Felix Stalder on Mon, 10 Sep 2007 16:38:18 +0200 (CEST) |
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<nettime> Our New Public Life: Free Cooperation, Biased Infrastructures and Authoritarian States |
[This is a talk I gave a few days ago at Ars Electronica's "Goodbye Privacy" symposium, curated by Ina Zwerger and Armin Medosch.] Our New Public Life: Free Cooperation, Biased Infrastructures and Authoritarian States In her statement, symposium curator Ina Zwerger writes that she doesn't take part in email lists, does not run a blog, and publishes no personal information on-line because she values her privacy highly. Yet, even a cursory search brings up a pretty good record of what she has been doing over the last decade, from dropping out of university to representing public broadcasting at official functions. We find her home address with a picture of the building, her mobile phone number, and all the rest we are no longer surprised find. And this information is available in about two minutes of searching, using just a single tool to which anyone in the world has access. Of course, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Her banks has collected vast amounts of information, likewise her cell phone provider and her ISP. All of which is potentially accessible by others as well. This is the situation for someone who actively values her privacy, without devoting her life to preserving it. The amount of personal data on anyone who living in the advanced pockets of the globalized word -- data available to anyone who either searches for it with or has access to the right slices of the communication infrastructure -- has never been greater than today. And if trends of the last 50 years are any indication, the sheer volume of personal data is only going to grow. During the 1990s, a lot of energy has been devoted to "safeguarding privacy in the digital age". Increasingly, the consense among activists and scholars is that these efforts have failed. As a consequence traditional notion of privacy, so central to the entire concept of the citizen in liberal political theory, as it was outlined by Beate Rössler, has become void. Underneath this historical trajectory beyond privacy lie two developments that are intimately related, but are usually treated separately. One is the fact that our daily lifes are being deeply embeeded in digital communication. Ever more traces of our daily actions are gathering in the data-bases of the infrastructure providers. Emails logs, credit cards statments, frequent flyer lists, online shopping receipts, cell phone records, and so on. Form this, the data body is assembled, sometimes following, sometimes precedding our physical bodies. We heard about this a lot yesterday. The other development that is that more and more people are speaking as individuals in public. Not too long ago, not only did few people speak in public, but most who did so spoke as functionaries, advancing institutional opinions, impersonal knowledge, or corporate endeavors. They rarely spoke as themselves, this was reserved for "off the record" conversations. Now, the notion of "off the record" is close to meaningless. As many have found out with embarrassment, you cannot send an email "off the record." It's always just a supoena away. More to the point. Not only have we personal blogs, discussion boards, digital social networks, and so on. Additionally, areas where communication used be be relatively impersonal â?? science, journalism and others â?? are becoming more personalized. Until a few years ago, many newspapers published articles without a byline. Not any more. Journalist are personalities now, and anyone can be a journalist. Increasingly, the peer-review process is becoming transparent, and we can observe how people go about making their speech intersubjective. This is happening in the hard sciences, not just in Wikipedia. In the process, entire new domains of speech are now regarded as public. Another example: One of the reasons why programmers like to write open source software is because it makes their personal contributions visible to others and therefore helps to establish their own individual reputation, independent of their employer, if they have one. If we want to understand the new landscape beyond privacy, we have to bring together these two developments, relate the fact most of our actions are leaving traces that are collected and processed, to the fact that more and and more of our actions are becoming more personalized and publicized at the same time. This has deep consequences both on an individual and a societal level. Let me start with the first one. On the level of the individual, the boom of web2.0, to use a shorthand for personal public speech, extends a generally increasing individualization of society. Processes of 'self-development' have become central to contemporary societies. Over the last 50 years, the task of identity-building has shifted away from relatively stable, hierarchical institutions -- family, workplace, church -- to the individual and his or her self-chosen context. In the 1960s, freedom-oriented social movements challenged a heavily bureaucratized society, rejecting its model of the 'organization man' and his 'one dimensional' personality. Almost 40 years later, this development has reached mainstream and hardend into what cultural critic Marion von Osten calls the "creative imperative": the systemic demand on individuals to be creative and expressive. Through a combination of pull- and push-processes, large segments of the population have acquired substantial cultural capital, developed a heightened desire and need to be unique. They â?? or should I say: we ? â?? are finding themselves within vastly expanded fields for self-expression and have embarked on a search for recognition and reputation. The old division of labor in the field of culture where a few highly, individualized cultural producers worked for a relatively undifferentiated mass of consumers, is being complemented by a new culture of prosumerism, for the want of a better term, created by people who are users and producers at the same time. The DJ selecting and mixing records in a live setting, not the writer struggling alone with the empty page, is the contemporary cultural archetype. Though, perhaps this cliché is already tired and being supplanted by the image of the blogger offering a personal take, in real time, on whatever slice of the world appears relevant to him or her. Web 2.0 offer ways to (re)establish their own link to the world, however they see it, be it comings and goings of their cat, Scandinavian 'necro metal', or anti-globalization. Personal public speech transforms people who used to be spectators into participants. Sometimes, the difference between these roles is so small that it might feel insignificant, but sometimes the consequences of this shift are enormous, bringing down governments or embarrassing corporations. The more spectacular cases show clearly what I would argue is the case everywhere. Building links to the world is not a passive act of observing, but an active intervention into the world, not the least by validating some aspects of the world as important, that is, worthy of attention, while letting others fall out of sight. Yet, at the same time, it is also validating the person through his or her ability to establish those links, as the one capable of establishing meaning of some kind in a sea of noise. Since this is done mainly through self-directed volunteer efforts (even if some make money) the meaning established is, first and foremost, a personal one. Thus, it's a process of co-creation of an individual identity and a world at large. It seems plausible that this is contributing to a type of (self)experience very different from model still dominant, where the world inside of us, our self, is far removed from the world outside of us. The Cartesian a prori "cogito ergo sumâ??, according to which the only thing we can ultimately be certain of is our individual thinking, is less convincing a starting point than it used to be. Rather, we are entering a world of 'networked individualism' where individual self-identity â?? both in terms of the image one has of oneself as well as in terms of the image others have of one â?? can no longer be separated from one's position within a relational network. This is a subtle, but very fundamental shift. The notion of 'networked individualism' already indicates that individualization does not mean atomization or some other dystopic notion of people being isolated behind their computer screens. Rather it points towards forms of identity situated between the fully autonomous individual, rooted in his or her privacy, and the faceless member of a collective, whose personality is subsumed under the identity of the group. Yet, if idendividual identity is primarily understood, and experienced, as relational, then concepts like privacy, which is anti-relational to its core, are becoming more and more alien. We can see some of this new balance between individuality and sociality in an emerging, distinct pattern of online collaboration. People seem to act neither as egoistic individuals, maximizing their own resources nor as selfless contributors to a collective effort. Rather there is something in between, something new, that we might characterize as "weak cooperationâ??. Usually, cooperation entails people first specifying a common goal and then working towards achieving it. Specifying the common goal is often a very difficult process, requiring considerable negotiations between all involved parties before the actual work can even begin. Unless some shortcuts are introduced, be it through the market or hierarchical decision making, these processes do not scale very well. Yet, today, we have sometimes very large groups working together quite productively, though we might not share their sense of what it means to be productive. The reason for this seems to be that here cooperation emerges after the fact. not as something planned beforehand. Since much of this is self-directed volunteer work, it means people do it, first and foremost, for themselves. People publish their own works, drawing on works of others. Once these are published, and visible to others, there is a chance, just a chance, to detect others whose own works or thoughts complement one's own ideas in a meaningful way. Thus cooperation can begin on a low-key, ad-hoc level. Wikipedia is a good example here. The vast majority of contributors are only concerned with a very small number of articles. They may write once something on a topic they care about. In the process, some of them recognize that others care about the same, and they might interact with them on the basis of their shared, mutually-proven interest, whatever it is. Such cooperation requires minimal coordination and no planning or prior agreements. This is not community, if that concept is to have any meaning. Rather, this is weak cooperation, based on weak social ties. From that, some very few people might get interested in the project as a whole, and they start working less on their own article, but more on the administration of the system. In the process, they show to other administrators that they are committed, and based on that, they might become members of the core them, where weak cooperation slowly gives way to more conventional strong, that is planned, cooperation. Thus, weak and strong cooperation complement each other, but the key is that one does not need to become a member and identify with the project as a whole in order to begin to participate. By exposing oneself, by showing what one cares about, in one's own time and without payment, users offer themselves as trustworthy for collaboration. Not all of them are interested in that, and the degree of collaboration varies vastly depending on the field of activity. In political blogs, collaboration, that is information sharing and interlinking, is very high. Yet, even in relatively individualistic platforms, such as the photo-sharing site Flickr, about 1 in 5 people joins some groups of shared interest, that is, uses some collaborative features offered by the site. If self-identity and the experience of the world is one of pragmatic fluidity, then it seems save to assume that on a societal level, one of the effects is also the fragmentation the public sphere into sub-spheres. These are becoming increasingly differentiated by internal culture and set of rules, pragmatically assembled by the people who make up these publics as the go along. Since people are inhabiting more than one of these sub spheres at the same time, and are moving between them, this does not mean the breakdown of social communication, but it nevertheless adds to the crisis of those institutions that require a traditional public sphere to function. Compared with the immediacy and authenticity these new forms of cooperation seem to offer, partly because these limited, focused associations do not need to make difficult compromises, the discourse of the public sphere, particularly around politics, seems increasingly artificial and insincere. Not the least because politicians need to make difficult compromises to gain majorities and offer overall solutions that cannot accommodate the high degree of singularity of the "mix-and-matchâ?? lifes people are living. Politics, and the public sphere around it, appears as the domain of cynics. Yet, it would be entirely wrong to see this as a triumph of free cooperation and a withering of power of the state and of powerful institutions. On the contrary. The very same infrastructure that supports this hopeful transformation of individual identity and the new, voluntary modes of cooperation, also creates new means through which power is being exercised. We can observe this on two levels. The providers of this infrastructure are compiling information about users on a scale and level of detail unimaginable only a few years ago. With that data, they are creating new meta knowledge not just about individual users, but about entire groups of users, which allows them to know about connections of which individual users are not even aware of. This enables them to engage in profile-based predictions of future user behavior. There are benign and positive aspects of this. We all know amazon recommendation system, where we are presented with books that we are assumed to like, based on the profiles of others like us. Yet, it's easy to extend the logic of such recommendation systems into what sociologist David Lyon calls "social sorting". That is, the fitting of people's lifes into preselected trajectories that maximize the benefits of those who provide the infrastructure. In effect, one's future becomes a self-fulling prophecy, created by the providers of essential services without knowledge of or consent by the individuals affected. This without any accountability to individuals or even democratic oversight. This is strictly business, even if it does complement classic state surveillance. We will hear much more about this later on from David directly, so I will leave it with this. The second level on which the free sharing of information and the new modes of cooperation contributes to hardening of social power is perhaps less obvious. The institutions of government are classic bureaucracies, hierarchical and based on representation. They are very good at dealing with other institutions built the same way. Yet, they have profound difficulties dealing with networks built on loose cooperation. These networks are powerful, the can process very significant amounts of information and effectively create transparency of complex government processes. Let me give you an example. Bilaterals.org bills itself as "a collective effort to share information and stimulate cooperation against bilateral trade and investment agreements that are opening countries to the deepest forms of penetration by transnational corporations". Through collecting, aggregating and publishing critical information in real time, they challenge the state in an arena â?? international treaty making â?? that is has never been challenged before. But, the network that runs this site is neither clearly identified, because it's partly built on open, weak cooperation, nor does it represent anyone. This is organization not built around representation, but around weakly coordinated action. And there are thousands upon thousands of them. Form the point of view of the state, it is challenged by an organization it cannot talk to, because it is geared towards talking to representatives, not individuals. One of the ways which the state reacts to this challenge that it cannot deal with for structural reasons is to try to withhold information. This is done across the board, by expanding the scope of the executive, while restricting the means of oversight. This is most clearly the case in the US, where we have a government built around the notion and practice of "executive privilege" but also the case in Europe. >From the governments point of view, loose cooperation built on action rather representation, looks, in its most challenging form, just like terrorism against which it must provide security by, well, expanding the means of the executive. But because the boundaries of the networks are difficult to determine, and the patterns of communication of terrorists are like any other network of cooperation, society as a whole comes under suspicion. Every cell phone is a potential terrorists device. As an effect core elements of the state, centering around the security services, are becoming, at the same time, more secretive yet more omnipresent, further eroding privacy and other distinctions central to a liberal democracy, such as the one between military and police. These pictures of the entirely legal protest camps during this years G8 Summit in Germany were taken by a Tornado military fight jet, flying at less than 200 altitude. The social landscape in a world where notion is ill-fitting is characterized both by a flowering of free cooperation, where individuals experience their own identity intimately related to others with whom they create the networks through which they built their connective world. This is a functioning anarchy, understood as voluntary cooperation built on mutual trust. Though, it's a burgeois anarchy, one which exists within the domininant system, rather than as a revolutionary alternative to it. This development takes place through an infrastructure whose very design aggregate power in the hands of those who control the foundation of this new landscape: means of communication. And, this takes place within the framework of the state rebuilding its legitimacy around an authoritarian core promising security against the vagueries of free cooperation. Whether or not this makes the glass half full or half empty is a meaningless question, we are currently pouring into it as water is leaking out. The key question when we try to think about a world withput privacy is how we can promote free cooperation, which involves a high degree of visibility and identifiability of individuals, while limiting social sorting and preventing the state to rebuild itself around a deeply authoritarian core. If we manage that, I believe we can really say: goodbye privacy. --- http://felix.openflows.com ----------------------------- out now: *|Manuel Castells and the Theory of the Network Society. Polity, 2006 *|Open Cultures and the Nature of Networks. Ed. Futura/Revolver, 2005 ----- End forwarded message ----- # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@kein.org and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@kein.org