[Nettime-bold] Re: <nettime> jya on mil disnfo

["Katerina" <knd@hol.gr>]

Does any of you participants know of any Internet databases on Personal
Homepages? I am trying to locate different personal homepages for a research
I have to complete as a task for the University. I have come across some on
a random search basis, but I was wondering if you know of any other
resources for personal homepages. What I mean by personal homepages is
attempts by their creators to present themselves and their personal identity
on the space of a webpage.
Thank you all in advance,
Dionysis Panou

----- Original Message -----
From: "nettime's_roving_reporter" <nettime@bbs.thing.net>
To: <nettime-l@bbs.thing.net>
Sent: Monday, April 08, 2002 8:55 AM
Subject: <nettime> jya on mil disnfo


>
>      [via <tbyfield@panix.com>]
>
> To: cypherpunks@lne.com
>      Subject: CDR: Re: mil disinfo on cryptome
>           From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
>                x2
>
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> To: cypherpunks@lne.com
> Subject: CDR: Re: mil disinfo on cryptome
> From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
> Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2002 16:17:11 -0800
>
> It is likely that Cryptome and the Net will be used to spread
> disinfo, as with predecessor means of information spread.
> What better way to contaminate citizen tools than to
> try to make them unreliable compared to official sources.
> Dotty Rumsfeld is certainly practicing that with relish, rather
> being used for that purpose by smarter people who used
> Reagan and other big-smile dotters similarly.
>
> Even without disinfo, sources of information of all kinds
> need a beady eye and skeptical mind. One of a series
> we're assembling is on protection from explosives now
> that digital terrorism has been diminished by 9/11 and
> attention has returned to physical security of the homeland.
>
> We've looked at some of the homeland security opportunism
> of professionals in the built environment field -- engineers,
> architects, builders, real estate promoters, banks, insurance --
> and see that they are advocating restriction of information
> on protective measures to professionals and those entrusted
> to camouflage scary threats from the citizenry reassure
> against panic. This smells of protection racket which parallels
> the early argument for restricting crypto to specialists and
> hiding Net security threats from trusting users.
>
> Here's a link to a group of building associations set
> up in March to aid homeland security:
>
>   http://www.tisp.org/
>
> Here's a link to architects promotion of work
> on homeland security:
>
>   http://www.aia.org/security/
>
> However, some more seasoned parties say that it's time
> to share sensitive technology for protecting the physical
> infrastructure more broadly as the homeland comes under
> increasing threat. That military-grade protective measures
> need to be more widely known and incorporated into
> building codes and construction practices. It is expected
> that this could take up to 10 years to become effective,
> to rewrite codes, to retrain current professionals, to blend
> into professional students' curricula, to adjust budgets for
> safer construction.
>
> Blast Mitigation for Structures (1999)
>
>   http://cryptome.org/bmfs99.htm
>
> Protecting Buildings From Bomb Damage (1995)
>
>   http://cryptome.org/pbfbd95.htm
>
> So what is to be done in the meantime? We think more information
> on self-protection needs to be disseminated, following the
> crypto model, to liberate classified and restricted documents
> and foster development of practices which do not require
> state-licensed professionals to implement.
>
> We expect there will be bitching about putting dangerous
> information on the Net for amateurs to blow up themselves
> and neighbors, and rightly so, for it is needed to offset the
> soothing and deliberately scary disinfo associated with
> relying upon trusted parties who never quite live up to
> their promises to protect and hinder access to means
> of self-protection.
>
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> To: cypherpunks@lne.com
> Subject: CDR: RE: mil disinfo on cryptome
> From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
> Date: Sat, 06 Apr 2002 21:22:35 -0800
>
> Disinfo is a complicated topic, and it's not easy to know
> for sure when it is occurring; if it was easy to tell then
> it wouldn't be very effective disinfo.
>
> For all its admirable reputation RAND continues to
> be a forum for disinformation of high quality. This
> follows from its classified work and the cross-
> contamination of its unclassified output. But this
> is true of all persons and institutions which provide
> both classified and unclassified products.
>
> For a goodly part of the reputation of such actors
> is derived from their classified work and the imputation
> of value of unclassified stuff due to access to classified
> information.
>
> Contrarily, one can argue, that anybody who has
> access to classified material cannot be trusted for
> their unclassified work.
>
> David Kahn made such an argument when he refused
> to sign a confidentiality agreement for NSA  in order
> to have access to classified archives. According to Kahn
> he was the first to refuse that faustian arrangement
> (pun intended, Faustine). Instead he sat at a desk
> outside the classified archives and worked only
> with material that did not require an NDA, doing so,
> he said, in order to help assure reader trust of his
> work.
>
> Kahn's right, and admirably so, for once you get access
> to classified material you  are doomed to be distrusted
> outside the secret world. Too much lying has been done
> by those who have access for anybody with access
> to ever be trusted, which, no doubt, is the intention of
> those who believe in privileged information. You are
> either in or out, no mercy from either side, as Faust
> knew.
>
> To be blunt, no official can be trusted, period, nor can
> any of their contractors who have agreed to abide
> the official rules. Which, as oft stated here, includes
> all state-empowered and privilieged professionals,
> from architects to lawyers to doctors to priests to
> acupuncturists, and not least, journalists who may
> pretend to authorize themselves but behave in
> accord with the rules of their privileged publishers.
>
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> Date: Sun, 07 Apr 2002 19:31:01 -0700
> To: cypherpunks@lne.com
> From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
> Subject:  RE: mil disinfo on cryptome
>
> The Pentagon Papers was a classic disinfo operation
> confected by RAND. The NYT and Ellsberg will never
> let us forget their valor, credible only for those who abide
> a fairly narrow belief system, highly elitist and condescending
> toward the populace.
>
> Then there's Bill Sheehan's tragic price to remind what can
> go wrong with career-enhancing, arranged revelations when
> a beneficiary attempts to go beyond a neat, heavily promoted
> formulation oh so satisfying to those who arranged the op.
>
> Faustine, you lose your cool whenever established methodologies
> for handling information and belief about it are challenged, as
> if your faith in the way things are and should be is being
> unduly questioned.
>
> Reputation is a trap not an accomplishment, and you appear
> to have been ensnared by desire to be knowledgeable in a
> particularly sanctioned way. All those citations, all that
> homework, cannot beefup what's missing from your own
> original contribution. Abundant citing of authority, beware
> what it tells about your vacuity.
>
> Losing your cool, though, is swell, for it is a sign of advancement
> over over over-false-confidence and the yearning to have gotten
> matters of the world right once and for all. Nothing more crippling
> than a desire to be free of doubt, but that desire is a salient
> characteristic of those who are recruited into privileged circles:
> a promise of access to privileged information and behavior is
> the bait, the trap is never being able to talk about how sleight
> the secrets are, and how shitty the insiders treat one another,
> to anyone outside the magic circle. All secret societies fear
> disclosure of their vacuity, that's why secrets are invaluable.
>
> Just don't go there is the best advice, and a way to guard
> against that is to show characteristics that assure you will
> never be invited, that you can't keep secrets, not even
> false ones.
>
> Desire to part of an coseted elite is sucker's candy. The
> desire to reputable a pale shroud over insecurity and need
>
> for backing of reputable authority. That's why reputable people
> and forums are erected and selected for leaking worthless
> shit as if shinola.
>
> RAND didn't invent this hagiography of burnished research
> but it is a stellar producer of such icons and has an admirable
> network of distribution. You will hear what is intllectually
> corrupting about this orchestrated warped and incomplete
> information about world affairs when you talk to a RAND
> insider who has been dumped for stepping out of line, that
> is putting one's ideas and product outside the fearsome
> editorial board of the hallowed institution, as with RAND
> so with the hagiography of the New York Times, Washinton
> Post and others of the centrist compulsion.
>
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