Jordan Crandall on Tue, 5 Oct 2004 10:56:27 +0200 (CEST) |
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<nettime> notes on the operational condition |
Notes on the operational condition Jordan Crandall I am thinking of that construct that Etienne-Jules Marey launched into action with the firing of his "photographic rifle" in the early 1880s. Resembling, as it did, the weapon of a soldier or hunter, his camera-gun was a contradictory device, poised in the air to capture its prey by arresting it in the encodings of a photographic surface. The rifle was ultimately harmless, of course, geared to preserve rather than destroy -- although one could say that, in the years to come, it was the photographic apparatus that emerged the victor. Fast forward to the 1950s. During this decade, a radically new kind of organizational and representational complex began to emerge. It was driven by the development of digital computing, especially as it was integrated into military command, control, and communications systems. However like all camera-gun and weapon-tool formations, this "operational" complex was not shaped by technology alone. It was shaped by the demands and discourses of the defense economy. It was shaped not only by computationally-driven tools and techniques, but the symbolic-communicative practices and uses that surround them. It was shaped by the positions and qualities of a subjectivity that was integrated and adjusted to such arrangements. The analytical tradition of Marey continues, within a triumphant new technological-semiotic support. Today, in computationally-driven Western cultures, we are no longer seeing phenomena as primarily framed through the mechanism of the camera. We are seeing it through the combinatory processing grid of the operational construct. *** This operational construct is difficult to envisage. It can be distinguished from more conventional forms of representation through its aesthetics of processing. It registers a computer-mediated vision and a degree of machine intelligence, often with calculations distinctly visible on its image-field. We are not simply speaking about an image however. One should resist understanding the operational construct solely in terms of representation, for images provide only one window onto its mechanics. One should also resist understanding it in terms of a computer interface, for interfaces provide only one window onto its larger mechanisms. One should also resist understanding it as a military phenomenon. Operational constructs have developed in the context of media development, in a circuitous relation with spectacle culture, whether in terms of news, special effects, navigational devices, or interactive games. They have arisen out of the conditions of mediatization that enabled them, as they have informed the development of spectatorial regimes. I want to position this construct in such a way that it circulates across military and media culture as part of a larger historical discourse on technology, culture, and power in the West -- visible in the fields of computer science, economics, media studies, or an emerging culture of navigation and "location awareness." I want to position it in such a way that it complicates divisions between military and civilian, proprietary and public, surveillance and shopping -- providing a way that militarization and media culture can be held together in new assemblages, new objects for critical attention. Such an endeavor is urgent given the contemporary coupling of military and media industry. Western military expansion is occurring at a moment when the armed forces are increasingly assuming the role of protector and securer of global business investments. This has enabled unprecedented alliances between the military and the media-entertainment industries, whose lucrative contracts depend upon political support. News media corporations are directly involved in profiting from the sale of those commodities on which they report -- for example, marketing such products through their websites -- to the extent that news has become a profit center. It is a profit center that demands new and constant dangers for reportage and commodification. Since 1980, the two-cycle (AM/PM) basis for news delivery has been gradually replaced by a relentless 24-hour news delivery cycle that seldom looks back. It fuels a constant battle for attention-space, where the whole of reality is transformed into a DRAMATIC STAGE FOR ALLURING CATASTROPHES. Here there is no time to remember, because the next crisis -- always imminent -- demands our full vigilance. Battle simulations, television shows, and interactive games inhabit a mutually-reinforcing system of marketable threats and protections. There is nothing outside of this system, and especially as it is increasingly able to tap into the deeper mechanisms of the psyche, where danger is eroticized. Exacerbated by a wholesale triumph of spectacle culture, where reality is ever more intricately defined through the control of appearances, the boundaries between media spectatorship, combat, and shopping are eroding. *** A pilot is flying an aircraft during a combat situation in Iraq. It is flown jointly, by an operator in the cockpit as well as by operators on the ground. We are watching the scene as if through the cockpit window. Computer calculations are arrayed on the image-field. We see through the pilot's eye, but we also see through the viewpoint of the larger command network in which the pilot is embedded. The pilot is one actor within a distributed agency that combines humans and machines. Our viewpoint is momentary converged with that of the piloting agency. We are placed in position, momentarily aligned with this operator, sharing its perspective, hailed as subjects within its operational world. The news clip ends. The news anchor appears. She meets our gaze and addresses us in terms of a collective "we." We can define the operational construct as follows. It is an assemblage of computer-assisted operations through which objects are analyzed, tracked, and negotiated, in order to facilitate an arrangement of power. It helps to orchestrate a perceptual coordination, positioning its subject-objects within a determined situation whereby an operation of enforcement is conducted. It helps to structure a field of representation and a mode of attention that is particular to it. Following Foucault, we can say that it is a regulatory mechanism for the structuring of experience. As it seeps into general use, it carries with it a way of modulating and constructing discourses that define a field of objects -- whether friend or enemy -- and a subject adequate to know them. It becomes a model for thought and identification, a source of new concepts and metaphors, and an agent of material transformation. These need to be understood in a political relation. Think, for example, of way that one is compelled to adopt a position of extreme vigilance -- to "track" or scan rather than simply see -- in the reporting of "suspicious activity" at an airport. It is a machine-aided process of perception and knowledge accumulation, embodied in practice, that is bound up within the demands of an emerging security regime. Seen in this light, we could say that operational constructs play a role in producing the situations that they seem only to anticipate. They deliver images of the very system of conflicts that they help to maintain. By looking carefully at this construct, with an eye toward the conditions of its formation and its relationships to other computing and representational paradigms, one is compelled to ask: to what extent is it becoming a CONDITION? If the operational construct plays a role in the construction of "the enemy" and the stabilization of ally/enemy distinctions, then it participates in the generation of a new type of subjectivity -- a form of self-reference, or self-medialization, which is defined in response to a desired and feared Other. Such awareness opens up possibilities for political intervention -- understanding the forms of opposition to this orientation that are emerging in the globalized world. For the operational construct is only one "window" onto reality. There are other constructs that counter it, and for which, by its very nature, it is unable to account. It is powerless to envision terms of engagement that do not operate according to its logics. It can only assign them to the realm of the barbaric or irrational: that which lies outside of its license on reason. One can regard the eruption of violence as the result of the lack of political process within which these alternative constructs can be heard. *** A soldier on the ground in Iraq is calculating coordinates for a strike using laser binoculars and a GPS device. He transmits them via satellite to the Joint Operations Center in Qatar. Command personnel in Qatar check the information against digital maps made from satellite photographs, determine the coordinates for the strike, and then relay the coordinates via communications satellite to the pilot of a B-2, into whose missile guidance system they are fed. The launched missile is corrected in flight by a GPS satellite. A combinatory agency has emerged through this coordination and command network, spanning spatial distance and merging information from multiple sources. The operational construct is a product of the drive to eliminate the intervals between observation, analysis, and engagement and thus to generate an improved KNOWLEDGE-ACTION-TIME. One could see the entire history of military development as having been driven, in one way or another, by this need. Since 1950s, it has led to an emphasis on automation over manual labor since it is believed that only advanced technological systems are capable of dealing accurately and consistently with the calculations and extremely complex demands of battle situations -- particularly within the potentially devastating warfare scenarios of the Cold War period, when there was thought to be no time for human intervention. The operational construct is a contemporary manifestation of this historical drive. It is motored by the need for an instantaneity of action, where time delays, spatial distances, and "middlemen" are reduced through computational systems that facilitate the sharing of human and machinic functions. The integrated networking of the new generation of US military systems allows sensors, weapons, communications systems, commanders, and soldiers to be linked into one computing grid. A new form of agency emerges within this coordination and command network. One can see "unmanned" vehicles in this light, especially those that are armed: they are constructs that are shaped, in system and in material form, by the drive to collapse the distance between sensor, analyst, and shooter, through various systemic adjustments and relocations. The operational construct "warps" space and time and links multiple actors as if they were one. A combinatory field of perception arises within a distributed field of shared functions. This intertwining of human and machinic capacity, in the generation of a combinatory field of perception, is part of the historical development of media itself. In cinema, the spectator and the cinematic apparatus are mutually dependent in the act of conducting representation. One must be trained to behave and see in accordance with the conditions of the device. The viewer is immobilized and sensitized to a language of movement through which an extensive world is understood. The human becomes reliant upon the apparatus that populates its field of vision, adjusting to the rhythmic codes of its conveyance, as the apparatus is reliant upon the sensorium of the viewer for its actualization. A perceptual capacity and a signifying apparatus emerges through an integration of human and machine. We can say that, in a spectatorial or immersive situation, a subject is "distributed" within a field of engagement determined through technological systems of communication, storage, sorting, and retrieval, contoured under the social and institutional construction of knowledge. A viewing subject is linked or inserted into larger networks of seeing and linguistic meaning, and a decentered or multi-nodal self emerges. It is accompanied by experiences of disembodiment and incipient presence; experiences of mobility and translocality; experiences of prosthetic extension and liberation through machines. One can regard the history of popular media development in terms of adjustment, coordination, and acclimation -- whether television, console games, Internet, or mobile media. It is the history of technologized perception and presence. This history can be seen in terms of automation. Since the 1950s and 1960s, with the emergence of digital computing and the disciplines of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, the idea that visual and cognitive faculties can be automated began to take root. However, I am less interested in a specific history of automation than about the larger migrations of cognition within which the history of automation is intertwined. For example, by the 1960s television was already on its way to becoming, as it has today, a machine for the automation of thinking. Reflecting the viewer's own thought process, it develops its own conventions of simulated deliberation, absolving the viewer of the labor of decision-making -- as when a laugh track allows one to maintain a relaxed composure while the machine assumes the labor of chuckling. At the extreme end is the figure of the "couch potato," whose body is hollowed out by the apparatus as the televisual "smart image" assumes control. *** An Olympic sports event appears on television. On the corner of the screen, a digital readout clocks the timing of the runners as they cross the finish line. The winner, formerly determined by eye, it is now gauged by the machine. It is measured in tenths of seconds -- differences that unaided vision can no longer determine. The machine has become an actor in the drama -- the contestant that one primarily competes against. Even though we do not "play" this game, or access this situation directly, we are subjected to an operational condition that has helped to structure our way of seeing it, and the conventions of representation that are normalized in its actualization. We are part of the agency that "keeps track." The operational construct is a specific orientation of media history -- one that orchestrates a distribution, relocation, and integration of perceptual, communicative, and storage faculties in such a way as to produce an arrangement of power. Through machine-human-discourse integrations, the operational construct is that which helps to coordinate perception, situating its subject-objects within an enforcement grid. One might locate two pathways that are intertwined with its development. The first pathway is that of the analytical tradition of Marey, which gave rise to the technical underpinnings of the cinematic medium itself. This tradition involves an analytical probing into the phenomenon of movement in order to quantify and account for it. It is a scientific axis of delving into the realm of the invisible -- that which is too fast, too small, too obscure for the unaided eye to see -- in order to strip the object of its secrets. The second pathway, which we could locate at the origin of aerial photography, is that of the panoptic tradition: the simultaneous development of an all-encompassing, objective gaze that assumes power over this moving object, via its representation. These two pathways -- which can be understood in terms of scientific analysis and spatial control -- are DIMENSIONS of media development, which can be understood in terms militaristic or not. Whether in terms of this micro or macro tradition (which are not discrete), the larger impulse I want to locate is that of the controlling gaze that moves from TRACKING motion to ANALYZING its components to DETECTING pattern to STRUCTURING action to negotiating SIGNIFICANCE, all for the benefit of ASSUMING POWER over a moving object by way of its representation, in both a material and discursive sense. And again, this has involved escalating time pressures contoured under an economy of threat, moving toward a reduction of the intervals between detection, analysis, and engagement. In everyday life it is visible in such impulses as "keeping track," when one needs to account for a moving object in the most precise terms as to assert control over it, to manage it, lest it become unruly and threaten unproductivity, inconvenience, or "wasted time." As clusters of tools, procedures, and metaphors, technologies configure a platform for discourse and ideology. This analytical-panoptic tradition, intertwined with the development of computing technologies, has led to the generation a particular technological-semiotic support: a way of ordering, making sense of, and communicating one's position and orientation vis-a-vis the represented, contoured under an institutional-discursive paradigm. The operational image -- heir to this tradition -- acts as a window onto a computational process, as if part of an instrument panel. Its conditions of figuration are driven by the systematic, logical rules of computing, where it is understood that everything -- warfare, ground realities, markets -- can be formalized, modeled, and managed. The processing activity and notations that are visible on the image-field arise out of, and compel, a figuring of reality as mathematical and "capturable" through a formal programming logic. It registers the imposition of the human will to dominate an unruly or unproductive reality, over and through the machine, and therefore carries with it an intoxicating sense of control. Within the perfect world of the operational system, reality is subsumed within the dictates of the interface. By the very nature of the system, the sense of mastery and control through logical computational procedures establishes a de facto power relation between observer and observed. Such a technological ensemble is modifiable -- politics make it possible -- yet it has political orientations built into its system. It is not only the technology and its use, in other words, but the assumptions and orientations that come bundled with it. Computational techniques of analysis and simulation, along with a reliance on mathematical formalization and technological rationalism (over cultural and historical understanding) as a way to solve global problems, have contributed to an experience of the world as a predictable, manipulable entity, leading to a sense of dominance over the future. That which does not play according to these terms is othered -- or Orientalized -- as irrational or primitive. One could describe this orientation as "militaristic," yet it is also shared in the worlds of science, marketing, and videogaming, for example. In the mediated relation between viewer and viewed, a power relation is always inscribed. Mastery through the realm of representation has a long history, often equated with parochialism and the orientation of the pornographic. It is the gaze that calls nature to offer up its secrets, and the procedure through which empirical knowledge is attained: the stance of the researcher; the explorer; the seeker of truth. A sense of mastery is generated through the contemporary media apparatus, where the media spectator is infused with an artificial sense of control over the machine and an exterior world represented on the screen. The object of viewing is dissected, subjugated. So is its subject. The drive toward real-time engagement -- that is, the drive to narrow the intervals between observation, analysis, and engagement and thus to generate an improved knowledge-action-time -- operates bi-directionally. It operates both on the object and subject of viewing as both are integrated with machinic systems. As the military apparatus endeavors to AIM, so is the viewer-consumer AIMED AT. *** A user of a GPS-enabled mobile device is navigating unfamiliar terrain. Rather than a hostile territory, an unproductive and unruly one is engaged, in order to transform it into a space that can be controlled, represented, and traversed. A destination is chosen in order to fulfill a need, whether for pleasure or service, shopping or logistical support. Individually-tailored enticements appear on the screen. We are potential consumers in a location-aware landscape -- targets within the operational interfaces of the marketing world. Many interfaces open onto, and help construct, this given situation. We inhabit these combinatory and often contradictory spaces in situations of utility or control, accessing and accessed through the situations displayed on the screens. The tracked object is placed on a GEO-TEMPORAL GRID, and the coalesced subject is placed on an IDENTITY MATRIX. Both involve a positional grid, whether in the sense of navigation or identity. Think of the new paradigms of production, which involve the narrowing of the intervals between conception, manufacturing, and distribution: the "production on demand" or "just in time" delivery models that have aimed toward instantaneity in shopping and media-entertainment development, in order to shrink the delays between detecting an audience pattern and formatting a new enticement that can address it. Through navigational and locative media, information from buying habits, travel locations, and audience demographics can be integrated into one comprehensive system, which aims to target viewer-buyers at the one-to-one level. The viewer-consumer is targeted within a demographic or marketing grid. Such escalations are welcome in the name of convenience, portability, and safety. Bringing the body up to speed through technological augmentation -- "better living through technology" -- has always been a key trope in modern Western consumer culture, from the high-tech kitchens of the 1960s to the cyborg fantasies of contemporary fiction. It has always coalesced against a field of inefficiency and danger. Time has always been of the essence. For both the military and the civilian observer, there is no "time" for reflection. In the military realm, reflection adds time and space in which the target might slip away. It expands, not lessens, the gap between detecting and intervening, sensing and shooting. In the popular realm, slowness -- the stuff of reflection and deliberation -- is to be avoided, instantaneity prized. American media culture is one of impatience and immediacy. For the former, reflection is distributed and automated toward the goal of controlling the object; for the latter, it is distributed and automated -- some would say evacuated -- for the goal of controlling the subject. However, again, we are talking about a symbiotic relationship as both subject and object are mutually intertwined within the combinatory human-machinic realm. And yet the analytic-panoptic vector is about acquiring a position of mastery through an omniscient distribution of the gaze: a controlling gaze that is everywhere yet nowhere, and which acquires power solely because of this amorphousness. The drive toward real-time engagement is haunted by the fundamental problems of representation, which concern the illusory correspondence between model and reality and the impossibility of eliminating the referential gap. If the gap cannot be closed, can it be "overstepped"? The drive toward simultaneity has led to the development of new formats of prediction and simulation -- the formal modeling of closed systems and the development of highly sophisticated scenario planning techniques. With computers forming the base for strategic thought, the world is modeled as a formal machine, subject to its determining logics. The image becomes too slow, too cumbersome. Lagging behind, it can only move ahead of the real. The future is modeled as a probable construct not only in order to anticipate events, but to mold realities to fit it. In a sense, there exists a probable construct -- a kind of idealized scenario -- that stands in relation to reality as its TENDENCY. It configures as a STATISTICAL INCLINATION, which hovers like an ideal form awaiting a reality that will fill it. It becomes a silhouette that models future positions, a ghostly forebear into which reality flows. Think of the DARPA futures market that was recently proposed -- a system whereby investors could bet on the probable occurrence of eruptive global events, with the idea that markets could anticipate such events. One could also think of the ideology of pre-emptive war itself as an outcome of this PREDICTIVE FORMALISM. *** Again, I am focusing on a construct of control and looking at popular media through its lens. I am not focusing on media in general, which as we know, is not only about control. And yet, control is internalized. It filters into the popular realm. One could posit a bidirectional, combinatory subjectivity: an OPERATIONAL SUBJECTIVITY that emerges through this distributed capacity of analysis, communication, and engagement -- seeing, knowing, acting. We might also refer to it as a "militarized subjectivity." As media-entertainment viewers, we align with it, as if operating the image-apparatus through its agency. It is a subjectivity in which we can unwittingly take part -- especially as deliberation is "automated" -- as we align with its ontology of friend/enemy division. (Again, we are talking about human-machine-discourse integrations that are not only about technologies themselves, but the symbolic-communicative practices and uses that surround them.) We refer to ourselves in its terms; we place self and other according to its categorizations. In the US people often evaluate films in terms of their opening weekend revenue rather than their content. Everyday passersby speak of "targeted neighborhoods." We choose between the categorizations and distinctions that it offers, such as us or them, democracy or fundamentalism. Who aims, who is aimed at? We have a diligent OPERATOR, situated within a command network, who is engaged in the activity of tracking, identifying, positioning, targeting, or intercepting of an object of hostility, and whose position is known within a command network (or by the enemy). We have a diligent OBSERVER, who watches according to the codes of media reception and whose proclivities and buying histories are databased. We have a diligent NAVIGATOR who uses a device for pinpointing a trajectory within a location-aware navigational system that offers up individually-tailored enticements. When the observer is the "site" of operation, it becomes the operational construct's "object." The operator would then constitute the target rather than the tracker. However, a combinatory operational subjectivity would suggest that we target ourselves. *** A videogame player is leading a group of soldiers in a battle simulation. The simulation is a commercialized version of a military training program called Full Spectrum Warrior. Controlling the joystick, we are placed directly in the driver's seat. This operator is a combination of real and fictional entities, in virtual conflict scenarios that are based on real ones. Assessing a potentially dangerous situation, we call in support and prepare to attack. We feel a rush of adrenaline; our heartbeat quickens. There is no denying the thrill that we feel from this adventure. The operational construct is geared toward penetrating through the scrim of appearances to get at the "core" of a phenomenon, as if it could close the referential gap. It must strip away the layers of mediation to probe into the object's hidden truth. One could say that this impulse to probe beneath the layers of signification and the play of differences, to get at the "real thing" itself, is shared in contemporary media culture's "passion for the Real" -- played out in the adventure factor in military recruitment advertisements, immersive games, and extreme sports, as well as the popular aesthetics of rawness and unfiltered immediacy in surveillance-entertainment. A widespread cultural mistrust in the image compels the development of new forms of accuracy. The reality television show or the embedded reporter dispatch is somehow more authentic, more real, to a television viewer accustomed to the tricks of the trade. As Lacan defines it, the Real is the hidden fantasmatic underside of our sense of reality, which cannot be assimilated into the symbolic order of language or into the domain of shared images. It provides the fundamental support of reality, yet it cannot be incorporated into it. To attempt to accommodate it is to enter the domain of contradictions, where violence can be both horrific and pleasurable, and where surveillance can be voyeurism. It is the place where violence and sexuality share a common impulse: what Bataille describes as an intense longing for an integration that could only mean dissolution and death, and hence which embroils us in an endless cycle of contradictory compulsions. In this sense, the site of battle is not only the place of violent contestation, but, as Klaus Theweleit would say, the site of the body's resistance to the threat of its self-disintegration. In this dimension there is a jouissance that is felt in the catastrophe, or in the anticipation of the catastrophic eruption -- an illicit, excessive life-joy, an unconditional life-affirmation, irresolvable in terms of symbolic reality or the realm of appearances. It is the realm where one secretly thrills to the potential spectacle of crime, and where danger is not only avoided but secretly COURTED. It flourishes in the disaster imaginary and the criminal unconscious. One experiences its contradictions when one feels a "morbid curiosity" -- when, present in the aftermath of a violent act, we have to look, but we don't want to see. The possibility of danger is a constitutive element of attraction: it is the lure of the unattainable, the unpredictable, the incipient, the dangerous web of intrigue that pulls us into the videogame. For the operational construct, such an admission is tatamount to defeat. The operational orientation is that which cannot allow the possibility of surrender -- that is, of succumbing to desire. Even to acknowledge a voyeuristic impulse is already to admit that one can be "taken in." It is understood as a form of weakness, especially in terms of the aggressive, masculine, warrior stance that is pervasive in military and gaming culture. The "thrill" of shooting and killing can be felt privately but not addressed publicly. Yet objects coalesce not only in ways that can be justified in terms of surveillance, concern, or hostility -- they also coalesce as unexpected sites and unfathomable situations that Lacan would call SUBLIME OBJECTS, impossible-real objects of desire. Rather than confronted in these terms, of course, these often coalesce into EXCESSES TO BE ELIMINATED, introduced within the targeting grids of the operational construct itself. The object that coalesces within its determining grids is that which is BECOMING-RESOLVABLE -- that which is in the process of being held accountable to its terms. It is the object in the process of being materialized as controllable, persecuted in the name of the law, defended against in the name of threat, contested in the name of propriety. It is a defense against some aspect that threatens to surface and disrupt the separations upon which reality is built, and therefore undermine its very cohesion. The determining grids of the construct are those of both pleasure and punishment. At times we can glimpse both at work, such as in the first shock of the voyeuristic denigration at work in the images of Abu Ghraib, before it began to be stabilized in the realm of representation and discourse. We have to glimpse it in its instantaneity, before it is worked through in the realm of appearances and made targetable. Therefore, while we have defined the operational construct an apparatus of control that functions in terms of an analytical-panoptic tradition of observation, we also need to foreground the libidinous mechanisms that are always behind the mechanisms of control. In addition to a formulation of the operational construct as an instrumental, technical-discursive assemblage that enacts a vector of power, we can add an axis of INTENSITY or AFFECT. What I want to locate here is an axis of intensity that underlies the symbolic register, continually confounding politics of representation. It cannot be harnessed, but nonetheless must be intuited, ventriloquised, acknowledged. It is a necessary dimension of any study of a combinatory operational subjectivity, for it allows us to account for non-linguistic or non-representational phenomena such as devotion, belief, desire, and dignity. It is a necessary dimension to acknowledge in any study of operational constructs, in order to avoid an exclusive emphasis on semiotic meaning. In addition to the meaning of a phenomenon, one must endeavor to account for its MOTIVATING POWER. Meaning is often pressed into service of an even more fundamental intensity of belief. Intensities will always trump semantics -- they will mold meanings to their own ends. Although this dimension of intensity and affective engagement is not representational, it is, following Deleuze, "gradated" by representation. Its figures and pathways cross beneath the images of the world and underlay the vectors of perception. It is played out with the realms of fantasy, folklore and the news, and projected into the realm of the exotic or the grotesque, and of course, harnessed in the fields of marketing. It is projected into the realm of consumer goods and images, aimed at creating economies of desire that are often couched in the language of protection. These economies aims to "save" the consumer from inconvenience, wasted time, and threat through the marketing and development of items that can offer a temporary sense of safety, productivity, and allure. Think of the following two consumer products that are currently being marketed for home use: the "cell phone stun gun" and the "explosion-proof air conditioner." Networks of pleasure and paranoia are harnessed in order to produce an awareness of ENDANGERED ENTICEMENT and move a populace to action - that is, to consume material, virtual, or discursive objects. In the West, subjects are compelled to believe in a cause (democracy) and dedicate themselves to a "way of life" (shopping). The expression "defending our way of life" embodies the twin engines of militarization: desire and fear, attraction and protection. This means defending the right to acquire as the very means of "freedom of mobility." It means defending the right to own and circulate objects, and to constitute oneself as an object to be marketed. Through an interlocking mechanism of selling and consuming, looking and buying, one grazes along endless arrays of enticements offered up for the desirous and acquiring eye -- enticements that are aimed at the replication of desire in the eyes of others. Such a mechanism becomes the very condition of mobility. It is a process of defining the self in terms of an unbounded menagerie of attractions, which leaves it forever lacking. We can say that whenever there is surveillance, there is shopping, and vice-versa: the CONSUMER POLICES and the POLICER DESIRES. *** MOSCOW, Feb. 17 -- It was a campaign manager's dream visual: A president weeks away from an election stands on the bridge of a nuclear submarine out at sea, watching the test launch of two intercontinental missiles capable of destroying an enemy city. President Vladimir Putin took his position aboard the Arkhangelsk on Tuesday afternoon, television cameras dutifully recording the moment. And he waited. And waited and waited. Finally after 25 minutes, naval officers announced what had become painfully obvious, that the launch had not taken place, and they shuffled the guests and journalists below deck, according to Russian reporters on the scene. Putin disappeared without a word. Russian news organizations promptly reported that a malfunction had scuttled the launch. Then, a few hours later, the navy's top admiral denied that any launch had been planned. A "virtual launch" had been intended from the start, he explained, and it had been a success. "The work was carried out according to the plan," Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov said at a televised briefing Tuesday. "And to make things completely clear, I'll say that the ballistic exercises were designed as a virtual launch, which was done twice, first in one spot, then in another." The operational gaze strives for a global, comprehensive analysis and a complete panoptic vision, yet these are impossibilities. Where there is monitoring, there is camouflage. The myth of total control or "full spectrum dominance" pervades military-business culture, yet there is also an awareness of the extent to which any technology can be fooled. The drive toward strategic advantage occurs not only through developing ways to narrow the window between detection and engagement, and through an anticipation of the ways in which one's opponents can outwit one's maneuvers. Detection is always outwitted by deception, and therefore needs to anticipate the countermoves and jamming strategies that will eventually undermine it. One endeavors not only to know faster and better than one's opponents, but to strategically deploy diversions - false information, disguises, decoys - that send them off the track. For example, in order to gather information on potential recruits, US law enforcement agencies set up websites that are geared to resemble extremist sites. Visitors to the sites can be tracked. On the other hand, such groups can transmit false information in order to determine whether they are being monitored. Such diversions are often aimed for distribution and replication along media pathways. Consider an aerial video, shot by the Israeli Defense Forces, of a funeral that occurred during the 2002 siege of the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank. The IDF claims that this videotape documents a fake ceremony, staged in order to multiply the number of casualties in Jenin. The deception could have occurred at groundlevel -- one needs to shape the act of being observed to one's own advantage, especially during times of conflict -- or at the level of the institution that has orchestrated the framing of the image. The potential or the deployed image becomes artillery in the battlegrounds for attention. One endeavors to find ways of lessening one's footprint upon the representational screens of others through self-concealment or stealth. The drive to collapse the distance between observation, analysis, and intervention is a sculpting force, but this force is most productively not a one-way vector. Military vehicles are shaped, in system and in material form, by not only their increased need for invasive effectivity, but by their need to evade detection by opposing forces. The sculpting force is bi-directional, and the STEALTH MATERIALITY that arises coalesces as a mutable surface between detection and deception. It is both an invasive and evasive form. Military forms and capacities are always embedded in such tradeoffs between protection, visibility, mobility, speed, and firepower. To increase the capacity of one is to decrease another -- the heat from a missile launch site makes it vulnerable to enemy detection, for example. Increased speed does not necessarily mean increased firepower. Invasive capacity can lessen protective capacity. As the construct opens onto such material forms and representations, it also opens onto discourses. One "bends the truth" and engages in "spin," anticipating the countermoves of one's opponent in discursive strategies. In the contemporary culture of spin, any event can be made to conform to any interpretation. On the personal level, one adopts various escape strategies in everyday life, such as using a mobile phone to transport yourself into another conversation in order to avoid a difficult or dull encounter in your vicinity. To deceive is to endeavor to escape public scrutiny; to maneuver on the edges of visibility. It is employed on all sides of the political spectrum. Deception also moves into an anticipatory space of perception -- as if to prefigure deceptive maneuvers before they occur -- as SUSPICION. The operational construct's other -- the object of its gaze -- is that which is deemed incapable of telling the truth. It is inherently DECEITFUL. The operational construct interfaces material-discursive form. It is a window onto an incipient materiality. It marks a kind of "edge" of material-perceptual reality. It does not simply represent, but constitutes an aspect of the events onto which it opens. It is part of their formation. Within its matrices, ordinary objects and gestures are transformed. *** A Pakistani man named Kamran Akhtar is arrested in New York for taking "surveillance videos" of buildings in Manhattan. He claims that he is simply a video buff, shooting landmarks for his family and friends back home. After viewing one of his tapes with about 50 local business and law enforcement officials, an FBI spokesman proclaims that "This video serves no other purpose but surveillance. There is no doubt." On what basis does he defend his claim? The video "appears to be extremely preliminary and very general of an overall view of downtown. Our sense is that he doesn't know what he is taping. He is simply trying to show tall buildings in crowded areas." Tourist video or surveillance video? To determine the distinction, we have to delve deep within the image. With a suspicious or inquiring gaze, we look for clues, in a situation where even the smallest choices assume ominous overtones. A suspicious angle (why does he look upward?), a curious focus (why linger on that building entrance?), an odd camera movement (why a slow pan to the right?), a hastening pace (why the agitation?), an odd level of familiarity (does he know what he is doing?). A dynamic of suspicion invades a language of critical analysis. Policeman, politician, or media critic? All use economies of fear and desire to produce their brands of critical awareness. I am reading into the representations that I see, to determine the components of militarization today. I am writing with a vigilant eye, as if a surveiller, looking for something to militate against. With this writing, I am sketching another economy of fear. Catastrophe has served me. --- This text is based on a paper delivered at the workshop "The City as Target" at the National University of Singapore in August of 2004. I would like to thank my colleagues to whom this ongoing research is indebted: John Armitage, Ryan Bishop and John Phillips, Jonathan Crary, Sean Cubitt, Manuel De Landa, Paul Norris Edwards, Stephen Graham, Thomas Y. Levin, Lev Manovich, Brian Massumi, and Eyal Weisman. A full bibliography is in development and will be posted in subsequent installments. The Feb 17 Moscow news clip, quoted above, was written by Peter Baker at the Washington Post Foreign Service, and originally cited by James Der Derian. http://jordancrandall.com/underfire # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@bbs.thing.net