| Ivo Skoric on Sun, 18 Nov 2001 09:34:30 +0100 (CET) |
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"Ivo Skoric" <ivo@reporters.net>
Re: Will missles return to sting?
Just unjust
HirsonWexlerPerl Immigration Law News Flash!
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From: "Ivo Skoric" <ivo@reporters.net>
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2001 13:56:09 -0500
Subject: Re: Will missles return to sting?
This sounds like a reasonable threat. Early in 1990's when Croatia
became a country, there was a celebration on a Croatian merchant
ship in the Red Hook harbour in Brooklyn. This was behind the US
border, effectively. My friend and me got in driving his 14ft moving
truck. We were waved in and out of area and nobody ever checked
the truck - this would perhaps be impossible to imagine after 9-11.
The truck was empty in both directions - but in theory the ship
could have brought some Stinger missiles from Bosnia unused by
mujahedeen, and we could have brought them back into the US,
with no knowledge of the US authorities. And whenever I hit the surf
at the Jones Beach remote West End I see a number of wide
fuselage airliners coming from Europe flying low preparing for
anding on JFK, easy targets - I always wondered whether the TWA
flight 800 was shot down like that by a Stinger missile by some Al
Qaeda or other terror group.
ivo
date sent: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 03:28:32 -0500
send reply to: International Justice Watch Discussion List
<JUSTWATCH-L@LISTSERV.ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU>
from: Daniel Tomasevich <danilo@MARTNET.COM>
subject: Will missles return to sting?
to: JUSTWATCH-L@LISTSERV.ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU
Will Stinger missles be used by anyone in Afghanistan?
There are still many of them out there that the CIA wasn't able
to purchase back.
More than a decade after the Soviets left Afghanistan, some 300 to 600
Stinger missiles remain unaccounted for. Some CIA boosters attempt to
downplay the threat by claiming that the batteries in the missiles have only
a short shelf life. However, while researching at the National Security
Archives, I uncovered a 1987 document from the U.S. Army Central Command
stating clearly that "the BCU, the power source required to activate the
Stinger, has a shelf life of at least 10 years, with a reliability rate of
98%-99%."
Daniel
(article not for cross posting)
-------------------------------------------------------------
USA Today
Wednesday, November 14, 2001
Editorial/Opinion
"Will missiles return to sting?"
By Alan J. Kuperman
Federal investigators are treating the crash of American Airlines Flight 587
as an accident, and it may well turn out to be just that. But the
possibility of a terrorist act crossed every mind when the news broke Monday
that an airliner had dived into a New York neighborhood. There was instant
speculation that the airliner might have been the victim of a bomb - or,
even more ominously, a surface-to-air missile.
Not likely this time, we are being assured. But the risk remains: No amount
of heightened security within an airport will stop the launch of a
man-portable surface-to-air missile from an off-site location. During
takeoff and landings, lumbering civilian airliners are defenseless against
such missiles, which have fallen into troublemakers' hands around the globe.
Ironically, the roots of this missile proliferation lie in U.S. policy
toward Afghanistan in the mid-1980s. At that time, the occupying Soviet army
was using helicopters to batter the Afghan mujahedin rebels, our allies.
After 2 years of heated debate, the United States in late 1986 provided the
rebels one of our highest-technology weapons: the man-portable Stinger
anti-aircraft missile.
At first, the Stinger had a decisive impact, shooting down dozens of Soviet
and Afghan military aircraft in a few months. In short order, however, the
Red Army adopted a series of technical and tactical countermeasures that
effectively nullified the Stinger. The Soviets retrofitted aircraft with
flares, infrared beacons and exhaust baffles to disorient the missiles, and
their pilots operated at night or employed terrain-hugging tactics to
prevent the rebels from getting a clear shot.
Within about a year, the Stinger became so ineffective that the rebels
essentially stopped firing them. That's when the Central Intelligence Agency
made a crucial error. Basking in the Stinger's early success, and apparently
unaware that the rebels had stopped firing the missiles, the CIA provided
the rebels hundreds more. With no immediate need for the missiles, the
rebels either sold them at international arms markets or squirreled them
away for future use.
Thanks to this CIA mistake, the missiles spread to rebel and terrorist
groups around the world. In 1987, it was reported that an Iranian boat had
fired a Stinger that hit a U.S. helicopter in the Persian Gulf but failed to
explode. In 1991, Tunisian fundamentalists reportedly used a Stinger in a
failed assassination attempt. In the early 1990s, Stingers shot down
aircraft in civil wars in Bosnia (twice) and Tajikistan, according to
reliable accounts. In addition, an anti-aircraft missile was used in 1994 to
shoot down the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi,
triggering the Rwandan genocide.
Media reports also indicate that Stingers have been acquired by Kashmiri
militants, Indian Sikhs, the Iranian drug mafia, Iraq, Qatar, Zambia, North
Korea, Libya and militant Palestinian groups. In addition, authorities have
broken up plots to acquire the missiles by the Irish Republican Army, the
Medellin cartel, Croatian rebels, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechen secessionists
and Cuban exiles.
The first President Bush tried to stop this hemorrhaging after it became
clear that our former Afghan allies were linked to radical Islamic
terrorists. He gave the CIA $10 million to buy back the Stingers, and when
that proved inadequate, the agency got another $55 million in 1993. The CIA
eventually retrieved a few dozen Stingers, but the main effect of the
buyback program was to bid up the black-market price of the missile from its
original value of $30,000 to as high as $200,000. Inadvertently, this
enabled rebels and terrorists to sell Stingers back to the CIA at inflated
prices and then to use the proceeds to buy even larger numbers of cheaper
missiles at arms bazaars. To put this in context, the $65 million
appropriated to the CIA to buy back a fraction of the leftover Stingers is
about twice the Pentagon's original purchase price for all of the missiles
provided to the rebels.
More than a decade after the Soviets left Afghanistan, some 300 to 600
Stinger missiles remain unaccounted for. Some CIA boosters attempt to
downplay the threat by claiming that the batteries in the missiles have only
a short shelf life. However, while researching at the National Security
Archives, I uncovered a 1987 document from the U.S. Army Central Command
stating clearly that "the BCU, the power source required to activate the
Stinger, has a shelf life of at least 10 years, with a reliability rate of
98%-99%."
The scariest part is that civilian airliners are considerably more
vulnerable than military aircraft to Stingers and other such missiles. They
are bigger, slower and have no defense mechanisms, and areas adjacent to
commercial airports are unguarded. Simply put, during takeoff and landing,
airliners are sitting ducks for anyone able to get close to the airport with
a functioning surface-to-air missile.
To defend against the missile threat would be a major challenge. Only two
methods are possible. First, civilian aircraft could be equipped with the
same missile detectors, flares, infrared jammers and other countermeasures
as military aircraft. This likely would cost billions of dollars, unbearable
for an airline industry already reeling from the aftereffects of the recent
terror attacks - unless the federal government footed the bill.
Second, we could establish large exclusion zones around airports to prevent
anyone on the ground from getting a shot while the plane remained within
range below about 15,000 feet. However, this would be unfeasible at airports
located in densely populated areas, such as those in New York, Los Angeles
and Washington.
To those cognizant of the missile threat during the past 15 years, it has
been a pleasant surprise that few civilian airliners have been shot down by
terrorists. Experts traditionally have explained our good fortune by saying
that terrorists do not seek to kill large numbers of civilians, which would
serve no political purpose. In the wake of Sept. 11, however, that
reassuring assumption must be reassessed.
Alan J. Kuperman, a visiting scholar at the University of Southern
California's Center for International Studies, is the author of a 1999
Political Science Quarterly analysis of the Stinger missile and U.S.
intervention in Afghanistan.
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From: "Ivo Skoric" <ivo@reporters.net>
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2001 13:57:13 -0500
Subject: Just unjust
The victorious Northern Alliance conquered Afghanistan: Herat,
Kandahar, Mazar-i-sharif, Kabul - all key Afghan cities are now
more or less under their control. So, they can now proceed with the
favorite pastime of the Afghan warring factions: punishing the
enemy. Northern Alliance commander Dostun, reportedly, likes to
tie them for the tank tracks and then drive the tank around, until
they are certifiably grinded. Next: bombing Afghanistan to get rid of
Northern Alliance.
Taliban are in 'tactical retreat' as their one-eyed leader Mullah
Omar says, still bent on the destruction of the US, Allah willing.
This of course is just a double-speak for losing the war. OBL is
nowhere to be found, however. And the world anxiously awaits his
next video-letter. Although, this may be more difficult to deliver now
- since the US bombed Al Jazeera's Kabul satellite uplink station,
asuring the CNN's lasting world's supremacy as the news provider.
Meanwhile the Dept. of State provided INS with a list of Muslim
countries from which males of fighting age should be put under
scrutiny - whether they are trying to get to the US, or are already in
the US. Nationalist profiling? And the president signed an executive
order that, if read between the lines, says the following:
Any non-American citizen who George Bush personally doesn't like
from time to time can be 'determined' a terrorist, and thus subject
to arrest, indefinite detention and a military court trial, without a
right to appeal. Of course, this applies only if it is in the interest of
the United States. I.e. those like Dostun, will not be determined
terrorists right now, because they are allies of the U.S. in the
current war. But this may change in the future, of course, subject
to king W.'s disposition. Nice work on making the US look really
unfriendly to new immigrants - and that after more than two
centuries of inviting them over. Of course, the new executive order
was unwelcomed by practically the entire liberal America, human
rights groups, and even some conservative columnists...
ivo
>From LCHR:
"The way I read this, when the president points a finger at someone
and says he is a 'terrorist,' that person goes before a military
commission and Donald Rumsfeld sets the rules," said Elisa
Massamino of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. "This will
be seen as a kangaroo court. We are struggling with international
opinion to say this is a just war, and this has a great potential to
backfire against us."
>From AI:
Amnesty International is particularly concerned that the Military
Order:
- is discriminatory by affording foreign nationals a lower standard
of justice than US nationals;
- gives unfettered and unchallengeable discretionary power to the
executive to decide who will be prosecuted and under what rules,
as well as to review convictions and sentences. This is
inconsistent with the principle of the separation of the executive
and the judiciary;
- expressly bypasses the normal principles of law and rules of
evidence applied in the trials of people charged with criminal
offences in the US courts;
- provides no right of appeal against conviction or sentence to a
higher court, or access to redress for any human rights violations
that may occur during arrest, detention or prosecution;
Even Will Safire attacked the measure! ->
<underline><color><param>0000,8000,0000</param>http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/15/opinion/15SAFI.html
No longer does the judicial branch and an independent jury stand
between the government and the accused. In lieu of those checks
and balances central to our legal system, non-citizens face
an executive that is now investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury
and jailer or executioner. In an Orwellian twist, Bush's order
calls this Soviet-style abomination "a full and fair trial."
<underline><color><param>0000,8000,0000</param>http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/national/14DETA.html
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23716-
2001Nov13.html
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/11/13/inv.military.trials/index.html
http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/1113-
184.html
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Military Order on Detention, Treatment of Non-Citizens
U.S. Newswire
13 Nov 19:13
White House Military Order On Detention, Treatment and Trial Of
Certain Non-Citizens In The War Against Terrorism
To: National Desk
Contact: White House Press Office, 202-456-2580
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following was
released today by the White House:
MILITARY ORDER: DETENTION, TREATMENT, AND TRIAL OF CERTAIN
NON-CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution
and the laws of the United States of America, including the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public
Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10,
United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Findings.
(a) International terrorists, including members of al Qaida,
have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military
personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within
the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed
conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.
(b) In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism,
including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the
headquarters of the United States Department of Defense in the
national capital region, on the World Trade Center in New York, and
on civilian aircraft such as in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a
national emergency on September 14, 2001 (Proc. 7463, Declaration
of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks).
(c) Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in
international terrorism possess both the capability and the
intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United
States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths,
mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place
at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
Government.
(d) The ability of the United States to protect the United
States and its citizens, and to help its allies and other
cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens, from
such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon
using the United States Armed Forces to identify terrorists and
those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to
eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks.
(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the
effective conduct of military operations and prevention of
terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this
order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried,
to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable
laws by military tribunals.
(f) Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the
nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by
and under this order, I find consistent with section 836 of title
10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in
military commissions under this order the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts.
(g) Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths,
injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential
acts of terrorism against the United States, and the probability
that such acts will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary
emergency exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency
constitutes an urgent and compelling govern-ment interest, and that
issuance of this order is necessary to meet the
emergency.
Sec. 2. Definition and Policy.
(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom
I determine from time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the
relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit,
acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor,
that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim
to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy,
or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described
in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of
this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such
individual be subject to this order.
(b) It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of
Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any
individual subject to this order is detained in accordance with
section 3, and, if the individual is to be tried, that such
individual is tried only in accordance with section 4.
(c) It is further the policy of the United States that any
individual subject to this order who is not already under the
control of the Secretary of Defense but who is under the control of
any other officer or agent of the United States or any State shall,
upon delivery of a copy of such written determination to such
officer or agent, forthwith be placed under the control of the
Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 3. Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense. Any
individual subject to this order shall be --
(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the
Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States;
(b) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on
race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria;
(c) afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing,
and medical treatment;
(d) allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the
requirements of such detention; and
(e) detained in accordance with such other conditions as the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
Sec. 4. Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials
of Individuals Subject to this Order.
(a) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be
tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by
military commission that such individual is alleged to have
committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties
provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or
death.
(b) As a military function and in light of the findings in
section 1, including subsection (f) thereof, the Secretary of
Defense shall issue such orders and regulations, including orders
for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be
necessary to carry out subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Orders and regulations issued under subsection (b) of this
section shall include, but not be limited to, rules for the conduct
of the proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial,
trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of
process, and qualifications of attorneys, which shall at a minimum
provide for --
(1) military commissions to sit at any time and any place,
consistent with such guidance regarding time and place as the
Secretary of Defense may provide;
(2) a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting
as the triers of both fact and law;
(3) admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the
presiding officer of the military commission (or instead, if any
other member of the commission so requests at the time the
presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the
commission rendered at that time by a majority of the commission),
have probative value to a reasonable person;
(4) in a manner consistent with the protection of information
classified or classifiable under Executive Order 12958 of April 17,
1995, as amended, or any successor Executive Order, protected by
statute or rule from unauthorized disclosure, or otherwise
protected by law, (A) the handling of, admission into evidence of,
and access to materials and information, and (B) the conduct,
closure of, and access to proceedings;
(5) conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys
designated by the Secretary of Defense and conduct of the defense
by attorneys for the individual subject to this order;
(6) conviction only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a
majority being present;
(7) sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a
majority being present; and
(8) submission of the record of the trial, including any
conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by me or by
the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for that
purpose.
Sec. 5. Obligation of Other Agencies to Assist the Secretary of
Defense.
Departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United
States shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, provide to
the Secretary of Defense such assistance as he may request to
implement this order.
Sec. 6. Additional Authorities of the Secretary of Defense.
(a) As a military function and in light of the findings in
section 1, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out any of the provisions
of this order.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may perform any of his functions or
duties, and may exercise any of the powers provided to him under
this order (other than under section 4(c)(8) hereof) in accordance
with section 113(d) of title 10, United States Code.
Sec. 7. Relationship to Other Law and Forums.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to --
(1) authorize the disclosure of state secrets to any person not
otherwise authorized to have access to them;
(2) limit the authority of the President as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces or the power of the President to grant
reprieves and pardons; or
(3) limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of Defense, any
military commander, or any other officer or agent of the United
States or of any State to detain or try any person who is not an
individual subject to this order.
(b) With respect to any individual subject to this order --
(1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to offenses by the individual; and
(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy or proceeding sought on the individuals behalf, in (i)
any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any
court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.
(c) This order is not intended to and does not create any right,
benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
law or equity by any party, against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.
(d) For purposes of this order, the term "State" includes any
State, district, territory, or possession of the United States.
(e) I reserve the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense,
at any time hereafter, to transfer to a governmental authority
control of any individual subject to this order. Nothing in this
order shall be construed to limit the authority of any such
governmental authority to prosecute any individual for whom control
is transferred.
Sec. 8. Publication.
This order shall be published in the Federal Register.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 13, 2001.
Copyright 2001, U.S. Newswire
Ivo Skoric
1773 Lexington Ave
New York NY 10029
212.369.9197
ivo@balkansnet.org
http://balkansnet.org
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From: "Ivo Skoric" <ivo@reporters.net>
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2001 13:54:29 -0500
Subject: HirsonWexlerPerl Immigration Law News Flash!
More on decreasing liberties of foreign nationals in the US - this
may well end the image of the US as the most popular destination
for immigrants. Well, there are other places on the planet, aren't
there?
This law applies to males of fighting age from Muslim countries (the
definition that seems to be translated from the Serbian army
practice in Bosnia). Note: Bosnians are _NOT_ on the list. Note
#2: INS is really short on roaming agents so those checks within
the US do not seem like such a big and overwhelimg threat.
ivo
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
HirsonWexlerPerl
Attorneys at Law
Practice Limited to Immigration & Naturalization Law
Immigration Legal Update
www.hirson.com
November 14, 2001
The U.S. Department of State Introduces A New Security Hold for Certain
Arabic and Muslim Men.
The U.S. Department of State has announced that it will add
an additional 20 day waiting period to the processing of nonimmigrant
visa applications of men between the ages of 16 and 45 from certain
Arabic and Muslim countries. This new security hold will allow the
Department of State to do the following: cross check applicants' names
with the FBI's terrorism databases; require applicants to complete a new
background questionnaire that will reveal any previous military service,
previous weapons training, previous travels, and previously held
passports.
The new security hold applies to more Arabic and Muslim
countries than those currently listed as countries which sponsor or
support terrorist activities. The countries that are subject include:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,
the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
What Foreign Nationals Should Expect While Traveling
Within the United States.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign nationals have expected
increased scrutiny when entering the United States and now should expect
increased scrutiny when traveling within the United States. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") is now enforcing a little
known provision of the United States immigration laws found under
Section 264 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires all
foreign nationals over the age of eighteen to carry documentation
evidencing both their identity and immigration status "at all times". A
foreign national who fails to comply with this regulation can be guilty
of a misdemeanor and may face fines and even jail time.
Foreign nationals should carry their passports or a government issued
identification document to establish their identity. In addition,
foreign nationals must carry documentation to establish their
immigration status. Examples of documentation establishing immigration
status include:
Foreign Nationals in Temporary or Nonimmigrant Visa Status.
These foreign nationals must carry the notice of approval and I-94
Record. Students should also carry their I-20 forms.
Nonimmigrants who are employed in the United States should carry
additional documentation verifying that their current employment is
authorized and consistent with their visa status (company issued
identification, recent payroll check stubs, business cards, and a letter
from the employer stating the foreign national's current position.)
Applicants for Permanent Residence whose temporary visa
status have expired should carry the INS-issued receipt notice
evidencing their filing of Form I-485 and, if employed in the U.S.,
their Employment Authorization Document ("EAD card").
Permanent Residents should carry their alien registration
cards or their passports, which must contain a stamp verifying status as
a permanent resident.
Other types of Documentation which evidence Immigration Status may
include, but are not limited to: I-95, Crewmen's Landing Permit; I-184,
Alien Crewman Landing Permit and Identification Card; I-185, Nonresident
Alien Canadian Border Crossing Card; DSP-150 (effective 10/01/01,
replaces Form I-186) Nonresident Alien Mexican Border Crossing Card;
I-688, Temporary Resident Card.
Other legislation to watch for:
Attorney General John Mr. Ashcroft has submitted an INS reorganization
plan to the White House's Office of Management and Budget. The plan
separates the INS' immigration-services function from its enforcement
function. Other efforts under way on Capitol Hill are more radical,
including splitting the INS into two separate agencies.
For further questions about these, or any other U.S. Immigration topics,
please feel free to contact our New York office and speak with one of
our attorneys at (212) 509-4921 or e-mail us at hirson-ny@hirson.com
New York, NY, hirson-ny@hirson.com; Newport Beach, hirson@hirson.com;
Los Angeles, hirson-la@hirson.com; San Diego, CA, hirson-sd@hirson.com;
Wilton, CT, hirson-ct@hirson.com; Phoenix, AZ, hirson-az@hirson.com; Las
Vegas, NV, hirson-lv@hirson.com; Toronto, Canada,
hirson-toronto@hirson.com
Web Based Case Tracker Capability
CONTACT US FOR ALL OF YOUR U.S. AND CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LAW
REQUIREMENTS
If you wish to be removed from our Immigration Law News Flash! e-mail
list, please contact rita@hirson.com
Ivo Skoric
1773 Lexington Ave
New York NY 10029
212.369.9197
ivo@balkansnet.org
http://balkansnet.org
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