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| <nettime> iraq file #2: 28 oct 2002 - 7 feb 2003 |
Vigilantism
Artcontext <deck@artcontext.org>
Today's UN resolution and the netizen and citizen response?
ronda@ais.org (Ronda Hauben)
re: 'Bomb Texas'
kevcross4@webtv.net (Kev Hall)
"Iraq will defy UN, says Blair"
"Jason Handby" <jasonh@pavilion.co.uk>
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report
ben moretti <bmoretti@chariot.net.au>
Desert Peace
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Wolfgang_S=FCtzl?= <wolfgang@t0.or.at>
Fwd: Stratfor Weekly: The Region After Iraq
ted <pifmik@yahoo.com>
RE: <nettime> waiting for the war
Curt Hagenlocher <curth@motek.com>
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 17:30:58 -0500
From: Artcontext <deck@artcontext.org>
Subject: Vigilantism
<!------------------------------------------------------
State Vigilantism: American Adventure Politics
An attempt to account for the apparent support that
G.W. Bush still enjoys among Americans in late 2002,
addressing the vengeful role being played by the
President, and arguing that familiar vigilante action
film narratives are the operative leitmotif for his
brand of post-9/11 adventure politics.
http://artcontext.org/crit/essays/stateVigilantism
(This message is a Free Love announcement of Artcontext.)
- ---------------------------------------------------------->
<html>
<head>
<title>State Vigilantism: American Adventure Politics</title>
</head>
<body bgcolor="white">
<table border="0" width="654" align="center">
<tr>
<td width="250" align="right" valign="top">
<h2><a href="http://artcontext.org/crit/essays/stateVigilantism/";>State
Vigilantism:</a></h2><h4><a href="http://artcontext.org/crit/essays/stateVigilantism/";>American
Adventure Politics</a></h4><h6>by Andy Deck</h6>
</td><td width="100" valign="top" align="right"><a href="http://artcontext.org/crit/essays/stateVigilantism/";><img alt="::::" src=
"http://artcontext.org/crit/essays/stateVigilantism/img/posse.jpg";
border="0" width="95" height="353"></a></td>
<td width="304"><blockquote>An attempt to account for the apparent support that
G.W. Bush still enjoys among Americans in late 2002, addressing the
vengeful role being played by the President, and arguing that
familiar vigilante action film narratives are the operative
leitmotif for his brand of post-9/11 adventure
politics.</blockquote></td>
</tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">
<center>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<hr>This is a Free Love message from Artcontext. <br> <a href="http://artcontext.org/dialog/list/index.php?email=nettime@bbs.thing.net";><img border="0" src="http://artcontext.org/dialog/list/img/change.gif"; width="133" height="21" alt="[Change Subscription]"></a><p> </p><a href="http://artcontext.org/dialog/list/entry.php?email=nettime@bbs.thing.net";><img alt="Artcontext" border="0" width="198" height="34" src="http://artcontext.org/img/decor/artContext.gif";></a>
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------------------------------
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2002 20:47:30 -0500 (EST)
From: ronda@ais.org (Ronda Hauben)
Subject: Today's UN resolution and the netizen and citizen response?
Today the UN security council voted for war and against peace
The press release about authorizing this move toward war
is at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm
The voices they report of governments claiming that this
resolution is bringing peace to the world is difficult
to read.
As I understand it, arms inspectors previously left Iraq because
1) There was an acknowledgment that they were being used to spy on Iraq.
2) The US and Great Britain were going to begin to bomb Iraq
and the arms inspectors didn't want to be the victims of the bombing.
No where in this resolution is their language acknowledging the
facts of the UN activity to allow the arms inspectors to be
used as spies on Iraq.
Also it is difficult to watch the US government, and other governments
like the governments of England, and France, and China, and even
Norway and Syria as part of the unanimous agreement to this resolution.
There were up to 200,000 people in the US in Washington DC and
many more around the country, yet the US government continues
to press its efforts to control the oil of Iraq.
And there were 400,000 in London and many in other countries
also protesting these activities.
Clearly the UN is *not* caring about the interests or concerns
of the world when it goes along with such an activity as the
US government's demands for support for its harrassment
of Iraq and its people.
How the peoples of the US and the rest of the world will find
to stop such dangerous activities as the UN is now setting
in motion, is hard to understand. But the peoples of the
world need to find some way to challenge this march toward
war that the US and now other governments of the world
have complied with.
Where is the opposition? Why none in the Security Council?
Why such an intimidation of any honest or progressive
actions in the world?
Wondering but persisting
And in solidarity with the people of Iraq and of other country's
around the world who care for peace and cooperation
among nations
In support of netizenship and citizenship
Ronda
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/other
http://www.ais.org/~ronda/
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2003 12:03:29 -0500 (EST)
From: kevcross4@webtv.net (Kev Hall)
Subject: re: 'Bomb Texas'
= + =
Three CRUCIAL sites:
(1) http://Antiwar.com,
(2) http://Ellsberg.net ("Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the
Pentagon Papers," important book by Daniel Ellsberg),
(3) http://www.Space4Peace.org (Global Network Against Weapons &
Nuclear Power in Space).
STOP STAR WARS. KEEP SPACE FOR PEACE.
'SPACE WAR' Links -- U.S. military plans for global control through
"full spectrum dominance":
(1) United States Strategic Command
.... http://www.stratcom.mil
(2) http://www.af.mil/vision
(3) Vision for 2020:
www.fac.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf
(4) http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020
(5) http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace
(6) Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html
(7) U.S. Space Command's 'Long Range Plan,' (1998):
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm
Support the Plowshares, Catholic Worker http://www.CatholicWorker.org
and anti-Trident movements.
The blessings of love, peace & justice from Kevin, 48; U.S. Navy veteran
(Vietnam evacuation-pull-out, 1975), ex-law school student, ex-newspaper
reporter. Pacifist, cyber-infowarrior, gardener, stay-home father-of-4,
Tampa Bay area, Fla., U.S.A.
+ Blessed are the Nonviolent Peacemakers & Truth-tellers. Make each
joyful or suffering act or moment a plea for grace & mercy & a prayer of
thanks to God. Trust in the salvific life, death & Resurrection of Jesus
& in His Second Coming. Come in Glory Lord Jesus Christ. May Divine Love
& Mercy be upon us all. Amen. +
JESUS SAID: "But now you are trying to kill me...You
belong to your father the devil and you willingly carry out your
father's desires. He was a murderer from the beginning and does not
stand in the truth because there is no truth in him. When he tells a
lie, he speaks in character, because HE IS A LIAR AND THE FATHER OF
LIES." (John 8:40-44)
+ holy francis of assisi, guide me. thanks magpie: friend, soulmate,
love, wife, life; my clare ("chiara"), the mother of our children, & a
saint -- "francesco." +
Gratitude to Dorothy Day, Father John Hugo, Thomas Merton, Thich Nhat
Hanh, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Archbishop Oscar Romero,
Cesar Chavez, Eileen Egan, Pope John Paull II, Ron Kovic, Daniel
Ellsberg, Stevie Wonder, Bruce Cockburn, Bruce Springsteen, Joe
Strummer, Bill Blum, Scott Ritter, Daniel Berrigan, Phil Berrigan & Liz,
Jonah House, & Carl Sagan.
Mercy, mercy, mercy.
Kev-cross@Sacred Heart-garden-grotto
+ Resurrection. Deo gratias. +
=========== + ===========
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 16:59:43 -0000
From: "Jason Handby" <jasonh@pavilion.co.uk>
Subject: "Iraq will defy UN, says Blair"
...closely followed by the UK and US, by the looks of it.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2711859.stm
'The UK prime minister said he wanted a second UN resolution to authorise a
potential war with Iraq - but repeated his pledge to contemplate action in
the face of "an unreasonable veto". '
Forgive me for asking, but what constitutes an "unreasonable" veto? For
example, are US vetoes of Security Council resolutions which criticize
Israeli actions "reasonable" or "unreasonable"? How are we to decide?
If the US and UK (and others) act in defiance of the UN Security Council's
deliberations then doesn't that also count as defying the Security Council?
Is one kind of defiance worse than another?
Either the UN Security Council is the ultimate authority over international
security issues or it isn't. One can't start quibbling over how its
decisions are arrived at on a case-by-case basis just because one doesn't
like them.
Jason
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2002 10:22:27 +0930
From: ben moretti <bmoretti@chariot.net.au>
Subject: U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report
The White Man's Burden, eh? I wonder what the next years' headlines will be?
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iran, Officials Report
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy North Korea, Officials Report
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Venezuela, Officials Report
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Libya, Officials Report
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy China, Officials Report
Ben
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/11/international/11PREX.html?pagewanted=print
October 11, 2002
U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report
By DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - The White House is developing a detailed plan,
modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, to install an
American-led military government in Iraq if the United States topples
Saddam Hussein, senior administration officials said today.
The plan also calls for war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders and a
transition to an elected civilian government that could take months
or years.
In the initial phase, Iraq would be governed by an American military
commander - perhaps Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander of United States
forces in the Persian Gulf, or one of his subordinates - who would
assume the role that Gen. Douglas MacArthur served in Japan after its
surrender in 1945.
One senior official said the administration was "coalescing around"
the concept after discussions of options with President Bush and his
top aides. But this official and others cautioned that there had not
yet been any formal approval of the plan and that it was not clear
whether allies had been consulted on it.
The detailed thinking about an American occupation emerges as the
administration negotiates a compromise at the United Nations that
officials say may fall short of an explicit authorization to use
force but still allow the United States to claim it has all the
authority it needs to force Iraq to disarm.
In contemplating an occupation, the administration is scaling back
the initial role for Iraqi opposition forces in a post-Hussein
government. Until now it had been assumed that Iraqi dissidents both
inside and outside the country would form a government, but it was
never clear when they would take full control.
Today marked the first time the administration has discussed what
could be a lengthy occupation by coalition forces, led by the United
States.
Officials say they want to avoid the chaos and in-fighting that have
plagued Afghanistan since the defeat of the Taliban. Mr. Bush's aides
say they also want full control over Iraq while American-led forces
carry out their principal mission: finding and destroying weapons of
mass destruction.
The description of the emerging American plan and the possibility of
war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders could be part of an administration
effort to warn Iraq's generals of an unpleasant future if they
continue to support Mr. Hussein.
Asked what would happen if American pressure prompted a coup against
Mr. Hussein, a senior official said, "That would be nice." But the
official suggested that the American military might enter and secure
the country anyway, not only to eliminate weapons of mass destruction
but also to ensure against anarchy.
Under the compromise now under discussion with France, Russia and
China, according to officials familiar with the talks, the United
Nations Security Council would approve a resolution requiring the
disarmament of Iraq and specifying "consequences" that Iraq would
suffer for defiance.
It would stop well short of the explicit authorization to enforce the
resolution that Mr. Bush has sought. But the diplomatic strategy, now
being discussed in Washington, Paris and Moscow, would allow Mr. Bush
to claim that the resolution gives the United States all the
authority he believes he needs to force Baghdad to disarm.
Other Security Council members could offer their own, less muscular
interpretations, and they would be free to draft a second resolution,
authorizing the use of force, if Iraq frustrated the inspection
process. The United States would regard that second resolution as
unnecessary, senior officials say.
"Everyone would read this resolution their own way," one senior official said.
The revelation of the occupation plan marks the first time the
administration has described in detail how it would administer Iraq
in the days and weeks after an invasion, and how it would keep the
country unified while searching for weapons.
It would put an American officer in charge of Iraq for a year or more
while the United States and its allies searched for weapons and
maintained Iraq's oil fields.
For as long as the coalition partners administered Iraq, they would
essentially control the second largest proven reserves of oil in the
world, nearly 11 percent of the total. A senior administration
official said the United Nations oil-for-food program would be
expanded to help finance stabilization and reconstruction.
Administration officials said they were moving away from the model
used in Afghanistan: establishing a provisional government right away
that would be run by Iraqis. Some top Pentagon officials support this
approach, but the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency
and, ultimately, the White House, were cool to it.
"We're just not sure what influence groups on the outside would have
on the inside," an administration official said. "There would also be
differences among Iraqis, and we don't want chaos and anarchy in the
early process."
Instead, officials said, the administration is studying the military
occupations of Japan and Germany. But they stressed a commitment to
keeping Iraq unified, as Japan was, and avoiding the kind partition
that Germany underwent when Soviet troops stayed in the eastern
sector, which set the stage for the cold war. The military government
in Germany stayed in power for four years; in Japan it lasted six and
a half years.
In a speech on Saturday, Zalmay Khalilzad, the special assistant to
the president for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African
affairs, said, "The coalition will assume - and the preferred option
- - responsibility for the territorial defense and security of Iraq
after liberation."
"Our intent is not conquest and occupation of Iraq," Mr. Khalilzad
said. "But we do what needs to be done to achieve the disarmament
mission and to get Iraq ready for a democratic transition and then
through democracy over time."
Iraqis, perhaps through a consultative council, would assist an
American-led military and, later, a civilian administration, a senior
official said today. Only after this transition would the
American-led government hand power to Iraqis.
He said that the Iraqi armed forces would be "downsized," and that
senior Baath Party officials who control government ministries would
be removed. "Much of the bureaucracy would carry on under new
management," he added.
Some experts warned during Senate hearings last month that a
prolonged American military occupation of Iraq could inflame tensions
in the Mideast and the Muslim world.
"I am viscerally opposed to a prolonged occupation of a Muslim
country at the heart of the Muslim world by Western nations who
proclaim the right to re-educate that country," said the former
secetary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, who as a young man served as a
district administrator in the military government of occupied Germany.
While the White House considers its long-term plans for Iraq,
Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, arrived in Moscow this evening
for a day and a half of talks with President Vladimir V. Putin. Aides
said talks were focused on resolving the dispute at the United
Nations. Mr. Blair and Mr. Putin are to hold formal discussions on
Friday, followed by a news conference.
Mr. Blair has been a steadfast supporter of the administration's
tough line on a new resolution. But he has also indicated that
Britain would consider France's proposal to have a two-tiered
approach, with the Security Council first adopting a resolution to
compel Iraq to cooperate with international weapons inspectors, and
then, if Iraq failed to comply, adopting a second resolution on
military force. Earlier this week, Russia indicated that it, too, was
prepared to consider the French position.
But the administration is now saying that if there is a
two-resolution approach, it will insist that the first resolution
provide Mr. Bush all the authority he needs.
"The timing of all this is impossible to anticipate," one
administration official involved in the talks said. "The president
doesn't want to have to wait around for a second resolution if it is
clear that the Iraqis are not cooperating."
Copyright The New York Times Company | Permissions | Privacy Policy
- --
- --
ben moretti
bmoretti@chariot.net.au
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2003 18:37:01 +0100
From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Wolfgang_S=FCtzl?= <wolfgang@t0.or.at>
Subject: Desert Peace
Desert Peace. The coming Iraq war as a historical mission.
- -------------------------
How the states of the "new Europe" act on behalf of world history.
- -------------------------
At first sight the appeal of eight European heads of government,
published last Friday and calling for a united stance against Iraq,
documents the spirit of obedience of a rather heterogeneous group of
NATO model member states. The first commentaries spoke of a diplomatic
coup staged by the Bush Administration, and of an impressive victory of
the US on the battlefield of infowar.
However, the appeal is more than this: it is an instructive example of
how a spin is created beyond moral and legal criteria that is designed
to make the question of the legitimacy of a possible intervention
redundant by inserting it into a metahistorical context, where it
dwindles into a redundant triviality.
Any insistence on legitimate procedures appears as deafness against the
call of history. For according reasoning of the appeal, attacking Iraq
is an historical mission of grand dimensions in the face of which no
signs of hesitation and questions are admitted.
The lines of the appeal tremble with the thunders of world history.
Democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, so the words of
the appeal, are "under greater threat than ever" - a threat which can
only be countered by the "transatlantic bond", which "today more than
ever" is the guarantee of "our freedom".
Using heroic language, the appeal speaks of the historical liberation
missions against Nazi rule and communism, both a result of "American
bravery, generosity and far-sightedness", implying that today a war
against Iraq would be a natural expression of the same attributes, and
stating that "today more than ever" unity and cohesion must be preserved.
With such an amount of historical driving force, no one needs to ask
under which circumstances a military intervention in Iraq would in fact
be justified. Unlike commands, questions undercut unity and cohesion.
And there is no room for such undermining in a situation in which
procedures of legitimacy have been suspended.
It is the suspension of such procedures that, according to Giorgio
Agamben, characterizes the state of emergency, in which all sovereign
power is assumed by the police. It surely is no coincidence that the new
interventions are often likened to police operations, quite as if they
were a matter of the superpower's official duties. In a paradoxical way,
this state of emergency seems to establish itself as a permanent
condition in which the difference between "war" and "peace" becomes
obsolete because both terms are dissolved in the technological spectacle
of "security" - a kind of cold peace that rests on the permanent
possibility of war. Consequently, the appeal speaks of "peace" only in
conjunction with "security", while arguing in favour of war.
Already now many speak of "the war" against Iraq, not of "a possible"
war. But "the war" has always already begun, it has its place in peace.
As Brecht writes, "Their war kills what their peace has left". The
appeal of the "new Europe" shows that the argument for peace as security
is an implicit argument for war, and postulates war as an instrument of
peace. This becomes possible when in the state of emergency the moral
criterion of justice is dissolved in the technological criterion of
"precision" (strategists have already pointed at the increased precision
of the weapons systems to be used against Iraq), and the democratic
criterion of an open debate is substituted by the tactical criterion of
speed and trick.
In this way, the justification of war is annulled by being placed within
the police / military logic of the state of emergency, where and can be
deployed smoothly and efficiently, much like an artillery gun or a
aircraft carrier. The military notion of unity is placed above the
democratic notion of difference. In all this, the present can only be
understood as a result of past wars (more precisely: victories), and
violence becomes more natural with each further war: more difficult to
identify and name, more difficult to distinguish from what happens
anyway, more problematic to ward off. With every new war, it becomes
more difficult to argue in favour of peace without being viewed as
insane or irresponsible. As a result, aside from killing of people and
destroying resources, aside from the suffering generated, wars such as
the one which is now being prepared turn the intellectual landscape into
a desert. Their unnamed casualties include the intellectual foundations
which would make it possible to think of politics as something different
from security. Perhaps, after "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm", it
would be appropriate to name the coming invasion "Desert Peace".
- ---------
A previous German version of this commentary was published in the Vienna
daily "Der Standard", 3 Feb 2003.
- ---------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2003 20:37:26 -0800 (PST)
From: ted <pifmik@yahoo.com>
Subject: Fwd: Stratfor Weekly: The Region After Iraq
*the reasons for invading Iraq - plain and simple
*the rest is a docudrama
// The conquest of Iraq will not be a minor event in
> history: It will represent the introduction of a new
imperial power to the Middle East and a redefinition
of regional geopolitics based on that power. The
United States will move from being an outside power
influencing events through coalitions, to a regional
power that is able to operate effectively on its
own.//
- --- alert@stratfor.com wrote:
> Date: Wed, 05 Feb 03 18:42:17 CST
> To: <redalert@stratfor.com>
> From: <alert@stratfor.com>
> Subject: Stratfor Weekly: The Region After Iraq
>
> Here is your complimentary Stratfor Weekly, written
> by our
> Chairman and Founder, Dr. George Friedman.
> The Region After Iraq
>
> Summary
>
> Desert Storm was about restoring the status quo
> ante. The 2003
> war with Iraq will be about redefining the status
> quo in the
> region. Geopolitically, it will leave countries like
> Syria and
> Saudi Arabia completely surrounded by U.S. military
> forces and
> Iran partially surrounded. It is therefore no
> surprise that the
> regional powers, regardless of their hostility to
> Saddam Hussein,
> oppose the war: They do not want to live in a
> post-war world in
> which their own power is diluted. Nor is it a
> surprise, after
> last week's events in Europe indicating that war is
> coming, that
> the regional powers -- and particularly Saudi Arabia
> -- are now
> redefining their private and public positions to the
> war. If the
> United States cannot be stopped from redefining the
> region, an
> accommodation will have to be reached.
>
> Analysis
>
> Last week, the focus was on Europe -- where heavy
> U.S. pressure,
> coupled with the internal dynamics, generated a deep
> division.
> From the U.S. point of view, regardless of what
> France and
> Germany ultimately say about the war, these two
> countries no
> longer can claim to speak for Europe. Ultimately,
> for the
> Americans, that is sufficient.
>
> This week, U.S. attention must shift to a much more
> difficult
> target -- the Islamic world. More precisely, it must
> shift to the
> countries bordering Iraq and others in the region as
> well. In
> many ways, this is a far more important issue than
> Europe. The
> Europeans, via multinational organizations, can
> provide
> diplomatic sanction for the invasion of Iraq. The
> countries
> around Iraq constitute an essential part of the
> theater of
> operations, potentially influencing the course of
> the war and
> even more certainly, the course of history after the
> war. What
> they have to say and, more important, what they will
> do, is of
> direct significance to the war.
>
> As it stands at this moment, the U.S. position in
> the region, at
> the most obvious level, is tenuous at best. Six
> nations border
> Iraq: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey
> and Iran. Of
> the six, only one -- Kuwait -- is unambiguously
> allied with the
> United States. The rest continue to behave
> ambiguously. All have
> flirted with the United States and provided varying
> degrees of
> overt and covert cooperation, but they have not made
> peace with
> the idea of invasion and U.S. occupation.
>
> Of the remaining five, Turkey is by far the most
> cooperative. It
> will permit U.S. forces to continue to fly combat
> missions
> against Iraq from bases in Turkey as well as allow
> them to pass
> through Turkey and maintain some bases there.
> However, there is a
> split between the relatively new Islamist government
> of Turkey,
> which continues to be uneasy about the war, and the
> secular
> Turkish military, which is committed to extensive
> cooperation.
> And apart from Kuwait, Turkey is the best case. Each
> of the other
> countries is even more conflicted and negative
> toward an
> invasion.
>
> Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iran are very
> different countries
> and have different reasons for arriving at their
> positions. They
> each have had very different experiences with Saddam
> Hussein's
> Iraq.
>
> Iran fought a brutal war with Iraq during the 1980s
> -- a war
> initiated by the Iraqis and ruinous to Iran. Hussein
> is despised
> by Iranians, who continue to support anti-Hussein
> exiles. Tehran
> certainly is tempted by the idea of a defeated Iraq.
> It also is
> tempted by the idea of a dismembered Iraq that never
> again could
> threaten Iran, and where Iran could gain dominance
> over its
> Shiite regions. Tehran certainly has flirted with
> Washington and
> particularly with London on various levels of
> cooperation, and
> clearly has provided some covert intelligence
> cooperation to the
> United States and Britain. In the end, though --
> however
> attractive the collapse of Iraq might be -- internal
> politics and
> strategic calculations have caused Iranian leaders
> to refuse to
> sanction the war or to fully participate. Iran might
> be prepared
> to pick up some of the spoils, but only after the
> war is fought.
>
> Syria stands in a similar relation to Iraq. The
> Assad family
> despises the Husseins, ideologically, politically
> and personally.
> Syria sided openly with the United States in 1991.
> Hussein's
> demise would cause no grief in Damascus. Yet, in
> spite of a
> flirtation with Britain in particular -- including a
> visit with
> both Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Charles for
> Syrian President
> Assad -- Syria has not opted in for the war.
>
> Nor have the Jordanians -- at least not publicly.
> There are
> constant reports of U.S. (and Israeli) special
> operations troops
> operating out of Jordan. U.S. Marines have trained
> during the
> past month in Jordan, but the government remains
> officially
> opposed to the war -- and what support it will give,
> it will give
> only covertly.
>
> Finally, there is Saudi Arabia, which has been one
> of the pillars
> of U.S. power in the region since the 1950s and
> which has, in
> turn, depended on Washington for survival against
> both Arab
> radicals and Iraq itself. The Saudis have been
> playing the most
> complex game of all, cooperating on some levels
> openly,
> cooperating on other levels covertly, while opposing
> the war
> publicly.
>
> For all of the diversity in the region, there is a
> common
> geopolitical theme. If the U.S. invasion is
> successful,
> Washington intends to occupy Iraq militarily, and it
> officially
> expects to remain there for at least 18 months -- or
> to be more
> honest, indefinitely. The United States will build
> air bases and
> deploy substantial ground forces -- and, rather than
> permit the
> disintegration of Iraq, will create a puppet
> government
> underwritten by U.S. power.
>
> On the day the war ends, and if the United States is
> victorious,
> then the entire geopolitics of the region will be
> redefined.
> Every country bordering Iraq will find not the
> weakest formations
> of the Iraqi army along their frontiers, but U.S.
> and British
> troops. The United States will be able to reach into
> any country
> in the region with covert forces based in Iraq, and
> Washington
> could threaten overt interventions as well. It would
> need no
> permission from regional hosts for the use of
> facilities, so long
> as either Turkey or Kuwait will permit transshipment
> into Iraq.
> In short, a U.S. victory will change the entire
> balance of power
> in the region, from a situation in which the United
> States must
> negotiate its way to war, to a situation where the
> United States
> is free to act as it will.
>
> Consider the condition of Syria. It might not have
> good relations
> with Hussein's Iraq, but a U.S.-occupied Iraq would
> be Syria's
> worst nightmare. It would be surrounded on all sides
> by real or
> potential enemies -- Israel, Turkey, Jordan and the
> United States
> - and, in the Mediterranean, by the U.S. Sixth
> Fleet. Syria --
> which traditionally has played a subtle, complex
> balancing game
> between various powers -- would find itself in a
> vise, no longer
> able to guarantee its national security except
> through
> accommodating the United States.
>
> A similar situation is shaping up for Saudi Arabia.
> The United
> States is operating extensively in Yemen; it also
> has air force
> facilities in Qatar and naval facilities in Bahrain.
> U.S. B-1
> bombers and some personnel are going to be based in
> Oman. The
> United States has established itself along the
> littoral of the
> Arabian peninsula. With U.S. forces deployed along
> the Saudi-
> Iraqi border, and with U.S. domination of the Red
> Sea and Persian
> Gulf, the Saudis will be in essence surrounded.
>
> The same basic problem exists for Iran, although on
> a less
> threatening scale. Iran is larger, more populated
> and more
> difficult to intimidate. Nevertheless, with at least
> some U.S.
> forces in Afghanistan -- and the option for
> introducing more
> always open -- and U.S. forces in Iraq and the
> Persian Gulf, the
> Iranians too find themselves surrounded, albeit far
> less
> overwhelmingly than would be the case for Syria or
> Saudi Arabia.
>
> The only probable winners would be Turkey, which
> would lay claim
> to the oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk; Jordan,
> whose security
> would be enhanced by U.S. forces to the east; and
> Kuwait, which
> is betting heavily on a quick U.S. victory and a
> prolonged
> presence in the region.
>
> If we consider the post-Iraq war world, it is no
> surprise that
> the regional response ranges from publicly opposed
> and privately
> not displeased to absolute opposition. Certainly,
> Syria, Saudi
> Arabia and Iran have nothing to gain from a war that
> will be
> shaped entirely by the United States. Each
> understands that the
> pressure from the United States to cooperate in the
> war against
> al Qaeda will be overwhelming, potentially
> irresistible and
> politically destabilizing. This is not the world in
> which they
> want to live.
>
> Add to this the obvious fact of oil, and the dilemma
> becomes
> clear. The United States is not invading Iraq for
> oil: If oil was
> on Washington's mind, it would invade Venezuela,
> whose crisis has
> posed a more serious oil problem for the United
> States than Iraq
> could. Nevertheless, Washington expects to pay for
> the
> reconstruction of Iraq from oil revenues, and there
> will be no
> reason to limit Iraqi production. This cannot make
> either Riyadh
> or Tehran happy, since it will drive prices down and
> increase
> competition for market share.
>
> Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria have every reason to
> oppose a war in
> Iraq. The consequences of such a war will undermine
> their
> national interests. They were depending on Europe's
> ability to
> block the war, but that strategy has failed. The
> Saudis and
> Syrians then launched into an attempt to find a
> political
> solution that would prevent a U.S. occupation of
> Iraq. That
> centered around either Hussein's voluntary
> resignation and exile,
> or a coup in Baghdad that would produce a new
> government -- one
> that would cooperate fully with weapons inspectors,
> and remove
> the U.S. justification for occupation.
>
> This attempt, in collaboration with other regional
> powers and
> countries like Germany and Russia, is still under
> way. The
> problem is that Hussein has little motivation to
> resign, and his
> security forces remain effective. Hussein apparently
> still is not
> convinced that the United States will invade, or
> that he will be
> defeated. His seems to assume that, if his troops
> can inflict
> some casualties on U.S. forces, then the United
> States will
> accept a cease-fire without toppling him. He will
> not abdicate,
> nor will his followers overthrow him, until those
> two assumptions
> are falsified. What that means is that the United
> States still
> would occupy Iraq militarily, even if there was a
> coup or
> resignation as the campaign unfolded.
>
> If you can't beat them, join them. The European
> split -- and the
> real possibility that France and Germany ultimately
> will endorse
> war in some way -- mean that war cannot be
> prevented. Hussein
> will not abdicate or be overthrown until the war is
> well under
> way. Therefore, it is highly likely that the war
> will take place,
> the United States will occupy Iraq and that the map
> of the Middle
> East will change profoundly.
>
> Continued opposition to the war, particularly from
> Riyadh's
> standpoint, makes little sense. The issue until now
> has been to
> cope with the internal political challenges that
> have arisen in
> the kingdom since Sept. 11, 2001. After the Iraq
> war, this issue
> will be supplemented by the question of how the
> United States
> regards the kingdom. It is not prudent for a nation
> surrounded by
> a much more powerful nation to allow itself to be
> regarded as an
> enemy. Therefore, we are witnessing a shift in the
> Saudi position
> that might evolve to reluctant, public support for
> the war by the
> time an attack is launched.
>
> Iranian leaders do not feel themselves to be quite
> in such
> desperate straits -- since they are not. However,
> the presence of
> U.S. power on Iran's borders will create an urgent
> need to settle
> the internal disputes that divide the country. The
> need to do so,
> however, does not guarantee a successful outcome.
> The division
> between those who feel that an opening to the United
> States is
> essential and those who feel that protecting Iran
> against the
> United States is paramount might become exacerbated
> and
> destabilize the country. However, there is no
> immediate, overt
> threat to Iran, although the possibilities for
> covert operations
> increase dramatically.
>
> Jordan will do well, but Syria's future is cloudier.
> Washington
> has concerns about Syria's long-term commitment to
> U.S.
> interests, and Damascus might find itself squeezed
> unbearably.
> Turkey will fatten on oil and manage the Kurds as it
> has done in
> the past. But nothing will be the same after this
> war. Unlike
> Desert Storm, which was about restoring the status
> quo ante, this
> war is about establishing an entirely new reality.
>
> The United States is, of course, well-aware that its
> increased
> presence in the region will result in greater
> hostility and
> increased paramilitary activity against U.S. forces
> there.
> However, the U.S. view is that this rising cost is
> acceptable so
> long as Washington is able to redefine the behavior
> of countries
> neighboring Iraq. In the long run, the Bush
> administration
> believes, geopolitical power will improve U.S.
> security interests
> in spite of growing threats. To be more precise, the
> United
> States sees Islamic hostility at a certain level as
> a given, and
> does not regard an increase in that hostility as
> materially
> affecting its interests.
>
> The conquest of Iraq will not be a minor event in
> history: It
> will represent the introduction of a new imperial
> power to the
> Middle East and a redefinition of regional
> geopolitics based on
> that power. The United States will move from being
> an outside
> power influencing events through coalitions, to a
> regional power
> that is able to operate effectively on its own. Most
> significant,
> countries like Saudi Arabia and Syria will be living
> in a new and
> quite unpleasant world.
>
> Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why the
> regional
> powers are behaving as they are. The disintegration
> of the
> European bloc has, however, left them in an
> untenable position.
> The United States will occupy Iraq, and each
> regional power is
> now facing that reality. Unable to block the
> process, they are
> reluctantly and unhappily finding ways to accustom
> themselves to
> it.
> http://www.stratfor.com
> Strategic Forecasting, LLC
>
=====
arigato
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------------------------------
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2003 08:55:48 -0800
From: Curt Hagenlocher <curth@motek.com>
Subject: RE: <nettime> waiting for the war
"Duke Ritchie" suggested that:
>> But perhaps the Murdoch Empire should begin
>> each of its reports or dispatches from Baghdad by
>> disclosing how much
>> money they paid "Saddam" today.
> Fair enough too. But by that logic, should not all media
> organizations (both pro-war and pro-appeasement) do the
> same thing?
It seems to me that the word "appeasement" is used primarily
by warmongers trying to draw some kind of a parallel between
the situation today and the situation in the 1930s.
As a matter of grammar, there can be no "appeasement",
because there haven't been any demands or threats. Only
if Saddam were to say, "Give me Kuwait or there'll be war,"
would that comparison be valid.
And by the way, most of us "pro-appeasement" types know the
correct response to a demand like that.
- --
Curt Hagenlocher
curth@motek.com
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