William Waites on Mon, 25 May 2015 16:00:38 +0200 (CEST) |
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Re: <nettime> What should GCHQ do? |
On Sun, 24 May 2015 22:09:00 -0400, "t byfield" <tbyfield@panix.com> said: > I'm skeptical about crypto absolutism because one of its first > effects would be, in effect, to *privatize* everything. 'Public' > would be reduced to whatever was cracked or leaked As was pointed out to me on IRC, and I agree and tried to include this point, the main problem is that most people cannot accurately distinguish between public and private when it comes to communication. The way the network treats their data often does not match their intentions. Most often this happens in the direction of mistakenly making something public that was intended to be private such a message between you and your spouse. It can happen in the other direction too, but the situation is not symmetric: you can publish things that were once private but you cannot unpublish things. > But I do think that the growing 'moral' push toward secure > communications is troubling, and that preserving 'insecure' > communications channels as a legitimate choice is vital. Publishing something -- making it public -- is one thing. This message is public. However the act of publishing, and the act of reading can be private. In sending this message, some details about exactly where and how and by whom it was sent are obscured. In my case it doesn't really matter much. I even put my real name on it and anyone who wants to find me can easily do so. But for some people -- the prototypical example being journalists in a hostile place -- it matters very much. By arranging for it to be difficult see, on the wire, what is going on we help them because it means they do not stand out. That's the moral argument. Insecure channels generally are still opaque to most people. The only ones who benefit from them are those in a privileged position to watch what is happening on the wire. There is no practical difference to the reader or author if a message is transmitted over a secure or an insecure channel. It only matters to someone else who might be watching. Storage is a little different, but only a little. If you store your information on a computer that you control then there is not much benefit to encryption. Unless it is possible for someone else to come to control it without your permission, and there are many ways that this can happen. If you store your information on somebody else's computer then you had better trust them and transitively anyone else who is in a position to see their computer. Or you can ``trust the math and the engineers'' as you put it. But the thing is, you don't have to just trust the math. You can check it for yourself. You can check the implementations by the engineers. That's difficult and impractical for most people but it is possible in principle. Maybe you have a friend that you trust who tries to keep on top of these things. I am not a mathematician or a cryptographer but I know some of them, and I find that in virtually all cases I trust their *motivations*. They are human so there is a gap between the theory and what is the case in the world, but we try to narrow that gap. To me it seems better on average to place trust in people who are in the business of clearly explaining things rather than obfuscating and appealing to emotions in order to profit. -w # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@kein.org