, of those perverse versions of the fantasy. It does what I cannot do in the press: examine the role of that press itself in creating the substance, if it can be called that, of these corporate desires. The infobahn emerges as a fantasy to fill a certain void, a certain faltering of the "animal spirits" of capitals' desire. Without an object of desire, capital cannot invest itself in the world it finds around itself. As Michael Eisner, CEO of Walt Disney says about this infobahn thing: "I don't get it, so we are not investing in it." (Deagon, 1994b) Without investing in that world, it cannot remake itself. It becomes, as they say, 'mature' -- a short step away from death. The information age has been ageing for quite a long time now. As Bob James, Group General Manager of Strategic Development at Telecom explained it to the Sydney Morning Herald computer pages editor Gareth Powell, telecoms the world over will contract if they think that their business is just POTS (plain old telephone services), because: "It starts to become a commodity when you can buy it from a wide range of suppliers." So telecoms have to think about new services and new infrastructure to run new services. According to James, "On average, television is used for three hours a day, the telephone for 30 minutes. Television needs two megabits a second compared to the telephone which needs only 64 kilobits." (Powell, 1994a) So while telecoms would love to offer services that soak up some of that TV watching time, this involves considerably more bandwidth, and that sort of bandwidth is still not so cheap to deliver. Or as Ray Smith, Bell Atlantic CEO puts it about the TCI deal: "Basically, both cable and telephone businesses are mature businesses with mature technologies, customers and product lines. We have reached the limits of our original franchise but believe we have tremendous opportunity to find new ones if we can reinvent ourselves around a new marketplace with a whole new set of requirements." (Deagon, 1994a) A sort of transcendental logic lurks here, either mature companies resurrect themselves to answer a new desire -- or they die. Of course the Bell Atlantic deal was not meant to be, and its unravelling nearly putting paid to the information superhighway fantasy as the yarn spun to a standstill. "The breakup of the Bell Atlantic / Tele-Communications Inc deal is still sending shock waves throughout the business world..." writes the Advertising Age, and yet the story quotes the result of online discussions that publication sponsored through its involvement in the commercial online system Prodigy, neatly showing off its own interest in electronic media at the same time as it dampens expectations. CAPITAL, SEDUCTION & DEATH The Bell Atlantic/TCI deal wasn't exactly unprecedented -- 1993 saw a spurt of investment in cable and wireless networks. MCI loudly and proudly publicised plans for a $20bn consortium to build an information superhighway. It also earmarked $2bn for a plan to offer local service, and compete with the regional phone companies. (Flaherty, 1994) Quite a few corporate speculations and projections had used the infobahn rhetoric before. What made the Bell Atlantic announcement different was the sheer size of it. The amount of money hooked to the rhetoric had an ontological property -- it announced that the infobahn was now a far more probable future reality than it had previously appeared, even when backed by the authority of the vice president. It is a unique feature of the culture of capital that corporate identities are in the long run premised on the desireability of the future being *different* from the past. Companies are validated by their ability to incorporate into themselves and themselves into an image of a different future. A future others accept as a projection of a desireable and posessable future terrain. The company that successfully 'husbands' this image to grow and proliferate has to simultaneously possess it for itself and arouse the desire of others for it. What does the corporation want? It wants the future to desire it. It desires the desire of the other. And it wants its rivals, its dependents, its patrons to desire its desire. This is the basic structure of fantasy, (Zizek, 1989, pp87-129) but as it exists in the historical romance that has become 'late capitalism'. (Jameson, 1991, 1-55) Irony is the wetnurse of history. Marx said that capital is a culture where "...all that is solid melts into air, all that is sacred is profaned....". (Marx, 1978, p70) It became a culture that thrives on revolutionising itself, and revolutionising us, its agents, rather than the other way around. The desires invested in futures that have now passed deflate into corporate stagnation, impotence, death -- or worst, merger as the junior, 'passive' partner in a hostile 'takeover'. The other side to this historical form of 'radical negativity' (Zizek, 1989, p5) is the corporation's positive projection of the fantasy of its own desire, posited in terms of a future. As Zizek says, "desire is not something given in advance, but something that has to be constructed -- it is precisely the role of fantasy to give the coordinates of the subject's desire, to specify its object, to locate the position of the subject in it." (Zizek, 1991, p6) Even when the subject in question is the legally incorporated collective subject of the company, its object of desire a flow of revenue and its location mapped on a spreadsheet projection into the future, marked off in accounting quarters. The enormous growth in desktop media, presentation graphics and the like is the symptom of an investment in this positive ontology, where capital reinvents itself as a more general, collective fantasy. A fantasy meant to counter the spectre of Marx and Schumpeter's (1981) bleak vision of capital as radical negativity and endless death. Capital has created a new theatre of operations for itself, in which it fantasises its future and organises its desires. (Ross, 1991, 169-183) This is postmodern capital, thrusting itself into the future, in bad faith and indeed false consciousness, rather than being burned up by an inability to outrun its own past. SCORING Investment confidence is not just about the 'hard' numbers, it is about the ability to imagine a sphere of (relatively) unrestrained action. One of the functions of the business media is a sort of locker room boy's talk that tries to talk up this very possibility of making it, unencumbered, to the profit zone of 'blue sky.' "Two things that have just happened in the US indicate that the world is on the threshold of a new communications era." (Gray, 1994) Commentator Robert Gray calls the play from the March 1994 corporate press releases: Viacom has beat Barry Diller's QVC to Paramount, buying it for $10 million; that software firm Oracle has allied itself with Bell Atlantic and a collection of smaller firms, including Apple and the Washington Post. The point of the first score is that Viacom now joins News Corp and Time Warner in the league of "mega- media groups." The second announces an all-star line-up for what we are meant to believe is the big league playing field for the future conflicts of capital investment -- interactive television. By April 1994 the pundits are less sure of themselves. A less attractive future becomes a more common prognosis. Three events punctured the bull run on the future of the infobahn that Ray Smith raised to the level of a media feeding frenzy. Besides the collapse of his $20-odd billion Bell Atlantic / TCI merger, there was the collapse of $4.9bn Southwestern Bell/Cox Enterprises deal and a federal judge's rejection of $12.6bn AT&T / McCaw Cellular deal. "Corporate executives and media moguls are gnashing their teeth over the regulatory climate in Washington after the scuttling of a second deal" editorialises a Reuters reporter after the Southwestern Cox nil-all playoff. (Kelley, 1994) What she means is that these deals have no value unless the telecoms can fly free of federal regulation, and there are not enough encouraging signs that they will have a free hand to keep the merger mania afloat. Southwestern Bell called off plans for a $4.9bn cable TV partnership with Cox Enterprises, and blamed it on the tighter rules on cable rates imposed by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). "I don't care what the FCC says, I think this is all attributable to the FCC's second cable rate rollback. It has sent a signal to the marketplace that the FCC and the Clinton Administration are going to be regulating this industry with a heavy hand," the Advertising Age quotes one Ms Jessica Reif, an analyst with Openheimer and Co. (Mandese, 1994) The FCC made it clear to cable operators, with two mandatory cuts to basic cable fees, that it would not tolerate monopoly pricing practices. This put pressure on the asking price the cable companies demanded of the telecoms in the merger deal negotiations. The state-managed referent that ultimately sets the value of these firms is the regulated monopoly price that cable firms can charge for 'basic cable' services. While rhetorically, 'deregulated' and 'free' markets are usually taken to be synonymous, they are not. The cable and telecom companies want to be freed from regulation, but they do not want competition -- they want to be free to extract monopoly rent prices. The possibility that they might cement alliances organised around a new fantasy promising benefits for all, and in the process weaken the regulatory net was an attractive play in the corporate sport of seduction. It just did't quite come off. ANTAGONISM AND FANTASY Part of the problem with monopoly strategies in communications is that while it may appear to be desirable for an individual company to achieve something approaching monopoly power, this may be contrary to the interests of capital as a whole. The rhetoric of 'deregulation' may well mean the attempt by a monopoly to free itself from state imposed limits to its power. The rhetoric of 'competition' more likely reflects the desire of other companies to substitute another mechanism of control should the pressure to relax