Wolfgang Suetzl on Tue, 20 Nov 2001 05:12:20 +0100 (CET) |
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<nettime> Habermas on Faith, Knowledge and 9-11 |
Violence and precision The Peace Price of the German Publishers and Booksellers Association, a lost opportunity. A rejoinder to Habermas. Juergen Habermas has been awarded the 2001 peace price of the German publishers and booksellers association. This demands an explanation. After all, Habermas, recently referred to as the "philosopher of consensus" by the German journalist Jan Ross, justified NATO's bombing of Serbia by stating that this was comparable to the labour pains of the emerging global civil society that is to take over from the nation-state centered international system of the present. This new world society, according to Habermas, is still without institutions capable of enforcing the respect for human rights upon governments, and therefore it was both legitimate and necessary for the international community to draw upon the services of existing institutions, even if these still belonged to the traditional international law-regulated system. The fact that the institution in question was no other than NATO seemed of no further consequence to Habermas. After all, he argued in an editorial published by the German weekly Die Zeit, the "programmatic exemption of civilians" and the "great precision of the attacks" provided them with a "high level of legitimacy". To be sure, this phrase is more than just a philosophical appreciation of the world view of NATO strategist and former peace activists converted to militarism (does anyone remember Blair's CND membership? Solana's anti-NATO protests? Fischer's pacifism?). For if taken seriously, it turns the inheritance of the European Enlightenment, whose defence is the philosophical mission of Habermas, against itself. The Enlightenment, and in particular the universal concept of human rights it engendered are about de-legitimising violence wherever this cannot be achieved through national legislation. Now if the legitimacy of violence is linked to the universality of human rights, as was the case in the NATO bombings, and echoed in Habermas' position, than all those who stand up against this violence stand "against themselves" and run the risk of ending up as weird marginal figures engaged in a monologue. Hence the eerie silence on the part of a peace movement committed to Enlightenment ideals that accompanied the bombings. Such ruins of the Enlightenment can no longer serve as the basis of a critique of violence, but instead perfectly serve the purpose of justifying a new type of violence - a violence whose legitimacy is defined technically, and therfore increases with the level of technical sophistication. Western technology equals just wars. Attributing a high level of legitimacy to the precision of attacks means no less than turning the morality invoked in the justification of the bombings over to technical performance. On this level, western universalism, in spite of its multiple fragmentations in the history of the 20th century, still functions - and functions all too well. No longer do states have to spend time sorting out complex moral issues and engaging in lengthy democratic procedures (e.g. a mandate of the UN security council, a declaration of war by parliament, etc.), in public discourses and in open debates, except for ornamental reasons. The new just wars demand quick deployment of forces, both military and rhetorical. Their justice resides in the precision of weapons, establishing a mutual dependency of the legitimacy of war and military technological innovation. Legitimacy, as it were, becomes a technical feature of the weapon. And the "moral consensus" which the legitimatising of these wars draws upon, and which the "philosopher of consensus" seeks, is only the silence in the face of the precision of technology. The peace prize was awarded against the background of the attacks in the USA and the retaliation strikes against Afghanistan. What better could have happened to the networks of terror and to potentially violent haters of the western community of technology and values, than precisely this dissolution of justice in technical performance, the undermining of the Enlightenment by its own technological condition, justified paradigmatically by Habermas in connection with the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia? For if such acts of violence need no longer seek legitimacy because the latter comes in a package with high-tech armaments, and if legitimacy no longer requires democratic procedures but only efficient and precise systems of destruction and representation, it becomes much easier for terrorists to provoke government-led attacks against democratic constitutions, whose imprecision stands in sharp contrast to the supposed precision of the attacks against the enemy on the outside. These attacks are doomed to failure in spite of their force, but capable of effectively weakening the inner legitimacy of states. But for the same reason it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against this type of violence on the basis of the Enlightenment principles. The extra-institutional critique that would be particularly important at this time, given the weakening of the institutions, is faced with the choice between confused speechlessness and monological strangeness. Against this background, it must be asked whether Habermas' call for a "return of the political in another form" is any more than a rewriting of Clausewitz. Equally, the "common language" that according to Habermas must be found to settle differences with non-western fundamentalists is already there: in the form of the techno-moral networks that have been offered to non-western communities since the 19th century as sole valid mode of being. And the "civilising power of formation" resembles the 19th century colonialist ethos of "la civilizacion des sauvages". These views, then, offers some good prospects for the future of war and for the arms industry. Good prospects, too, for those violent actors who seek to sabotage the inner legitimacy of western states. The recent blind fervour in slashing fundamental and civic rights is already an indication of what is possible. But why, it might cynically be asked, should we still have fundamental rights and democratic principles, if legitimacy can be achieved much more efficiently through technical means? It would be time to leave this spiral of moral legitimacy and military technological innovation, and to look for a thinking that is capable of it. Whether the opportunity to stimulate this process by the awarding of a peace prize as prominent as the Frankfurt one has really been seized seems quite debatable. Wolfgang Suetzl (A German version of this commentary was published in the Austrian "Standard" newspaper) # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo@bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@bbs.thing.net