McKenzie Wark on Thu, 27 Mar 2003 09:18:10 +0100 (CET) |
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For those interested in the similarities and differences between the media envelope of this Gulf war and the previous one, here is an extract from Virtual Geography, in which I tried to tell the story of that war, and develop some concepts for it. -- Ken 1. Saddam / Sodom Dateline: Baghdad, Thursday, August 23th, 1990. Iraqi television shows President Saddam Hussein sitting in a television studio surrounded by fifteen British citizens. These people, now hostages, were residents of Iraq and Kuwait when Iraq invaded its Gulf neighbour. Saddam Hussein appears in a suit and tie with a little white handkerchief neatly folded in his left breast pocket. The Iraqis allow the foreigners to talk to their families while the rest of the world watches on. They listen as Saddam explains that the Western media have misrepresented the situation. "In the past few days," he says, "I have come across articles published in the Western papers urging President Bush to strike Iraq and actually use force against Iraq despite your presence here." Responding to a mother's worries about her child's education, Saddam Hussein offered to send "experts from the ministry of education." Putting his hand gently on the head of seven year old Stuart Lockwood, he remarked, "when he and his friends, and all those present here, have played their role in preventing war, then you will all be heroes of peace." While the broadcast appeared on Iraqi television, the program seemed entirely aimed at a Western audience. Western media picked it up quickly and broadcast it around the world the next day. It drew instant and predictable official and media responses. The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd called it the "most sickening thing I have seen for some time." Rupert Murdoch's English tabloid press dubbed Saddam Hussein the "Butcher of Butcher of Baghdad". The American State Department called this event "shameful theatricals". A "repulsive charade" said the British Foreign Office. More than moral outrage at the hostage taking fuelled this response. Two rather more elusive factors emerged in this extraordinary attempt at direct political communication along the media vector between widely differing cultural sites. One was that Saddam Hussein confounded our most cherished beliefs about the genres of television and the kinds of stories they legitimately tell us. Looking like a cross between Bob Hope and Geraldo Rivera, Saddam Hussein appeared to Western viewers as a demented talk- show host, in gross breach of the etiquette even of 'reality television', where only crooks, pimps, prostitutes and unscrupulous used car salesmen may be treated to raw acts of intimate verbal violence on camera. Or perhaps the format of the program looked uncomfortably close to Oprah Winfrey on a bad day, talking about bondage or child abuse. This offence to contemporary American sensibilities was compounded by another, much older and deeper one. Saddam Hussein unwittingly presented us with a repetition of an ancient and fearful superstition about Arabs, and what Slovenian psychoanalyst Slavoj Zizek calls the threat to our sense of national enjoyment. "We always impute to the 'other' an excessive enjoyment; s/he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment." The 'fundamentalists', the only adherent of Islam one ever hears about, fall into the first category. The Iranian revolution, that otherwise unintelligible blow to the forward march of 'modernization', was the fault of the fundamentalists, who had stolen the pleasures of the modern consumer way of life not only from the Iranians, but threaten us too, with hostage takings and other high profile media events. That sacred libation of our everyday enjoyment was at stake here: oil. Until now, Saddam Hussain had in this scheme of things been 'our' Arab, a 'moderate', not an 'extremist'. As such he could be accommodated. When Saddam Hussein complained to the then American ambassador April Glaspie about a report on Voice of America radio critical of human rights abuses in Iraq, the ambassador informed him that its author had been sacked from the State Department. ‘Moderate’ means, in other words, that the official story will moderate the worse abuses of tyrants who are compliant allies, so long as they remain as such. When the Western television news and the front pages of the newspapers carried the close-up of Saddam Hussein's hand stroking the boy Lockwood's head, he changed characters in the ‘Orientalist’ vision the West has of the Middle East. Orientalism is a legacy of the colonial days, a collection of stories in which, as Edward Said says, it was axiomatic that the "attributes of being Oriental overrode any countervailing instance." Saddam Hussein touching Lockwood forced Western viewers to place the gesture in a frame of cultural reference. He did not appear to be a Muslim ‘fundamentalist’, a denier of pleasure. In the absence of any other cultural memory of images of the Middle East, the focus on the gesture of touching encouraged the viewer to read it in terms of the other legacy of Orientalist story. His hand on that boy’s head connects not the prohibition on enjoyment enjoined by the cartoon fundamentalists of journalistic cliche, but its opposite. From Wilde's Salome and Flaubert's Salambo, to Burrough's interzone of Tangiers and Trocchi's Carnal Days in the sultry sun, there is another string of stories of excessive enjoyment, of "harems, princesses, princes, slaves, veils, dancing girls and boys." Not least of which, the mythic story of the Arab pederast, which turned up most recently in the film Galipoli. A scene contrasts 'our' Australian soldier-boys buying prostitutes ('normal enjoyment') with the hint of Arabs buggering little boys (excess). This is the flip-side of the story about the puritan fundamentalism of Islam: the Arab "whose libidinal energy drives him to paroxysms of overstimulation." When Saddam Hussein opened a vector of communication to the West he obviously did not have these Orientalist fantasies and fears in mind. They are only absurd Western fantasies, after all. According to Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal, Iraqi television frequently pictured Saddam Hussein kissing babies during the war. "This had succeeded in Iraqi terms, and officials though they could make it work internationally, but they were wrong," Akbar Ahmed, a Moslem scholar at Cambridge, likewise reads the image in terms of how he thinks the dictator's own people would respond. "In his culture an elder, or figure of authority, often displays affection to children by patting the child or tousling the hair. It is socially approved and appreciated." Even a dictator must practice the political arts of affect. He must tap the common font of feeling with actions and images which cultivate popular acquiescence to his rule. Only at home he gets feedback on how his message goes over from the secret police. In the international area, there is no such closed loop to confirm and confine meanings. The trouble starts when one opens a vector between cultures which are not usually in communication with each other and tries to tap the affective responses of peoples one knows only through other images, transmitted along other media vectors. The audience has to decide whether to read the image in terms of ‘our’ frame or reference, or in the frame of what we know about the other. What we know about the other of the Middle East is mostly fantasy: images of our unspoken fears and desires, projected onto a few scraps of landscape and decor, costume and legend collected by long dead travellers of the imagination. The problem compounds when an Arab dictator speaks to those Western populations brought up on Orientalist understandings of the Middle East of Western manufacture. As Edward Said says, "The entire premise was colonial: that a small Third World dictatorship, nurtured and supported by the West, did not have the right to challenge America, which was white and superior." It is not just that the other place is a refuge for our lost desires and fears. Built in to the spatial mapping is an assumption of the marginality of the Middle East, a zone which in our presumption, is beyond the bound of the only moral and reasonable law — ‘ours’. This presumption is not as frankly spoken today as it was in the old world’s colonial heyday. The vector creates enough contact between places to create a sort of narrative prudence. Underneath, the assumptions are much the same. One can, and must, critique such vile cultural presumptions, which is what Edward Said does. One must critique the distortions perpetrated by the American media and the damage this does to American democracy, as Douglas Kellner does. One must speak the truth out the imperial designs of the American state and their effects, as Noam Chomsky does. One must use theory as Avital Ronell does, to explore the perverse logic by which America needs to create a theatre of operations, in which it attempts to localize and cauterize foreign bodies, unknown pleasures, addictive creeds. I trust those tasks are in numerically few but trustworthy hands. All around what Paul Gilroy once called the 'overdeveloped' world there are people working tirelessly and painstakingly, in the wake of the event, to put the vast slew of flotsam thrown up by it into the sort of perspective the more reflective time of critical writing provides. What is lacking, particularly in the voluminous reflections on the Gulf War coming out in the United States, is a writing about the kind of global media trajectories capable of producing such an event. Sure, there are criticisms of the American media coverage of the war. That is not what I mean. The criticisms, even good ones, are part of the same matrix of relations as produced the spectacle of the Gulf war in the first place. Many of the things conveyed in what George Gerbner calls the media's 'instant history' of the war were distortions or outright lies. Quite a few people know that now. How do we know? Through other media. More slow and considered media, like articles in the highbrow monthlies, but media all the same. Both the dangers and our ability to do anything about it tie in to our everyday experience of the vector. It is that experience that this book is about. from: McKenzie Wark, Virtual Geography: Living With Global Media Events, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994 _________________________________________________________________ # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@bbs.thing.net